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ABSTRACT 
NATO and European Security: A Case Study of Bosnian and 
Kosovo Crises 
The political history of Europe for the last two centuries may 
be viewed, at least in part, as a continual process of alliance 
formation and dissolution as the great powers and their smaller 
consorts sought the elusive goals of security and aggrandizement. If 
in 1812 Britain, Prussia and Russia could combine to defeat ihe 
Imperial Napoleon, why in 1949 should not Britain, France and 
later West Germany join to oppose the more contemporary threat of 
Soviet expansionism? True, crucial to the new pact, was the United 
States, culturally if not geographically European, but the method 
remained the same: to ally in order to meet a common enemy. 
An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the bond 
between the United States and its European allies since the 
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1949. 
This Thesis "NATO and European Security : A Case Study of 
Bosnian and Kosovo Crises" consists of five chapters and select 
bibliography. 
The first chapter deals with the origin and historical 
development of NATO. 
For a short period after 1945 the Americans talked about 
rolling back the frontiers of Communism, but any attempt to do this 
would provoke a World War III, because Russians regarded control 
of Eastern Europe as essential to their security. The mission was 
clearcut in Greece. To the American planners of 1947, World 
Communism had chosen Greece as its target, with Greek 
communists as the agent. Hence the United States had undertaken 
to arm, train, and supply a successful Greek resistance to 
communist subversion. In March 1947 the United States announced 
that instead of rolling back Communism it would not allow the 
Soviet Union to control areas other than those they held in 1947. 
The American followed up this statement with attempts to form 
alliance system which would effectively surround the Soviet Union. 
The most important of these alliances was the formation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); formed in April 1949. 
The second chapter deals with NATO and European Security, 
when Soviet power collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, and 
intense debate developed over the roles Europe's security 
institutions should play in the new era. Some, led by Moscow, 
favored abolishing both the Warsaw Pact and NATO and giving 
primacy to a pan - European collective security organization, 
perhaps in the form of a strengthened Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Others, led by Paris, believed that NATO 
was still needed, but that primacy should be given to European 
institutions such as the Western European Unions and the European 
Community (now European Union). Still others, led by Washington 
and London, believed that direct American engagement in European 
security affairs was still indispensable and that NATO, which 
provided the organizational framework for American engagement in 
Europe, was indispensable as well. According to this line of 
thinking, NATO needed to be preserved, reformulated, and made 
the centerpiece of Europe's new security architecture. American 
policy - makers wanted NATO to serve both as framework for 
European security and as' a vehicle for supporting US strategy in 
the rest of the world. 
The NATO Summit held in Madrid on July, 1997, was lo 
invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary any to join the 
alliance by 1999. 
The NATO summit held in Prague on November 2002, NATO 
took the historic step of inviting seven Central and East European 
States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania 
and Bulgaria to join NATO, increasing the number of NATO's 
member states from 19 to 26 countries. 
The third chapter deals with role of NATO in Bosnian crisis. 
The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed part of the 
Turkish (Ottoman) Empire for almost 400 years. Following the 
declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June, 
1991. On 1** March, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the 
republic 's independence but Serb-dominated territories in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina declared their intent to remain within the 
Yugoslav federation, then war broke out in Bosnia. 
NATO foreign ministers, meeting in June 1992, approved for 
the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside the 
territory of the alliance states. On 12 April 1993, NATO began 
enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a 
further precedent, member states operating in the NATO framework 
had been providing protective air cover for UNPROFOR troops 
operating on the ground to deter attacks against the 'safe areas ' 
established by the Security Council, namely Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, 
Gorazde. Zepa. 
The Serbs provoked the Western allies on August 28,1995, by 
firing a shell into a Sarajevo market, killing 38 civilians and 
triggering NATO's air strikes. Then NATO conducted the largest 
combat operation in its history. American, French, British, Italian, 
Dutch, Spanish and Turkish warplanes flew 500 missions from 
111 
bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. Even as the 
diplomats put the final touches on their agreement to divide Bosnia 
and Herzegovina into "two enti t ies", 49% of Bosnia to go to the 
Serbs and 5 1 % to go to Muslim-Croat Federation, NATO warplanes 
were blasting Serbian military targets throughout Bosnia for the 
second straight week. By Friday, (September 11 , 1995), when the 
diplomats met in Geneva, NATO airforces had flown more than 2000 
sorties. 
The Dayton Accord, which ended the war was signed on 
December 14, 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The forth chapter deals with role of NATO in Kosovo crisis, 
Kosovo was the autonomous province of Serbia. In 1974, the Kosovo 
Albanians had been given autonomy by Tito, to help protect their 
tradition and culture. On July 5, 1990, when the Serbian Parliament 
took over the functions of the Assembly and the government of 
Kosovo, thereby withdrawing from the province the autonomy it was 
granted by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974. 
The North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to 
independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable 
status quo. In mid-1998, NATO conducted a number of military 
exercises in Albania, in conjunction with the Albanian armed 
forces, in an attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian 
Government to end military action in Kosovo. 
On March 24, 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces launched cruise 
missiles and bombs at targets throughout the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), plunging America into a military conflict thai 
President Clinton said was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and 
bring stability to Eastern Europe". On June 10, 1999 , UNSC 
Resolution 1244 set the basis for ending air campaign. The air 
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operation was suspended by Secretary - General Javier Solana of 
NATO on June 10, 1999, after Milosevic had accepted the 
prescribed conditions and was formally ended on June 20, 1999, 
consequent to the withdrawal of all Serb military, special-police 
and para-military forces from Kosovo. 
The fifth chapter, the concluding section deals with the 
distinctive aspects of NATO and European Security and its future 
course of action. The larger issue for NATO is how to deal with 
such security threats far from its traditional sphere of operation. 
The alliance last revised its strategic concept in 1991, shifting from 
a policy of static defence against the Soviet Union to a regional -
oriented one reflecting the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact. 
When NATO intervened in Bosnia that involvement at least had the 
formal sanction of the U.N. Security Council and the Dayton Peace 
Accord signed by all parties involved in the conflict. In the Kosovo 
crisis, it had no mandate from the U.N. Security Council for acting 
against Yugoslavia. Its indulgence in military muscle flexing was 
quite contrary to the wishes of the Security Council which in its 
resolution 1199 on Kosovo had refrained from prescribing use of 
force to achieve the purpose of the resolution. But Washington and 
NATO had sidelined the U.N., thus signalling the formal transition 
of NATO from an organisation committed to mutual defence to that 
of international policemen. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the United States of America and its 
European allies is one of the few in the world today that has 
remained totally unaffected by the end of the World War. 
The world war strategy demanded the United States to look for 
friends and allies in Europe to stop the spread of communism by ihe 
Soviet Union. The U.S. was guided by its global policy of containing 
international communism. 
American military involvement in Europe provided regional 
security and economic stability in the region. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in this post Cold War era the U.S. now has further 
strengthened its position in Europe and the world has seen ihe 
eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). In 1999, the former Warsaw Pact members states Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary became NATO's "position" and 
NATO's "territory" advanced 800 kilometers eastward all at once. 
In November 2002, it took the historic step of inviting seven more 
central and Eastern European States, increasing the number of 
NATO's member states from 19 to 26 nations. 
The present study attempts to highlight the roles of the U.S. 
and its European allies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The special focus is on the issues of the enlargement of NATO, the 
European security, the roles of NATO in Bosnian and Kosovo 
crises, which have involved the United States of America and its 
European all ies. The study is divided into four chapters, each 
dealing with a specific issue. 
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The first chapter endeavours to present the historical 
development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). How 
who America interested to form military alliance with European 
countries"? It reveals that the U.S. interests in the region were 
largely dictated by its own security and of course, to maintain 
security and stability for the free nations of the European 
democratic camp. The U.S. involvement in the affairs of the 
European region also strengthened its global strategy. The end of 
the Cold War has certainly reduced the possibility of nuclear 
holocaust, but the fear of nuclear war still haunts the minds of the 
States. The second chapter surveys the security cooperation in 
Europe in the post Soviet era, the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and 
the unification of Germany, the expansion of NATO and shows that 
the American engagement in European security affairs is still 
indispensable and that NATO which provides the organizational 
framework for American engagement in Europe, is indispensable as 
well. 
NATO needs to be preserved, reformulated, and made the 
centerpiece of Europe's new security architecture. But the eastward 
expansion of NATO could lead to tensions and Cold War. The 
genuine fear of Russia is that by expansion of NATO upto its 
borders, NATO would become the supreme military of the West. The 
third chapter attempts to examine the role of NATO in Bosnian 
Crisis. NATO foreign ministers, meeting in June, 1992, approved 
for the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside 
the territory of the alliance states. In June 1992, NATO ships 
belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force in the 
Mediterranean, assisted by NATO maritime Patrol Aircraft, began 
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m onitoring operations in the Adriatic Sea. On 12 April 1993, NATO 
began enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
A demilitarized zone had been established on Mt. Igman in 
August, 1993, following an ultimatum, from NATO to the Bosnian 
Serbs to vrithdraw their forces from Mt. Igman. The forth chapter 
focusssed on role of NATO in Kosovo crisis. On April 30, 1998, the 
North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to independence for 
Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status quo. It 
rejected all use of violence either by state security forces to 
suppress political dissent or by separatist groups to seek political 
change. 
In mid - 1999, NATO conducted a number of military exercises in 
Albania, in conjuction with the Albanian armed forces, in an 
attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian Government to end 
military action in Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, four German 
Tornado fighter - bombers took off from a NATO base and 
participated in the first wave of air strikes against Serb military 
targets in Kosovo. Fifteen German aircraft and hundreds of support 
troops were engaged in NATO's Operation Allied Force for the next 
78 days. On June 10, 1999, UNSC Resolution 1244 set the basis for 
ending air campaign. The air operation was suspended by Secretary 
General Javier Solana of NATO on June 10, 1999, after Milosevic 
had accepted the prescribed conditions and was formally ended on 
June 20, 1999, after the withdrawal of all Serb military, special -
police and para - military forces from Kosovo. 
The fifth Chapter, the concluding section analyses the distinctive 
aspects of NATO and European Security and its future development. 
The method of study has been historical, descriptive and 
analytical. All source material is library based. Most of the library 
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data came from libraries in India especially Maulana Azad Library 
AMU, Aligarh, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Insti tute for Defence 
Studies and Analysis (New Delhi). The basis of the present study 
have been various documents, official and authoritative texts on the 
subject. Journals, articles, newspapers reports and comments, 
NATO's documents and so on. The present work attempts and so on. 
The present work attempts to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the issues concerning the role of NATO in 
European security, peace and stability in Europe. 
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CHAPTER- 1 
The Origin and Historical Development of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
1. American Par t ic ipat ion in the Al l iance . 
World War II left Europe economically enfeebled. The 
industrial infrastructure of most countries had been virtually 
destroyed. In the winter of 1945-6 there was famine in parts of 
Germany; bread rationing was introduced in France (a major 
agricultural country) and was fightened up again in Britain. Only 
American aid could ameliorate Europe's short-term problems and 
lay the foundations for long-term recovery. 
Although the USA, with its role in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, the Pacific, China and the Philippines had become a 
major world power long before World War II, the feeling persisted 
in both public and political opinion that it was not and should not 
become one. Sending forces to Europe in World War I was not seen 
as a precedent but as an isolated incident. Doing the same in World 
War II was seen in the same way by many sectors of influential 
opinion which, at the end of the war, sought nothing but a return to 
the status quo ante. This issue is often understood as American 
' isolationism' but that is largely a misnomer and misperception. The 
USA has been isolationist at least since the promulgation of the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1823 which attempted to shut the European 
powers out of the Americas, and thus retain the western hemisphere 
as an arena of US power and influence. Indeed, even before that, 
the United States had taken sides in the great European wars from 
the French revolution through to 1815 and the final defeat of the 
Emperor Napoleon.' The used of alliances has unquestionably been 
a major element in the traditional international politics of Europe. 
Whenever one state has threatened to dominated Europe, others 
have joined together to meet that threat. The political history of 
Europe for the last two centuries may be viewed, at least in part, as 
a continual process of alliance formation and dissolution as the 
great powers and their smaller consorts sought the elusive goals of 
security and aggrandizement. If in 1812 Britain, Prussia and Russia 
could combine to defeat the imperial Napoleon, why in 1949 should 
not Britain, France and later West Germany join to oppose the more 
contemporary threat of Soviet expansionism? True, crucial to the 
new pact, was the United States, culturally if not geographically 
European, but the method remained the same: to ally in order to 
meet a common enemy. President Woodrow Wilson's ill-fated 
attempt to reorient American foreign policy around the principle 
of "Collective security" is too well known to require elaboration 
here. Senate rejection of the League of Nations graphically -
reaffirmed American isolationist attitude toward Europe. But it is 
significant that in the World War 11 the United States believed that 
the greatest threat to its own security emanated from Europe; hence 
American policy makers consistently gave a higher priority to the 
European theater of War than they did to the Pacific theater. ' 
Western Europe in the immediate postwar period, denuded of 
military strength following the rapid allied demobilization, was also 
economically and politically prostrate. It became clear that it was 
incapable of reviving itself unassisted, certainly not within an 
acceptable period of time. In this condition Europe faced the 
largely undemobilized and massive military strength of the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union was imbued with an ideological urge and 
supported by propaganda forms almost stridently hostile to Western 
concepts and institutions of representative government or any loriii 
of collaboration in the political and economic recovery of Western 
Europe / Russia and America emerged from World II; They had 
different ways of life and different views of the World. The year 
after 1945 the Americans talked about 'rolling - back' the frontiers 
of Communism which meant a threat to remove the Communisl 
governments which ruled in Eastern Europe. However, this talk 
soon stopped as it was obvious that any attempt to do this would 
provoke a world war because the Russains regarded control of 
Eastern Europe as essential to their security. So in March 1947, the 
United States announded that instead of rolling - back Communism 
it would contain it. The containment of Communism meant that the 
United States would not allow the Soviet Union to control areas 
other than those they held in 1947.* 
By 1947 the Monroe Doctrine had been superseded by the 
Truman Doctrine's principles of containment as the guiding rule of 
America's relationship to Europe.* The mission was clearcut in 
Greece. To the American planners of 1947, World Communism had 
chosen Greece as its target, with Greek communists as the agent. 
Hence the United States had undertaken to arm, train, and supply a 
successful Greek resistance to Communist subversion. The absence 
of a requirement for official Greek reciprocity further simplified the 
situation. The aid itself would be increasingly military. The $ 300 
million allotted for the economic rehabilitation of Greece was 
quickly shifted to the hard - pressed Greek army, barely able lo 
hold its own against the querrila forces. Such was the situation 
when the first U.S. supplies reached Greece in the Summer ol 
1947.^ The threat was that the fabric of the West European 
economies and societies would come apart. There was an urgent 
need for a huge increase in the flow of imports to Europe to be paid 
in Dollars thai would supply the working capital . Unless the 
economies could be made to function again, a Communist takeover 
could occur without resort to external invasion or internal 
subversion, a strong economy would give strength to those who 
would defend themselves against the Communist alternatives." The 
Truman Doctrine set in motion a massive foreign aid programme in 
Europe. President Harry S. Truma, for whom the doctrine was 
named, stated the reasons clearly in his message to Congress on 12" 
March 1947: 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures. 
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic 
and financial aid which essential to economic stability and orderly 
political processes. 
The Marshall Plan projected at the Harvard Commencement o( 
5" June 1947, provided another major influence on the future 
military assistance programme. It stressed the importance of 
Europeans helping themselves through expanding their own 
resources and cooperating with their neighbors as a prerequisite for 
American help. The Marshall, Plan, then, would not only promote 
greater efficiency in the use of funds but also accelerate the 
restoration of a United Europe in close relationship with the United 
States ' . So under French and British leadership, the countries of 
Western Europe responded immediately to this lifeline. The 
'Marshal Plan' officially came to an end in 1951'" . 
It was in this atmosphere that, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin, commented to Marshall that what was really needed 
to support the economic reconstruction of western Europe was a 
military all iance. Marshall agreed-there was, he said, 'no choice in 
ihe matter' - but he also said it was necessary for the Europeans to 
take the initiative. The first steps followed quickly. The British 
government agreed on Bevin's course, and in the first months of 
1848 a mutual defence treaty was negotiated between Britain, 
France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg-the Brussels 
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and 
Collective self-Defence. The heart of the treaty, not withstanding 
various commitments to raising living standards, common 
civilization and cultural exchanges, is Article IV which promises 
that if one party is attacked, the others will provide ' all the 
military and other aid and assistance in their power'. The European 
part of the groundwork for the future NATO had been la id" . 
Indirectly, of course, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
encouraged this sort of security relationship. More concretely, in 
March 1947 the British and French signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. 
The main potential threat noted at that time was Germany. The text 
of the treaty mentioned that the signing nations would protect one 
another from any threat, 'a rising from the adoption by Germany of a 
policy of aggression or from action by Germany designed to 
facilitate such a policy? A year later, in March 1948, the Dunkirk 
alliance was widened into the Brussels P a c t ' \ 
The Signing of the Brussels Pact constituted the first 
European pole of defence. The signatories were only five powers, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain and France put 
forward several objectives. In the face of Communist danger, 
England suggested that moral and spiritual forces determined to 
defend the Western system be organized with the support of the 
Americans and the dominions. The Communist threat which could 
endanger the European democratic sys tem' \ European security 
required U.S. participation to offset Soviet power NATO, we must 
keep in mind, was a European not an American product, having 
been based so closely upon the model provided by the Brussels 
Pact. American participation in the Alliance resulted inevitably in 
the Americanization of the pact - there was no gainsaying U.S. 
hegeniony'\ The constant diplomatic driving force behind the Ireuly 
came from Britain's great post war Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin. 
However, within the State Department and the Truman 
administration there were strong doubts and divisions for months 
about the wisdom or the necessity of an alliance with Europe. 
The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in the Inter-
Departmental Auditorium on Constitution Avenue in Washington on 
April 4, 1949, was a simple low - key businesslike affair. There 
were short speeches from each of the twelve foreign ministers from 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the UniUul 
states of America. The special applause for Ernest Bevin when lie 
lumbered up to the podium. President Truman delivered a brisk 
address declaring the hope that the treaty "would create a shield 
against aggression and fear of aggression - a bulwark - which will 
permit us to get on with the real business of government and 
society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all of 
our citizens"'*. 
2. Rationale and Objective In The Formation of NATO 
Britain, American and Russia had been allies in the Second 
World War. However, almost immediately after the war in Europe 
ended distrust grew between Russia and her other wartime allies. 
There were several complex reasons for this. It was, however a fad 
that after the war Russia directly or indirectly forced Eastern 
European countries to adopt Communist governments. As a result 
the Western European countries with America and Canada, came lo 
believe that their individual security was threatened by Russia. 
They considered that unless they did something about it, one 
country afl(M- another in Western Europe might be taken over by \\\v 
Russians. They best course they believed was to band together in 
the NATO alliance for collective protection. The United Stales 
acknowledged that its security was inextricably connected with 
developments on the European continent. It believed in the domino 
theory of Communism which stated that if one country falls to the 
Communism its neighbors might fall next. The domina theory partly 
provoked the formation of NATO. 
It was testimony to the clumsiness if not the wickedness of 
Soviet behaviour in the years immediately following the Second 
World - War that the security concerns of Moscow's east-while 
allies should have so quickly shifted from their fiercely anti-
German orientation to a primarily anti-Soviet one . " The relevant 
circumstances in which that event took place were these: 
1. The Red Army stood along a line in Eastern Europe "from 
Stettin [Szczecin] in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic". As 
a result, the Soviet Union had ultimate power with respect to 
the organization of government and society and the foreign 
policies of the countries to the east of that line. 
2. The countries of Western Europe were individually much 
weaker militarily than the Soviet Union and were divided 
among the traditional national sovereign states. The leaders 
of most of them acted as if they felt threatened, more or less 
acutely and directly depending on their individual situations, 
by the proximity of Soviet power and their weakness in the 
faced of it and as if they wanted a guarantee of their security 
by the only power able to provide it; the United States. 
3, The United States, whose leaders acted as if they believed 
that the expansion of Soviet power or influence westward of 
the line that divided Europe would be harmful to American 
interests, provided that guarantee to the West European 
countries in the form of the Atlantic al l iance. The guarantee 
included a declaratory commitment to and a substantial 
military presence in Western Europe and was proclaimed to 
be one manifestation among others of the U.S. Policy of 
"Containing" further Soviet expansion. NATO was 
constituted in accordance with the United Nations clause 
permitting regional organizations, but it was intended to 
provide the collective defence that was needed to meet a 
situation not envisaged by the drafters of the United Nations 
Charter just four years earlier. They had believed that the 
concept of collective security - backed up as necessary by 
an international army created by the Great Powers existing in 
a more or less harmonious alliance with each other and with 
the lesser states, could keep aggressors under control with 
moral persuasion at first and with force if necessary. 
Collective security, in other words was designed to preserve 
peace among the members of the United Nations. Escott 
Reid, for one, had written even before the San Franscisco 
Conference created the United Nations that if a Great Power 
should in future act in such a way as to convince the other 
great powers that it is determined to dominate the world by 
force, the only way to prevent a world war from breaking out 
will be for the other great powers to form immediately an 
alliance against that power and to declare that the moment it 
comits aggression they will wage total war against it . . . That 
declaration may bring the state which is planning aggression 
to its senses and so prevent the war from breaking out... 
Reid may have written this, but neither he nor anyone else 
had truly foreseen a situation in which the Soviet Union 
would threaten to turn itself into an aggressor and 
simultaneously tie up the United Nations with procedural 
tactics and the consistent use of its Veto. NATO came inlo 
existence in other words, because in 1949 the UN had 
already demonstrated that it was going to be completely 
unable to provide the collective security it was supposed to 
deliver and the collective security that the Western 
democracies so desperately wanted. Moreover, it had no 
capacity whatsoever to offer collective defence against what 
seemed to be and was a genuine threat from the Soviet Union. 
Collective defence, to state the obvious, was the coming 
together of like-minded states to protect the group against an 
outsider. To be sure, the move of the NATO founding 
members toward collective defence was for all practical 
purposes a recognition that collective security was an idea 
that had failed.'" In effect, NATO was to be prepared to 
engage in "enforcement measures" against a fellow UNSC 
member (or any other possible threat) - if such action proved 
necessary. By counter-balancing a potential threat from a 
fellow UNSC members themselves and, if possible, to 
ultimately bring UNSC members NATO was consequently 
intended to deter the possibility of conflict among the UNSC 
members into cooperation in case of conflict among regional 
powers, in accord with the original purpose of the UN 
charter. While NATO was primarily forged against the threat 
of any potential aggression, including that posed by UNSC 
members, it was secondarily formed for the pursuit of general 
UN goals. Put another way, behind-the scenes NATO 
supporters for the predominant powers in Western Europe, 
and for cooperation among these governments, would 
indirectly help to maintain stability and well-being 
throughout the globe in the process of re-equilibrating 
international society.^' The Atlantic all iance was the core 
organization of the Western security system. NATO was a 
partnership of free nations for the purposes of security, 
based on a common conviction of civility, human rights and 
the underlying principle of individual freedom. The 
overdoing objective of the alliance was the preservation of 
peace and freedom so that its members could perfect their 
societies. Theoretically, the alliance would operate against 
any external threat, in practice, the purposes of the alliance 
had been to guarantee the security of the West vis-k-vis the 
common threat from the East. 
The North Atlantic alliance was not limited purely to 
military matters. It combined collective defence with the readiness 
to enter into dialogue and practical co-operation with the East, 
interalia, in the field of arms control and disarment, in accordance 
with concept of promoting international stability and a meaningful 
state of peace . The Atlantic Alliance had two main functions. Its 
first function was to maintain adequate military strength and 
political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure 
and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should 
occur.. . the Allies would maintain as necessary, a suitable military 
capability to ensure the balance of forces, thereby creating a 
climate of stability, security and confidence. In this climate the 
Alliance could carry out its second function, to pursue the search 
for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the 
underlying political issues could be solved. Military security and a 
policy of detente were not contradictory but complementary. 
Collective defence was a stabilising factor in world politics. The 
military capability of NATO, including its nuclear means, had not 
been acquired for the enhancement of power or for posturing, but 
exclusively for preventing aggression and war. ' The pledge in 
Article 5 of the Treaty that an armed attack against anyone or more 
of the members "shall be considered an attack against them all" 
and the agreement of each one to take "such action as its deemed 
necessary; including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic Area; "was a strong commitment, 
prescribing action under specified circumstances, and thus in fact 
limiting the freedom of action of each member of the alliance, 
because its treaty required no surrender of sovereignty by its 
members.^" The first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Lionel 
Ismay, had succinctly described NATO's real aims in 1957. "The 
U.S." he said, "needs NATO to keep America in Europe, Germany 
in rein, and Russia outside Europe." These goals had already been 
achieved. 
One of the major tasks of the European allies would be to keep 
the USA engaged with the alliance. "The US would only be 
interested in NATO if it is viable military organization. But NATO 
will only remain a viable military organization if the US is properly 
engaged. ^ The United States could reasonably expect to maintain 
its leadership status by taking advantage of NATO's consultative 
II 
function, by granting aid lo its NATO allies, and by profiling from 
NATO's ability to deter the Soviet Union." And through NATO the 
United Stales had induced research, development, and product ion 
programs for military purposes-first in individual countries and 
later across national boundaries in cooperative undertakings and 
had promoted other kinds of cooperative programmes, including 
certain service functions for NATO forces. " Bradley Klien, in a 
number of works, made the claim for NATO as a means by which its 
member stales had formed a collective political identity and 
community. Klien asserted that Western strategies concerning 
deterrence, nuclear weapons, overseas military bases and 
institutions were pari of an 'ambitious attempt lo erecl a globally 
stable framework for multilateral trade' . For Klien these pieces of 
the puzzle combined to create the 'Western System', with its focal 
point being the ' transatlantic network embodied - and consolidated 
- under the protective umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization'. Thus NATO was and is more than just a military 
alliance between western countries. It is 'one particular 
manifestation of a larger and more ambitious set of political and 
cultural relations that. . .have as their aim the reconstruction, 
intensification and perpetuation of a post-war order at both its core 
and its periphery' . Klien, after citing a member of leading 
politicians of Western Europe and North America to strengthen his 
argument, revealed what he meant when speaking of this set of 
relations. He posited that what was constructed was a 'whole way of 
life, a distinct civilizational project, which makes both promises to 
and claims upon its people? Above and beyond the political -
economic aspects of this project is the military - strategic one 
which overlays the other ." 
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In a radio speech to the country on March 18, 1949 U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that after the successful 
completion of the Charter of the United Nations, the countries of 
North America and Western Europe were ' joining' in the formation 
of a second arrangement, pertaining to the North Atlantic area'. 
The institutions (read : NATO) that will underwrite the peace 
and security of this area will express the underlying realties and 
commonly held interests of the countries of this area, those bciii 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law 
Finally, the NATO partners were anxious not only to deter a 
Soviet attack upon Europe but also to create the conditions on a 
worldwide scale for the growth of a reasonably stable international 
order of law in which the uses of violence would be minimised and 
the process of peaceful change guaranteed. In short, the NATO 
countries stood apposed to the forces of destructive revolution on 
the world scene; they stood for the forces of constructive evolution, 
looking forwards a genuine international community." 
The North Atlantic Treaty was the political frame work for an 
international alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, 
should it occur. It provided for continuous cooperation and 
consultation in political, economic and military fields. It was of 
indefinite duration. 
The signatory countries stated their desire to live in peace 
with all peoples and all governments. Reaffirming their faith in the 
principles of the United Nations, they undertook in particular to 
preserve peace and international security and to promote stability 
and well - being in the North Atlantic area. 
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To achieve these goals, ihey signed their names to a number 
of undertakings in different fields. They agreed, for example, to 
settle international disputes by peaceful means, in order to avoid 
endangering international peace, security and just ice. They also 
agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force in any way, which 
would not be consistent the purpose of the United Nations. They 
undertook to eliminate conflict in their international economic 
policies and to encourage economic collaboration between their 
countries. Under this Treaty, the member countries therefore 
adopted a policy of security based on the inherent right lo 
individual and collective self-defence accorded by Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter (Appendix 1), while at the same time 
affirming the importance of cooperation between them in other 
spheres. 
The text of the Treaty (appendix 1) consisted of 14 Articles, 
and was preceded by a Preamble, which emphasized that tlie 
Alliance had been created within the framework of the United 
Nations Charter and outlines its main purposes. Article 1 defined 
the basic principles to be followed by member countries in 
conducting their international relations, in order to avoid 
endangering peace and world security. 
Article 2, inspired by Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, 
defined the aims which the member countries will pursue in their 
international relationships, particularly in the social and economic 
spheres, and their resulting obligations. 
In Article 3, signatories slated that they will maintain and 
develop their ability, both individually and collectively to resist 
attack. 
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Article 4 envisaged a threat to the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of one of the member countries 
of the alliance and provided for joint consultation whenever one ol 
them believed that such a threat exists. In practice, this 
consultation took place in the North Atlantic and its subordinate 
committees. 
Article 5 is the core of the Treaty v^rhereby member countries 
agreed to treat an armed attack on anyone of them, in Europe or 
North America, as an attack against all of them. It committed them 
to taking the necessary steps to help each other in the event of an 
armed attack. 
Although it left each signatory free to take whatever action il 
considered appropriate, the Article stated that, individually and 
collectively, the member nations must took steps to restore and 
maintain security. Joint action was justified by the inherent, 
individual and collective right of self defence embodied in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter; but it was agreed that measures 
taken under the terms of the Article shall be terminated when the 
Security Council had acted as necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security. 
Article 6 to defined the area in which the provisions of 
Article 5 applied. However it did not imply that events occurring 
outside that area could be the subject of consultation within the 
alliance. The preservation of peace and security in the North 
Atlantic Treaty area could be affected by events elsewhere in the 
world, and the North Atlantic Council must therefore, as a matter of 
course, consider the overall international situation. 
Article 7 and 8, member nations stipulated that none of their 
existing international commitment conflicted with the terms of the 
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Treaty and that they will not enter into any commitments in the 
future, which did so. In particular, they slated that rights and 
obligations pertaining to membership of the United Nations were 
unaffected by the Treaty, as was the primary role of the United 
Nations Security Council in the sphere of international peace and 
security. 
Under Article 9, the parties to the Treaty established a 
Council, on which each of them shall be represented, which shall he 
able to meet promptly at any time. 
The Council in turn was charged with the creation of such 
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to implement the provisions 
of the Treaty. This was the basis on which the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization had been gradually built up. 
Article 10 provided the possibility of accession to the Treaty 
by any other European state in a position to further the principles 
of the Treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey, in 1955, the federal 
republic of Germany and in 1982, Spain acceded to the treaty under 
the terms of this Article. 
Article II described the process of ratification of the Treaty, 
in accordance with the constitutional processes of the signatories, 
and the manner in which the Treaty was to enter into force. 
Article 12 and 13 dealt with the possibility of revision of the 
Treaty after a period of ten years, and renunciation of the Treaty by 
any party to it, after 20 years. They had never been invoked. 
Article 14 gave equal authority to the English and French 
texts of the Treaty, and arranged for their safe deposit in 
Washington D.C. ' ' 
3 . The St ruc ture of NATO 
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The Treaty having come into force on August 24, 1949, after 
all the ratifications had been deposited, the Governments of 
member countries were faced with two tasks: that of setting up the 
various bodies necessary for the implementation of the Treaty and 
working out a common defence policy. At its first meeting in 
Washington on September 17 and 19, 1949, the North Allanlic 
Council began the establishment of the various NATO bodies. In 
particular, it decided that the North Atlantic Council, the principal 
authority in the Alliance and composed of the Foreign Ministers of 
member countries, would meet in ordinary session annually and 
could, at any time, at the request of any of its members invoking 
Article 4 or Article 5 of the Treaty, convened in extraordinary 
session. In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, the Council 
created a Defence Committee composed of the Defence Minsiters of 
member countries, charged with drawing up co-ordinated defence 
plans for the North Atlantic area. It was agreed that this Defence 
Committee would meet at least once a year. The military structure 
of the Alliance was begun by setting up a number of permanent 
bodies, first and foremost the Military Committee. It consisted of 
the chiefs-of-staff of the member countries and its function was to 
give the Council advice on general questions of a military nature 
and to provide guidance to its executive agency, the Standing 
Group. The latter consisted of representatives of France, United 
Kingdom and the United States, who were responsible for strategic 
guidance in areas in which NATO Forces operated.*"* The first 
organizational chart for NATO established five geographical 
planning groups under the Standing Group: Northern European 
Group; Western European Group; Southern European Group; 
Southern European /Western Mediterranean Group; Canada/United 
States Group; and the North Atlantic Ocean Group. 
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At a second meeting a month later, the Council established two 
further bodies, which had also been features of Western Union 
Organization: a Defence Financial and Economic Committee and a 
Military Production and Supply Board. The Defence Financial and 
Economic Committee was to be composed of the Finance Ministers 
of member governments and was to report directly to the Council 
thus matching the Defence Committee.' 
3.1 The North Atlantic Council (NAC)* 
The Council was the only formal NATO organ mentioned in 
the Treaty. Article 9 stipulated that the members establish a 
Council "on which each of them shall be represented, to consider 
matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty". Although 
the Treaty did not explicitly state that the representation would be 
equal, this had always been understood. In fact, the term 
"representation" was not well chosen, for the Council was not a 
representative body; it was a vehicle for executive co-ordination. 
Within NATO the traditional concept of the legal equality of stales 
prevailed. Undoubtedly the four major allies (United States, 
Britain, France and West Germany) carried a great deal more 
political weight than, said, Iceland or Luxemburg. But, unlike the 
Charter of the United Nations, which reserved special privileges to 
five powers, the NATO Treaty did not spell out any special powers 
(such as a veto) for the major members which were withheld from 
the lesser allies. The Council reached decisions by unanimous 
consent. The Council was fundamentally a meeting ground for 
governmental Ministers. Actually, however, it could meet at three 
levels (1) the Permanent Representatives; (2) the Ministers; and (3) 
Heads of Government. Since the Lisbon Meeting in February, 1952, 
See Figure 8. North Atlantic Council, p.XXII 
ihe North Atlantic Council had been a permanent body. The 
permanent representatives, who were of ambassadorial rank, met in 
sessions of the Council at least once a week during the intervals 
between Ministers' meeting, and wield virtually the same powers of 
decisions as did the Ministers themselves, with whom they 
remained in close consultation.' 
Whatever the level at which the Council met, its chairman 
was the Secretary General of NATO, Each year the Foreign Minsiler 
of a member state was honorary president of the Council. This 
presidency rotated annually according to alphabetical order in 
English. Since the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty was not 
supranational, all decisions taken were the expressions of the 
collective will of the member governments. It was in the Council 
that the views of governments were exchanged on all major issues. 
Consultation covered political, military, economic and a wide range 
of other subjects. 
Military policy matters were discussed at the same level in 
the 'Defence Planning Committee'. As in the Council, members 
countries were represented on this Committee by their Permanent 
Representatives. They met round the same table as the Council and 
also under the same chairmanship of the Secretary General. Since 
the withdrawal of France from the integrated military organization 
in 1966, her representative did not attend this meetings. 
3.2 The Permanent Representa t ives and Delegat ions 
The Permanent Representatives were assisted by national 
delegations also located at NATO Headquarters . The Delegations 
varied in size but the majority of them included officers specifically 
charged with representing their countries on the various specialized 
committees. Before a meeting of the council notice was given of the 
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agenda and any subjects to be discussed so that representatives had 
time to seek the instructions of their governments," ' 
3.3 The Secretary General and the international staff. 
Committees established by the Council were supported by an 
International Staff, made up of personnel drawn from all member 
countries, responsible to the Secretary - General. The Secretary 
General himself was responsible for promoting and directing ihc 
process of consultation within the Alliance. He proposed items for 
discussion. He had the authority to use his good offices at any lime 
in cases of dispute between member countries, and with their 
consent, to initiate enquiries or mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration procedures. The Deputy Secretary General assisted the 
Secretary General in his functions and deputised for him in his 
absence. The international staff comprised the Office of the 
Secretary General, five major Divisions, the Office of Management 
and the Office of the Financial Controller. Each of the Divisions 
was headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, who was normally 
the Chairman of the main committee dealing with his 
responsibilities^'. 
The Council accordingly decided at its fourth session in May 
1950 to establish the council of Deputies to be in continous session 
and to be responsible for implementing the decisions of the Council 
and for formulating issues requiring decisions by member 
governments. " Before even the Council of Deputies had time to 
meet, however, war had broken out in Korea. What might happen in 
Europe. There were only 200,000 poorly armed Allied occupation 
forces in Western Germany many, and in all no more than 14 Allied 
divisions and 1000 aircraft in Western Europe, compared with 
See Figure 5. NATO International Staff/Secretariat, p. XIX. 
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between 175 and 200 Soviet divisions and 20,000 aircraft,'" Europe, 
in other words, was more afraid of the Soviet Union than was the 
United States. The United States benefited in the bargaining which 
led to the alliance because she had to be persuaded, some what 
reluclanlly, to assist in Western defence/" However, President 
Harry S. Truman decided to station American combat troops 
permanently in Europe, and appointed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower 
as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in 
September 1950. He encouraged planning for a defence of Europe 
based on the thousands of nuclear weapons. He took orders from 
President Truman to proceed forthwith to Europe to establish a 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). On F' 
January 1951, Gen. Eisenhower Landed in Frankfurt with a small 
personal staff including his Chief of Staff-designate, Gen. Alferd M. 
Gruenther. They then began a quick initial round of the NATO 
capitals with plans for organizing the new command. In 1 February, 
1951 the French government requisitioned the Old Hotel Astoria to 
serve as temporary headquarters for Eisenhower's new command. 
However, the French decided to provides the new command post on 
the outskirts of Paris at an Old military drill and training grounds 
of the French Kings near Versailles. Under SHAPE there would be 
subordinate headquarters for Northern Europe at Oslo, Central 
Europe at Fontainebleau and Southern Europe at Naples and later 
on Atlantic Naval Command at Norfolk, Virginia. And on April 
2 ,1951, Gen. Eisenhower formally declared SHAPE Headquarters lo 
be "operational".' '^ 
On June 19, 1951, the NATO states signed an agreement on 
the status of their armed forces, providing the mechanism for 
maintaining "internal stability". This document gave the NATO 
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military command the right to deploy its armed forces, bases, 
command and control and other military bodies in member countries 
and what was the main thing, to introduce any number of its troops 
to any country which was part of NATO's militancy w i n g / ' 
In the event of aggression, the role of the Alliance was to re-
establish the territorial integrity of the North Atlantic area. NATO 
must therefore maintain sufficient forces to preserve the military 
balance with the Warsaw Pact and to provide a credible deterrent. 
NATO forces were made up of three interlocking elements known as 
the NATO Triad. They were: 
a Conventional forces strong enough to resist and repel a 
conventional attack on a limited scale, and to sustain a 
conventional defence in the forward areas against large -
scale conventional aggression; 
a Theatre nuclear forces to enhance the deterrent and defensive 
effect of NATO conventional forces against large-scale 
conventional attack, with the aim of convincing the aggressor 
that any form of attack on NATO could result in very serious 
damage to his own forces, and of emphasizing the dangers 
implicated in continuing a conflict; 
• United States and United Kingdom strategic nuclear forces 
which - provided the ultimate deterrent.** 
In peacetime NATO's military forces were subordinated to the 
political North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Defence PI annine 
Committee (DPC) through NATO's Military Committee (MC)*'* 
See Figure 6. NATO's Civil and Military Structure, p.XX 
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3.4 The NATO ihealre itself was d iv ided into th ree commands 
a reas : 
(1) Al l ied Command Europe (ACE) ' ; ACE was commanded by 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), ACE was 
NATO's pr incipal military command. Its mili tancy forces operated 
over area bounded by the northern most part of Norway, the 
southern most part of the Mediterranean, the western most part of 
the European Atlantic coast and the eastern most part of Turkey. 
SACEUR, as commander of ACE, thus had the dominant military 
role in NATO and, although his authority was theoretically 
subordinate to the Military Committee, in pract ice this was not 
so. 
In addition to SHAPE, Allied Command Europe composed four 
major subordinate commands (MSCs); 
(i) AFNORTH, headquartered at Kolsaas (Norway), was the 
command area of Allied Forces Northern Europe. 
(ii) AFCENT was the command area of the "Allied Forces 
Central Europe" which extended from the Elbe river in 
the north to the borders of Austria and Switzerland in 
the South. AFCENT had its headquarters in Brunssum 
in Netherlands. 
(iii) AFSOUTH was the command area of Allied Forces 
Southern Europe which covered Italy, Greece, Turkey 
and the entire Mediterranean Sea. AFSOUTH was 
geographically the largest of the three ACE MSCs and 
had its headquarters at Naples in Italy. 
See Figure 3. Allied Command Europe, p.XVII 
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(iv) 'UKAIR' was a unique ACE MSC in that it was 
essentially a single service (RAF), single nation MSC. 
UKAIR was based at high Wycombe in the UK and 
provided both air defence and attack airforces for 
employment within ACE. UKAIR operated British 
nuclear weapons. 
SACEUR also had the responsibil i t ies of commander - i n -
chief of American forces in Europe (USCOMEUR), in accordance 
with the double-hatt ing system, thereby placing him in the 
exclusive chain of command of the American civilian and military 
authorit ies. 
It was the latter provision more than any other that explained 
how NATO functioned as a military organization. This 
independence of the American commander with respect to the 
political authorit ies of the Alliance was greatly strengthened by 
another circumstance which derived from the fact that his area of 
responsibility as US commander in Europe extended over an area 
much greater than that available to him as SACEUR. It included 
both shores of the Mediterranean and a large part of East Africa 
and the Middle East. In this sector, USCOMEUR clearly could not 
be subjected to any multinational control, a reality which gave him 
wide scope for independence in all his act ivi t ies , including those 
that came under his SACLEUR hat. This c ircumstances explained 
the significant gap between the written word and reality in the 
structures of the Alliance. Political consultation did exist inside 
the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate committees, but the 
state of independence into which the geographical imbalance put 
the European nations relative to the United States guaranteed 
that these negotiations were very often no more than a formality. 
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NATO in its military sense-that was, mainly the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was essentially 
designed not to implement the military plans that it had 
formulated, but to enable the United States in the shape of the US 
Command in Europe (EUCOM), to take charge of military 
operations, using its own concepts and its own plans if it thought 
fit. In Cold War scenarios, therefore, once operations had been 
launched, the military organization was to be placed under a 
command that appeared to be SACEUR, subjected to the 
theoretical political authority of all the nations in the Alliance, 
but was in reality USCOMEUR, subjected to exclusive political 
control by U.S. national authorit ies. 
SACEUR and the other commanders* were the Council 's military 
stewards, directing the pooled ci t izen-armies. The United Stales, 
of course, did retain national control over the nuclear umbrella, 
but American plans and strategies for Europe's defence were ihe 
product of intensive consultation among par tners . If, in theory, the 
Council was the political master and SACEUR the military 
steward, in pract ice, even strong part isans of NATO saw little 
integration between the political machinery and the military 
commands. Hence the Council had never functioned as the 
All iance 's principal center for policy making, or even 
consultation. The Council 's role had always been peripheral to the 
military machinery built up around the Supreme Allied 
Commander. This lack of integration between the political 
authority and the military command had led one famous observer. 
General Beaufre, to call NATO " a body without a head". But there 
was a head-not in Europe, but in Washington. The Supreme Allied 
Commander had never been the first servant of the Council, but 
* See Figure 4. Major NATO Commands, p. XVIII 
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the viceroy of the American President. '" Nevertheless , he was a 
man from the center, and it was from Washington that his ultimate 
authority came, for Washington controls the nuclear weapons 
everyone believes constituted the real defence of Europe. The line 
of nuclear authority passed directly from Washington to the 
American military commander in Europe, who, almost necessarily, 
was also SACEUR. NATO was the rather elaborate apparatus by 
which we had chosen to organize the American prorleclorate over 
Europe. In pract ice , the arrangements reflected dependence and 
not in terdependence, hegemony and not integration. In short, 
NATO, which in theory suggested in terdependence, integration, 
and potential federation, in practice involved dependence, 
subordination and potential empire . ' 
2. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)* 
The second of NATO's major NATO commands (MNC's) 
ACLANT commanded an area, which extended from the North Pole 
to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North 
American to those of Europe and Africa, though not including the 
British Isles and the Channel. The office of SACLANT, as with 
SACEUR, was always held by an American officer and was 
headquartered at Norfork in Virginia, U.S.A. The ACLANT was 
commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
(SACLANT).'" 
3 , The third major NATO command was the All ied Command 
Channel (ACCHAN)* Allied Command Channel managed to pack no 
less than five subordinate commands into its tiny but important area 
of responsibility in the Channel and the southern part of the North 
Sea. The commander (CINCHAN) was a British admiral who worked 
See Figure 1. Allied Command Atlantic p. XV 
' See Figure 2. Allied Command Channel p. XVI 
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from Northwood, near London. Wearing another figurative hat he 
also directed the Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) major subordinule 
command under the authority of ACLANT. 
4. Developments Soon After NATO'S Formation 
Following Germany's defeat, it was divided into four zones 
controlled by the occupation forces of Britain, France, the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The former capital , Berlin, which fell 
within the Soviet Union Zone, was also divided into four sectors of 
Britain, France, and the United Sta tes ." During the Winter and 
Spring of 1948, the economic aid under the Marshall Plan was 
extended to the Western occupation zones. The Soviet Union, 
concerned that Germany could again pose a threat, sought to keep 
Germany economically weak, and made it clear that it considered 
these Western initiatives as violations of the Potsdam Agreement 
between the victors of 1945. A decision to introduce currency 
reforms in the Western occupation zones was the immediate cause 
of the crises. On March, 1948, the Soviet imposed the "baby 
blockade" by demanding inspection of military trains bound for 
Berlin through Soviet-occupied territory. The Allies responded by 
dispatching a train with armed guards with orders not to submit lo 
search, but the Soviets shunted it into a siding from which il 
eventually had to be withdrawn. They allied then mounted a small 
airlift to carry supplies to the military garrison. 
Soviet harassment resulted in a midair collision with some 
fatalities. Allied cargo planes were than given fighter escorts, 
whereupon the Soviets formally apologized for the incident. Ten 
days after its inception, the baby blockade was suddenly liflecl 
without explanation. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets imposed the 
"real" Berlin Blockade by halting all military and civilian surface 
traffic to West Berlin. The Soviets did not hide their objective: The 
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Soviet military governor told his American counterpart, General 
Lucius Clay, that the Blockade "would continue until the West 
abandoned plans for a West German government." 
The Soviets sought to prevent the formation of a separate 
West German government by means of the blockade, as George and 
Smoke summarized it: The Soviet hoped that the blockade would 
help to achieve their primary objective by shattering western unity. 
The blockade provided almost perfect leverage for exerting political 
- diplomatic pressure. Furthermore, in the event that the blockade 
failed to achieve its primary objective it could be expected to at 
least remove the West from Berlin. Neither objective was achieved, 
however. Instead, the airlift kindled public attitudes in the West 
that facilitated the birth of NATO and the Federal Republic. The 
Berlin Blockade, therefore, culiminated in a serious setback for the 
Soviet Union. Ultimately the West Berlin was given special status 
within the Federal Republic of Germany, known as West Germany, 
which was created in 1949 in the British, French and United States 
occupation zones and a Communist German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) was established in the Soviet Zone . " 
In an effort to built good credentials with NATO, both Turkey 
and Greece eagerly dispatched combat forces to Korea in 1950 that 
performed credibly on the battlefield. Turkey in the early 1950s 
pursued it diplomatic objective for NATO entry without respite. 
Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu declared publicly on August 1, 
1950, that NATO entry would be an "acid test of U.S. interest in 
Turkey" ." However, on 15"" May 1951, the U.S. State Department 
finally convinced of "mutuality of benefits", announced its decision 
to support Turkey's case for full NATO membership. It was followed 
by British declaration of support on 30 May 1 9 5 1 . " With the United 
States leading the way, a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa 
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(Seplember 1951) approved Greek and Turkish accession inlo 
NATO.'" Throughout 1951, the Council of Deputies sitting in 
London took two major decisions: first, to admit Greece and Turkey 
to the alliance, and second, to recognize the political machinery 
with a new Permanent Council and a strong internalionul secretarial 
under a Secretary General.*'' At the meeting in Lisbon of Foreign 
Ministers of the alliance - now enlarged to February 1952. Patrick 
Lione Hastings Ismay (Lord Ismay) from the United Kingdom was 
appointed the first NATO Secretary General. 
On February 1 8 ' \ 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their forces were 
incorporated in Allied Command Europe. After successful missions 
in Europe, Gen. Eisenhower returned back to the United States for 
the Presidential election. General Mathew Ridgway succeeded him 
as SACEUR on May 1952." 
In the same year the Atlantic Command (SACLANT) and the 
Channel Command (CINCHAN) were established**^ 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected in 1952, he 
then proposed that East and West exchange blueprints "of their 
armed forces and permit mutual "open skies" aerial inspection of 
their territory found no favour with the Russians. On the European 
Security, Russian insistence that NATO be disbanded and American 
troops withdrawn from Europe was equally unacceptable to the 
West' . The Soviet conventional military threat to Western Europe 
could not possibly be countered without Germany, just as Germany 
could not possibly defend itself on its own. The only way for 
Germany to protect itself was to receive protection from the United 
States. And the only way for America to protect Western Europe 
was to protect Germany.** 
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The 'Schuman Plan', secretly prepared by the French 
technocrat Jean Monnel, bounced through the French Cabinet, and 
released with a flourish in May 1950: A United Europe was iiol 
achieved [After 1918]; and we had war. Europe will not be made all 
at once or according to a single general plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto 
solidarity. The gathering together of the nations of Europe requires 
the elimination of the age - old opposition of France and Germany. 
The first concern in any action taken must be these two 
countries. With this in view, the F'-ench government proposed to 
take action immediately on one limited but decisive point to 
place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common 
higher authority, within the framework of an organization open to 
the participation of the other countries of Europe. So 1951 brought 
agreement on a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to 
consist of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg.''^ 
In September 1950, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of the Stale 
Department, asked his French and British colleagues to accept 
Germany's rearmament so as to enable West Germany to participate 
in the defence of its own territory. Robert Schuman, French Foreign 
Minister, reacted promptly with the cold comment: 'Germany's 
malady dates too far back to have been permanently cured; Reading 
this comment, one can gauge the extent of reservation there was in 
the attitude of the French. Schuman had been the architect of 
Franco-German reconciliation when he had proposed in May 1950 
the plan which was to engage the future European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), a treaty signed in Paris on 18"" April 1951), but 
the matter of defence was a stake of an altogether different kind.'"' 
With the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the E.D.C. 
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'European Defence Community' in 1954. The gap left by the 
collapse of E.D.C, had to be filled, and it was the British Foreign 
Secretary who took prompt action to fill it. As the result of his lour 
of the European Capitals, a Western European Union was created to 
take the place of the defunct E.D.C. at the price of an 
unprecedented British commitment to the Continent. ' A nine power 
conference was convened in London to try to reach a new 
agreement. This conference's decisions were embodied in a series 
of formal agreements drawn up by a ministerial conference held in 
Paris in October 1954. The agreements entailed arrangements for 
the Brussels. Treaty to be strengthened and modified to include llu; 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, the ending of the 
occupation regime in the FRO and the invitation to the later to join 
NATO."" 
In order to calm the French fears of a rearmed Germany, 
SACEUR'S powers were expanded to ensure in effect, that all 
German armed forces would be under his command, and at the same 
time the members of NATO declared that the North Atlantic Treaty 
was of "indefinite duration".'''^ 
As a result the West European Unity Treaty was signed and 
the Western European Union established. It was under this treaty 
that West Germany agreed not to attempt any changes to its borders 
by forces, and not to make nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. 
It also agreed not to make large naval vessels) long - range 
missiles . So West Germany had become a sovereign state by 
joining NATO in 1955. ' ' And on May, 1955, Germany acceded lo 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and contributed forces to 
the Alliance. 
In order to counter aggressive NATO moves, the countries of 
the Socialist Community signed, on May 14, 1955-(six years after 
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NATO was formed), the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance, subsequently called the Warsaw Treaty. The 
Treaty itself was formally modeled on the NATO treaty, although it 
did not establish institutions comparable to those of the North 
Atlantic Al l iance ." The Treaty explicitly stated that in case of 
armed attack against any signatory, the others would immediately 
come to its aid. The birth of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a 
forced response. It was and continued to be strictly defensive. 
The French caused a further sensation when, on 29" March 
1966, President de Gaulle announced that France was pulling out of 
the Integrated command structure (though not the alliance itself), 
and that all foreign NATO establishments must leave French 
territory in short order. The followed some complicated reshuffing 
and uprootings. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) abondened Rocquen Court outside Paris for a new home al 
Casteau near Mon in Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied 
Forces Central Europe betook itself to a still - smoking coalmine at 
Brunssum in the Netherlands. The Americans transferred their 
naval units in the Mediterranean from France to Italy, they had to 
re-route their lines of communications to Germany around French 
territory, and they transferred their aircraft from French airfields to 
bases in Britain and a dangerously crowded area of Germany. In the 
Rhineland and the Pala t ina te ." In due course it transpired that 
France was quite willing to have NATO's political headquarters 
stayed in Paris. However, the other allies, spurred on by Brilain 
and the USA, decided that, partly for operational reasons, it would 
have to accompany SACEUR'S military headquarters (Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, alias SHAPE) in a more to the 
Brussels area. 
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Bill ihc last Paris tneeling of NATO Council, wliicli look pUicc 
that December, showed how prevalent a desire to keep close 
relations with France was among NATO members. 
5. NATO'S Policies 
In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb and 
in 1953 its first hydrogen bomb, only nine months after the first 
similar test by the USA. In 1950s they both brought the so called 
tactical (or battle field or theatre, nuclear weapons to Europe - the 
USA about 1953, the USSR about 1 9 5 7 . " The Eisenhower 
administration (1953-61) developed a strategy known as 'massive 
retaliation' to deal with the growth in nuclear capability. According 
to this doctrine, aggression against the United States or its allies 
would be deterred with the threat of massive retaliatory nuclear 
strikes.^" The Alliance adopted "The Massive Retaliation" in 1957 
(contain in NATO document MC 14-2). This was based on the firm 
intention that, should deterrence fail, nuclear weapons would be 
used at any early stage. The conventional forces would not, because 
of their limited size, be expected to defeat a determined attack but 
rather to act as a trip-wire to allow time for nuclear retaliation to be 
implemented.'" 
The whole concept of nuclear deterrence, especially in its 
present version which called for maximum deterrence, and above 
alls, the insistence of NATO on the first-use option for nuclear 
weapons was based on the assertion that the Socialist States had 
massive superiority in the field of conventional weapons in general 
and in the military situation in Europe in particular."" 
During 1950s, NATO adopted a military strategy of "ihe 
sword and the shield". NATO ground forces supplied the shield. 
They served the dual purpose of blunting an enemy's initial attack 
and (sometimes referred to as the "trip-wire") alerting Western 
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government lo the threat. Then the NATO "sword" - overwhelming 
nuclear air and missile power was to strike against both the source 
of aggression and hostile armies in the field."' It was said that the 
American and other allies NATO ground forces deployed in 
Germany were there as ' trip-wire' designed to set off the NATO 
nuclear deterrent."^ On July 1953, General Mathew Ridgway was 
succeeded by General Alferd M. Gruenther as a new Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR)" In 1954, in response to NSC162/2, 
NATO, under the direction of General Alfred M. Griuenther, 
conducted a study to assess the implications of changing NATO's 
strategy to a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. The findings of 
this study, leaked to the press in July 1954, by nothing: 
1. Warfare in the future would inevitably by nuclear; 
2. the first atomic targets would be armed forces and military 
installations rather than major centers of population; 
3. the peak of destruction would come at the outset of war; 
4. therefore the outcome would be determined by the active 
forces in being. 
On November, 1956, General Lauris Norstad succeeded General 
Alferd M. Gruenther as a SACEUR. On the other hand Paul - Henri 
Spaak (from Belgium) succeeded Lord Ismay as NATO's Secretary -
General in 1957''^ In this period General Norstad a NATO Supreme 
Commander had twenty - five divisions or the equivalent, most of 
them in markedly improved fighting condition.''^' 
The strategy of massive retaliation changed when the Soviet 
Union developed a nuclear arsenal comparable with that of the 
United States. It was all very well to threaten the Soviets with 
genocide when they could not reply in kind. But when ihey could 
NATO changed its tune and took on a policy flexible response."' 
The adoption of flexible response (advocated by the Kennedy 
administration from the start and continued by Johnson, although 
not adopted as official NATO doctrine until 1967."" This strategy 
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went through various iterations, its last formulation being in 
document known as MC-14/3, which was approved by NATO in 
1967. According to MC14/3, NATO military strategy aimed to 
preserve or to restore the territorial integrity of NATO countries. 
Initial reliance should be placed on foreward defence along the 
inter-German border or other frontiers, subjected to Soviet military 
penetration. If the Soviet advance was not halted, NATO forces 
should fall back, continuing the struggle with conventional 
weapons. If this still did not produce a successful defence, NATO 
would then go through a process of flexible response, gradually 
escalating to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, theatre nuclear 
weapons, and, if necessary, intercontinental nuclear weapons. 
NATO 'flexible response' strategy was the result of a political 
compromise between Americans who desired more options before 
nuclear weapons were used, and Europeans who felt too many 
options would weaken rather than strengthen de te r rence . " The 
doctrine of 'flexible response' was regarded as a strategy primarily 
for countries with vast space, time and resources, the doctorine 
which it replaced of an early resort to nuclear weapons. But this 
posture soon lost its appeal in the early 1980s when the Soviet 
nuclear threat was enhanced by the SS-20s and NATO planned to 
meet this threat through the deployment of cruise missiles.'^' 
By 1980 NATO had 7,000 tanks on the Central Front (in Europe) 
compared to Warsaw Pact's 20,500 and 13,500 of which were 
Soviet. Soviet plans for rapid rates of advance, if successful, would 
overwhelm NATO's forces more quickly than they could be 
reinforced. Soviet deployment of SS-20s had also served the same 
purpose. It was a gross oversimplification to see the Soviet's 
maneuvers and arms buildup as a clear indication that they 
contemplated offensive action against NATO, just as it was naive to 
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wonder why Warsaw Pact forces were being expanded and equipped 
far beyond the defensive needs of the Soviet bloc. 
In 1982 the Alliance was shaken by the reverberations of the 
Siberian gas pipeline issue. To the unwelcome spectacle of public 
bickering among Alliance members over strategic dependence on 
the Soviet Union and contributing through trade to Soviet military 
potential was added the trauma of sanctions being applied by one 
member state against commercial companies in others. This 
unfortunate state affairs had arisen by degrees as a result of marked 
changes in international economic intercourse. Western European 
Countries, in the light of a relatively recent experience of an oil 
embargo, had decided to diversity their sources of energy and raw 
material supplies. Meanwhile economic recession and 
unemployment had driven them to intensify, in part by offering -
advantageous credit terms, their attempts to exploit the market 
offered by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."^ Edmund Burke 
wrote, "A state without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation". The North Atlantic Alliance had shown 
since its foundation that its leaders appreciated the truth of that 
commend. NATO had never been afraid of change and indeed had 
welcomed it whatever it had seemed to offer the prospect of 
building a safer and saner world. In doing so the Alliance had been 
guided and would continue to be guided by the fundamental 
principle of renunciation of the threat and use of force which was 
enshrined in Article 1 of he North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's program 
for peace in Freedom adopted by the Bonn Summit in June 1982, 
provided another guideline enabling the Alliance to face further 
changes in the international environment whenever they occurred. 
The summit declaration also confirmed the purely defensive nature 
of the Alliance by stating that none of its weapons - and thai 
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comprised conventional as well as nuclear weapons would ever be 
used, except in case of attack. 
The Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule 
occurred during Manfred Werner's chairmanship of NATO, he 
succeeded Lord Carrington as Secretary General of NATO in 1989.'^ 
On November 9, 1989, the decision of the East Germany 
government to pull down the Berlin Wall at the height of the 
Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule, and set the 
seal on the momentous political changes that took place during the 
year.'""' At the insistence of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 
the military structures of the Warsaw Pact were dissolved on April 
11, 1990 in Moscow and the seventh member East Germany ceased 
to exist with German Unification on October 3 , 1990. Finally on 
July 1, 1991, the leader of the Warsaw Pact signed the protocol 
dissolving the Warsaw Pact, thus ending a 36 year era of East-West 
conformation. Thus in one sense NATO had outlived its utility 
because its aim of arresting expansion of Communism had almost 
been achieved with the breaking up of the Soviet Union.'^^ 
6. NATO'S NEW STRUCTURES* 
Just a little more than a year after the terror attacks of 9-11, 
Alliance members met at a NATO Summit held in Prague in 
November 2002. The outcome of this historic summit resulted in an 
agreement providing for a truly remarkable set of changes for the 
Alliance, transforming the fifty year old, cold war structure of 
NATO into an organization designed to meet the uncertain world. 
NATO set a new course that is transforming virtually every aspect 
of the organization. Among the changes, NATO leaders agreed to at 
the Prague Summit were to streamline its command structure to 
provide a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable force 
See Figure 7. NATO's New Military Command Structure, p.XXI 
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capable of meeting the operational requirements for the full range 
of Alliance missions . 
With remarkable decisiveness and discipl ine, NATO best 
demonstrated its commitment to transformation by reducing the 
number of major headquarters from twenty to eleven. Considering 
that NATO's military command structure during the Cold War stood 
at 78 major headquarters, this achievement is truly revolutionary. 
The most substantial changes was the redesignation of Strategic 
Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) as Atlantic Command 
Transformation (ACT), which no longer has an operational command 
function. With its headquarters located in Norfolk, Virginia, ACT's 
primary function is to "oversee the transformation of NATO's 
military capabilities". '"" 
Allied Command Europe (ACE) is now designated as Allied 
Command Operations (ACO) but its functions remain unchanged. 
With three major joint forces commands, ACO has assumed an 
expeditionary posture. 
Joint Headquarters Command is located in Lisbon and has assumed 
the operational command function of SACLANT with the capability 
to form a maritime Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Joint Forces 
Command North and South integrate their land, air, and naval 
component commands into a functional joint force. Between them, 
they can form a land-based CJTF.'"' 
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CHAPTER - 2 
NATO And European Security: An Overview 
1. Europe after the Collapse of Soviet Union 
In the 'Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany' 
of 12 September 1990, the four allied powers and both German 
states agreed on (Bulletin, 1990J : 
• the recognition of the borders of the FRG and GDR as the 
borders of the United Germany ( Art. 1); 
• a commitment to peace and the non-use of force with the 
exception in accordance with its constitution and the UN 
Charter ( Art. 2); 
• a binding commitment of the United Germany to adhere to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not to produce, 
acquire or control the use of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons and to reduce its forces to 370,000 within three to 
four years ( Art. 3); 
• an obligation that no nuclear weapons and launchers and no 
foreign troops may be deployed on the territory of the former 
GDR after the withdrawal of all Soviet troops ( Art. 5); 
• the right of the United Germany to join all iances (Art.6); 
• the announcement that all allied prerogatives pertaining to 
Berlin and Germany as a whole will end on 3 October 1990 
and that the United Germany will acquire full sovereignty 
(An.7) . ' 
Germany also promised 13 billion marks towards paying and 
supplying the Soviet troops on German soil and towards their 
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repatriation and housing in the Soviet Union which was to be 
completed in 1994. 
The defence of the Atlantic organized within NATO appeared 
to continue to be valued as the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact 
and the collapse of the USSR did not bring to an end all threat to 
Europe. Right from the time of the London summit in June 1990, 
the heads of state and of government of the countries of the alliance 
drew the lessons of these first changes and concluded thai il was 
necessary to renew NATO, hence implicitly rejecting the idea of 
disbanding it. After the reunification of Germany in 1990, then the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, the disintegration of 
the USSR proceeded at a faster pace (it was finally completed in 
December 1991) . ' 
The American response had been based on the assumption 
that at the end the Soviet Union would prefer to preserve NATO 
because Moscow looked to Washington to act as a restraint on a 
unified Germany. That was why together with its all ies, the United 
States had proposed a number of concessions to make the idea of 
German NATO membership more palatable. Among them; changing 
the emphasis of NATO to make it a more political institution; 
imposing a variety of arms limitations on Germany; asking a 
unified Germany to provide economic assistance to the Soviet troops 
to remain in present - day East Germany for a specified period, and 
reducing the number of nuclear forces on German soil.^ As a 
hegemon outside Europe, the United States had equalized the 
European powers by burying the enmities that had led to two World 
Wars. It pacified Europe even though il provoked hostility in those 
countries that resented their loss of sovereignty, and it becomes the 
umbrella under which the E.U. could be established. For these 
reasons, Western Governments wanted the United Germany to 
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remain in NATO, for a Germany outside NATO would have caused 
concern, especially among the East and West Europeans and a 
NATO without Germany would have been deprived of personnel, 
logistics, and s p a c e / The Western Countries in cooperation with a 
Soviet Union thai was then rapidly changing, seized the chance and 
produced what could be considered as the greatest triumph of 
diplomacy in this century. Not even a full year passed between the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the final act of creating a United 
Germany. Along with East Germans, 400 million human beings were 
free from Communism, an achievement unthinkable without the 
persistent efforts of the NATO Allies.** 
In November, 1991, Allied Heads of State and Government 
agreed in Rome on NATO's new strategic concept. The new 
strategic concept and developments since its adoption underline 
that crisis management; peacekeeping and peacemaking in regional 
conflicts were becoming new and central tasks for the Alliance. The 
concept no longer emphasized massive mobilization but rather 
enhanced crisis management capabilit ies using more mobile and 
flexible force and cooperative efforts to project peace. NATO's 
contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management consists 
of three essential politico-military elements: 
• the provision, by its existence, a cohesion and strength of 
security anchor and stabilizing factor in Europe; 
• the contribution, through the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council which united NATO with the former member of the 
Warsaw Pact and their successor states of a mechanism for 
achieving a common understanding in security matters and a 
collective approach to the peaceful settlement of local 
conflicts; 
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• a close interaction with the UN, the CSCE,' the Western 
European Union and the European Community in a 
complementary framework of interlocking, mutually 
reinforcing international institutions. 
NATO's involvement in peacekeeping operations could find its 
expression in three main forms; 
• by contributing Alliance assets to a UN or CSCE 
peacekeeping operation; 
• by conducting or coordinating a peacekeeping operation on 
behalf of either organization; 
• by supporting the involvement of individual Allies in a 
peacekeeping operation. 
It is important to recognize that NATO is not an end in itself, 
it is a means to an end. And that end should the elimination of 
interstate war in Europe, not the preservation of NATO's Cold War 
form and function. NATO remains crucial to the defence and 
security needs of the nations on both sides of the Atlantic. It is an 
placeable guarantor of Euro-Atlantic Security, an unparalleled 
provider of political and military stability for Western Europe and 
now for the new democratics of Central and Eastern Europe as well. 
The real and potential threats to the physical security of Europe 
have to set alongside the growing threats to the values, to the trade, 
to the economic prosperity and, perhaps, to the political beliefs of 
both Europe and North America. What is needed is an Atlantic 
Community, a Community that will rest on the four pil lars. The first 
pillar is its shared belief in the rule of law and parliamentary 
democracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free trade, which 
has given its entire people unprecedented prosperity. The third is 
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), establishn^ent in 1975. In \994 the 
CSCE evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
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the shared European cultural heritage emanating from classical 
Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, 
beliefs and civilization of its own centuries. The fourth pillar must 
be defence and security as represented by the NATO Alliance. 
In a nutshell, NATO needs North America, and North America 
needs NATO. Europe is inextricably linked to North America and 
security. The logic goes something like this : peace and stability in 
Kurope create the conditions for economic growth and economic 
growth is what creates the opportunity for prosperity. Peace and 
stability are fundamental prerequisites for prosperity. 
2. North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
The German - American initiative in December 1991 to create 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which brought 
together foreign and defence ministers of the 16 countries, reflected 
US State Department determination that NATO should develop a 
broader role in European Security through extending its security 
regime across eastern Europe. By 1997 the NACC had been 
transformed into the Euro - Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 
bringing together to allies and 27 partners. Its wide-ranging agenda 
included cooperation on political and security related matters, arms 
control, international terrorism, peace keeping, defence, economic 
issues.'^ The inaugural meeting of NACC was held on 20 December, 
1991, attended by all 16 NATO allies as well as representatives of 
9 other countries including member states of the then already 
dissolved Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, the Soviet Union) and three Baltic Stales (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania). On 10 March 1992, a further 10 newly - independent 
states on the territory of the former Soviet Union joined the NACC. 
Georgia and Albania followed suit at the NACC meeting in Oslo on 
5 June 1992, NACC member stales were Albania, Armenia, 
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Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Uzbekistan. ^ 
It was an important step to raise the all iance's liaison 
relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to a 
qualitative new level in recognition of the democratic progress they 
had made. The invitation to these nations, including the three newly 
independent Baltic States, to join the NATO allies in an 
institutionalized framework of consultations was more than a 
symbolic gesture and may evolve soon into a primary security forum 
of a future Euro-Atlantic community. The NACC was conceived as 
a means for NATO to contribute to healing the division of Europe. 
It aimed to foster political dialogue, practical cooperation, 
transparency in military affairs, and the peaceful integration of the 
new democracies into the translantic community. The NACC was 
becoming a central element in the growing web of security ties thai 
bound European and North Atlantic together. 
3 . NATO enlargement and the partnership for peace (PFP) 
American policy - makers wanted NATO to serve both as 
framework for European security and as a vehicle for supporting US 
strategy in the rest of the world. These two objectives might well 
prove irreconcilable. Further enlargement to Europe's east and 
south-east spread security and stability across the region, but 
weakened NATO as a strictly military alliance." ' The idea was first 
planted with President Bill Clinton in April 1993, during a 
Washington ceremony to open the Holocaust Museum. With time on 
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their hands before the speech making, Vaclav Havel and Le(;h 
Walesa, the President of the Czech Republic and Poland, cornered 
Clinton to urge that NATO admit East European countries. Havel 
and Walesa had got nowhere with George Bush on the idea, but 
Clinton, in office only three months, was intrigued. 
In October, 1993, the US government decided the policy that 
the immediate issue was not enlargement of NATO but promotion of 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and proposed the unofficial meeting of 
defence ministers for the first time in NATO's history to discuss the 
opinions of the allied states. As a result, this proposal by he US 
was approved at the Travemunde talks, and the North Atlantic 
Council made a decision on PfP in December 1993. In January 
1994, NATO officially announced its policy for PfP. It was not a 
good idea to openly promote the NATO enlargement issue at this 
point of time considering the conditions of the former East 
European states that contained a number of uncertainties and the 
expected opposition by Russia. " In the Russian eyes, there had 
been a series of unfulfilled promises and slapped in the face by the 
West. Mikhail Gorbachev thought that Soviet acceptance of a 
unified Germany meant that NATO would not expand eastward." 
Some observers still see the Alliance mainly as an insurance 
guarantee against a future revival of Russian power. Others see 
NATO as a vehicle for exporting stability and ensuring democratic 
development in the new democracies of Central Europe, some see 
the Alliance as an instrument for developing multilateral responses 
to new security problems, particularly with regard to crisis 
management in Europe and beyond.^" Analysis have identified at 
least four threats which NATO may need to face. Firstly the issue of 
latent Russian power, Russia remains a large military state in 
possession of large nuclear arsenal which is still one of the primary 
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concerns of analysis and governments in NATO member stales. 
Whether Russia a remains politically stable, the complexion of its 
leadership, and the nature of Russia 's relations with the West will 
all be key determinants of concerns about the risks of latent Russia 
military and particularly nuclear power. A second threat is 
associated with new fault lines which some analysts argue are 
opening in relations between the West and other states or regions of 
the world. Such concerns have explored with varying degrees of 
conviction by scholars such as Huntington who points to a 'clash of 
civilisations which may shape the future security. A third concern 
lies in the divisions between the prosperous developed, industrial 
and technically advanced 'North and the less prosperous, 
undeveloped, less industrialised and less technically advanced 
'South'. In this analysis the North and South or the West and the 
Third World, may clash over issues as diverse as population 
migration, access to natural resources, the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction (biological, chemical and nuclear) and political 
and social instability. Finally, the West has also begun to articulate 
concerns about an 'Islamic threat with particular resonance in 
Europe given the close proximity of the Middle East and North 
Africa and the presence of large Islamic populations within many 
European states. Whatever the respective force of these arguments 
it is difficult to argue that NATO lives in a threat-free context, 
despite the end of the Cold War." The reality is that NATO, like 
most defensive alliances before it, lost its original purposes with 
the end of the cold war. It survives because it has redefined itself 
as an instrument for consolidating new European democracies ." The 
PfP had become a learning experience on the NATO to international 
security planning, budgeting and civilian control over the military. 
PfP is based on the declaration that the alliance has no offensive 
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anti-Russian objective rather, it welcome Russianr'SsBaLClDamid^^n 
the promotion of peace, security, democracy and a free-markel 
economic system in all of Europe. Albeit with reluctance, Russia 
joined the PfP with the reassurance that it would have a voice but 
not a veto power in the enlargement process, and that the eastern 
extension of the alliance would include a parallel strategic 
partnership between Russia and NATO. ^ In June 1994, Russia had 
agreed to NATO's proposal of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme, which in effect simply meant that Russia would be 
associated with NATO without any decisive or effective role in it. 
The West also tried to placate Russia by agreeing against 
deployment of nuclear warheads in the territory of the proposed new 
member countries of Eastern Europe and also to inform in advance 
any joint exercise or troop movements. * 
The wider scope of PfP is reflected in its objectives, as sci 
out in the Framework Document, issued at the Brussels Summit in 
January 1994, i.e. 
(1). to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and 
budgeting processes; 
(2). to ensure democratic control of defence forces; 
(3). to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject 
to constitutional considerations, to operations under the 
authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; 
(4). to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the 
purpose of joint planning, training, and exercise in order to 
strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of 
peacekeeping search and other as may subsequently be agreed, 
and; 
(5). to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to 
operate with those of the members of North Atlantic Alliance. 
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The Brussels Summit therefore invited PfP partners to 
establish their own liaison offices at NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels to facilitate their participation in NACC/PfP meetings and 
act iv i t ies ." The strategic objectives of NATO and PfP in this 
context can be summarized as follows; 
• to involve Central Asian countries in the European security 
architecture based on cooperative process is and on mutual 
consultations in case of threat; 
• to increase military cooperation and information exchange; 
• to increase inter-operability for interalia peace keeping 
operations on the basis of common conceptual approach. 
According to the Central Asian governments, the PfP 
programmes serves the objective of strengthening and modernizing 
their national armies. They consider this cooperation, supplemented 
by other military cooperation agreements with individual NATO 
countries, especially with the U.S., Turkey and Germany, as an 
efficient way of reducing their dependence on Russia. 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) participants at 30 April 1995); 
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan." 
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), created in 
1997, provides the overaching political framework for all the 
outreach and cooperation activities among allies and partners to 
complement the expanded opportunities provided by an enhanced 
PfP. The EAPC superseded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
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(NACC), which had been NATO's first means of giving ils outreach 
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a systematic structure. 
The Manfred Werner building, a new annex to NATO 
headquarter was officially inaugurated on 7 April 1998 by NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana. The building housed diplomatic 
delegations of non NATO partner countries members of the Euro-
Allanlic Partnership Council (EAPC). In addition, 24 out of a lolal 
of 28 EAPC partner countries have now named ambassadors and 
established diplomatic missions to NATO under the 1997 Brussels 
Agreement. These include Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
The Allied leaders launched the Training and Education 
enhancement Programme at the Washington Summit in April 1999-a 
structured approach to improving and harmonising NATO and 
Partner training and education activities, particularly through the 
establishment of PfP training centers.^" 
The PfP Training Centres already designated in Partner 
countries are described below : 
• Yavoriv Training Centre, Ukraine. This was the first Partner 
facility to be recognised as a PfP Training Centre, and has a 
long track record of P&P and similar exercise. 
• Almnas PfP Training Centre; Sweden: with excellent facilities 
and accommodation for 80 part icipants, this centre aims to 
enhance PfP cooperation generally, as well as more 
specifically promoting PfP cooperation in the Baltic sea 
region. 
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• Bucharest IMP Training Cenlre, Romania: Eslablisheil in 
1997 to conduct joint training activities and promote a 
better understanding of common NATO/PfP related issues, 
this centre offers "army brigade", joint service, peace support 
operations and other courses in English. 
• Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland; This 
international foundation with NATO/PfP members was created 
within the framework of Swiss Participation in PfP .Its core 
missions are training, research and conferences for 
diplomates, military officers and civil servants from the 
foreign and defence ministries of NATO and PfP countries. 
• Austrian International Peace Support Command: successor to 
the former Austrian Training Centre for Peacekeeping, this 
centre specialises in training civil and military personnel and 
units for peace-support operations. 
In major foreign policy statement delivered in Detroit. 
President Bill Clinton declared that "by 1999-NATO's 50th 
anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin wall-the first 
group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members 
of NATO. At the same time, the President pointed out that "NATO 
enlargement is not directed against anyone", and he invited 
Russia to take advantages of "the best chance in history to help to 
build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal 
respected and successful partners.^^ 
President Boris Yeltsin's stance against NATO expansion, 
however, underwent a dramatic change during his Helsinki meeting 
with U.S. President Bill Clinton in April 1997. In return for vague 
promises on the future Russian membership in what is now G-7, 
Yeltsin gave the green signal to the West on NATO expansion. On 
May 27,1997, amid much fanfare and media hype, the leader of the 
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16 NATO countries and Russia signed a charier al llie Elysce 
Palace in Paris, by the terms of which Moscow formally agreed to 
NATO's eastward expansion. The charter, called the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act, gives Russia on paper a permanent consultative role 
on security issues relating to Europe. Russia however, will have 
absolutely no say in the affairs of NATO.^ "* The parlies agreed lirsl 
on the establishment of the "Permanent Joint Council (PJC) " and 
the deliberation system (Joint Chairmanship by the Secretary 
General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member 
states on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia). They 
also agreed the PJC would meet at the level of Foreign Ministers 
and that of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at 
the level of ambassadors permanent representatives to the North 
Atlantic Council. It may also meet, as appropriate at the level of 
the heads of State and Government. 
Many in Europe feel that the hidden American agenda is to 
ensure that NATO and not the E.U., defines the structure of a 
wider Europe, and that the European allies share the bulk of the 
financial burden that NATO expansion will entail . The U.S. arms 
manufacturers apparently had an important role to play in 
influencing the US administration's aggressive blue print for NATO 
expansion .The NATO Summit to be held in Madrid in July, 1997, 
was to invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to join the 
alliance by 1999. ' ' 
The U.S. had ruled that only three new countries would be 
admitted to NATO in the first round, though others are to come in 
later. The welcome mat was out for the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. But France, Italy, Canada and other members of the 
alliance were pushing the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia. 
The U.S. would prevail, on these countries, because such decisions 
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must be unanimous."' At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO 
leaders invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start 
accession talks with the Alliance. These accession talks were 
followed by the signing and the subsequent ratification of accession 
protocols. The formal accession of the three new members took 
place on 12 March 1999. The Washington Summit in April 1999 
provided a fitting opportunity to respond to this desire. NATO was 
able to draw upon the experience gained not only during the three 
years of intensified dialogue meetings, but also through the 
integration of three newest members, into the Alliance. The 
result was the Membership Action plan, which provides assessment 
and feedback mechanisms for partners aspiring to NATO 
membership. Each aspirant is invited to submit an annual national 
programme on its preparations for possible membership, covering 
political and economic, defence/military, resource, security and 
legal aspects. Indeed, the decision by NATO to open its doors 
has led many countries in Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate 
their political, economic and military reforms. It has also 
encouraged them to bury old enmities and establish good 
neighbourly relations. Moreover, NATO's opening to Central and 
Eastern Europe is not happening in a vacuum. NATO's other 
initiatives the Partnership for Peace programme, the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, the NATO/ Russian Founding Act, the NATO-
Ukraine Charter and its dialogue with six countries from the 
Mediterranean - have created a powerful momentum for continent-
wide security cooperation. These initiatives have united almost 
all the nations in the Euro-Atlantic area around a common security 
standard.''" The ending of the Cold War and of East-West 
confrontation has not eliminated serious threats to the Western 
democracies or to the world as a whole. These threats do exist, and 
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will p(;rsist until the new states-the Republics of the former Soviet 
Union and, above all, Russia-achieve final success on their round 
to democratic transformation and economic reform. '^  Privately, 
there were suggestions that Russia would eventually like to join 
NATO. While the idea caused a stir of interest in alliance think-
tanks, most rejected it. The allies ultimately concluded that even to 
start a study on Russian membership would be a mistake, for it 
might lead Moscow to think entry was an eventuality, thereby 
reducing its incentives to reform and become more transparent. 
However, a Europe without Russia cannot be peaceful, undivided 
and democratic. If Russia remains on the outside, it will be a 
destabilising presence for the Baltic countries, for Ukraine and the 
Caucasus and for Western interests in central and southeastern 
Europe. It follows that the United states and Europe have much to 
gain by engaging Russia as a partner in building the new Europe 
rather than as a potential adversary."* Since the threats to Russia 
now come, not from America or NATO in the west, but from the 
south and the east, it makes sense to work with America and 
Europe to counter the problems of terrorism and weapons 
proliferation. America and Europe, moreover, are home to the 
firms and stock markets Russia needs to help finance its economic 
revival. 
On May 28,2002 President Vladimir Putin along with the 
leaders of NATO nations were present at Pratica Di Mare, a 
military base just outside the Italian capital , to sign the new 
"Rome Declaration". The Rome Declaration establishes a NATO-
Russia Joint Council. The new deal gave Russia equal standing in 
decision of common interest, ranging from counter terrorism to 
peacekeeping and arms control. President Putin declared thai 
while Russia would not itself seek to join NATO, it would not 
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oppose the next round of NATO's expansion, which looked likely 
to include the three Baltic republ ics / ' ' In November 2002, NATO 
issued membership invitations to seven former Soviet block 
countries stretching from Estonia in the North to Bulgaria in the 
South. All seven states: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia formally joined the alliance in April 
2004, bringing the number of NATO members to 26, as the flags of 
the seven new Allies were raised at the entrance to the Alliance's 
Headquarters in Brussels.** After that, NATO had identified the 
three countries of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia as candidates for 
the new batch of countries to accede to the al l iance. NATO would 
fulfill the process of accession of the 3 countries around 2007.**^ 
4. NATO AND THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
(WMD); 
The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
and their means of delivery are identified as a threat to NATO. 
"The principle non-proliferation goal of the Alliance.. . . is to 
prevent proliferation from accuring or, should it occur, to reverse it 
through diplomatic means. "The non-reference to "diplomatic 
means" of preventing proliferation is not accidental , the use of 
force is clearly what NATO has in mind.*^ In 1994's Summit, 
NATO Heads of state and Government formally acknowledge the 
security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and recognized this as a matter of direct concern to the 
Alliance. They therefore decided to intensify and expand NATO's 
political and defence efforts against proliferation. The North 
Atlantic Council subsequently established two groups to carry out 
this work. The first is the Senior Politico- Military Group on 
Proliferation, chaired by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for 
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Political Affairs. The group's focus is on the political and 
preventive aspects of NATO's approach to dealing with 
proliferation. The second is the Senior Defence Group on 
Proliferation. This group is co-chaired by a European and North 
American nation. The group is responsible for considering how 
NATO's defence posture can support NATO's non-proliferation 
effects but also provide protection should those efforts fail. The 
work of the two groups is brought and reported to the North Atlantic 
Council by the Joint Committee on Proliferation, Chaired by the 
Deputy Secretary General.* 
NATO allies have resolved to quickly ramp up their capacity 
to respond to attacks involving chemical, biological and 
radiological weapons while at the same time not ruling out pre-
emptive strikes as part of their strategy against terrorists. The 
increasing likelihood that terrorists will obtain and use Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) was a central theme at the 6-7 June 2002 
meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels. At the end of the 
meeting , ministers issued a statement identifying four general 
areas whose European allies and Canada need to improve 
capabili t ies, including response to WMD threats as well as 
acquiring strategic lift, secure communications and modern 
weaponry.*" In December 1998, Alliance Foreign and Defence 
Ministers expressed their determination to prepare NATO's forces 
to succeed in the full range of missions that they might have to 
face despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons 
.Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on 
proliferation that were created as a result of the 1994 NATO 
Summit, Ministers indicated that they were prepared to expand 
NATO's effort to address the evolving proliferation risk. A WMD 
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Centre will be created in the NATO International Staff in Brussels 
to improve coordination of all WMD- related activities at 
NATO. The Centre will: 
• Maintain the Matrix of Bilateral WMD Destruction and 
Management Assistance Programmes, a data base designed lo 
expand information sharing between member states on 
national contributions to WMD withdrawal and dismantlement 
in the former Soviet Union; 
• Serve as a repository for information on WMD- related civil 
response programmes in Allied nations; 
• Support the Alliance Groups dealing with WMD proliferation 
and through them, the North Atlantic Council; 
• Develop briefings, fact sheets and other information 
documents on WMD issues for a wider public audience.* 
5. The Medi terranean Dialogue 
NATO has already started a dialogue with six countries of the 
region-Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. 
They have all said they find it useful and want to go further. The 
purpose of the dialogue is to build confidence and to lay the 
ground for future cooperation, ' NATO's dialogue with six-non-
NATO countries of the Mediterranean region, launched in 1995, 
aims to dispel possible misconceptions about the Alliance and lo 
build confidence through greater transparency, discussion and 
cooperation. Simple geography means there will always be a link 
between security in Europe and that of the Mediterranean. The main 
purpose of the dialogue is to contribute to security and stability in 
the Mediterenean, achieving a better mutual understanding and 
correcting any misperceptions between NATO and the 
Mediterranean partners countries and NATO's dialogue is meant to 
reinforce other international efforts such as those undertaken by ihe 
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52 E.U., the OSCE, the WEU, and the Middle East Peace Process. 
Another important step in the effort to exchange information was 
the decision taken by Alliance foreign ministers in May 1998 to 
establish "Contact Point Embassies " in Mediterranean Dialogue 
countries. Under this system, similar to that which has been 
successfully operating in Central and Eastern European partner 
countries since 1992, the embassy of a NATO member country 
will represent the Alliance in each Dialogue count ry / And every 
year, some 500 representatives from NATO member states and 
countries participating in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the 
Mediterranean Dialogue come together at the College to attend an 
increasingly wide range of courses. Key Alliance and geo-strategic 
issues are analysed with the help of top political, military and 
civilian leaders, as well as outstanding international academics.^ 
6. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY 
(ESDI) 
NATO has transformed itself from an alliance for collective 
defence and transatlantic consultation into an organisation with 
most emphasis on defence cooperation and cooperative security. In 
the 1991 Alliance strategic concept, NATO's political strategy, it 
was agreed that within NATO " a European security identity 
"should be developed. The 1994 NATO Summit endorsed concepts 
of "Separable but not separate forces and 'Combined Joint Task 
Forces"(CJTFs) that could be made available for European led 
operations other than collective defence.** The Combined Joint Task 
Forces" (CJTFs) concept. This will provide NATO for the first time 
with deployable and mobile commands, trained and ready to 
respond to a range of contingencies. CJTF would also allow NATO 
assets to be put under WEU command in cases where NATO itself 
decides not to act. Providing forces for the WEU which are 
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"separable but not separate " from NATO will help the European 
Allies lo turn an emerging European Security and Defence Identity 
into an operational reali ty/ ' ' The foundations for the Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept were laid by NATO Heads of state 
and Government at their Brussels Summit in January , 1994, ' and 
was approved at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin 
on June 1995.*" The creation of a permanent framework for 
implementing the CJTF concept poses particular challenges. These 
include the need:-
• to ensure that its development is consistent with other 
elements of NATO's adaptation, including in particular the 
prospective revision of the command structure; 
• to take full account of the WEU dimension by developing the 
concept of separable but not separate capabil i t ies which 
could be used either by NATO or by the WEU; 
• to provide for the possible involvement of non-NATO nations 
in a CJTF; 
• to maximize cost-effectiveness and avoid duplication.^'^ The 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept is closely linked 
to the emerging European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI). By making available such NATO assets and logistic, 
and command and control for operations, the CJTF will avoid 
wasteful duplication of capabilities and prevent competition 
between NATO and the WEU.*" At their meeting in Berlin in 
June 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers took the decision to 
build ESDI within the Alliance. The main element of ESDI 
include ; 
• Political commitment to making a more effective European 
contribution to the Alliance and to close cooperation between 
NATO and WEU. 
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• ESDI lo be developed within NATO. 
• Regular joint meetings of NAC and WEU Council. 
• Potential availability, case by case of NATO assets and 
capabili t ies to support a WEU-led operation. 
• Mechanisms for releasing and returning NATO assets and 
capabili t ies and monitoring their use. 
• Close consultation between NATO and WEU on planning and 
conduct of WEU-led operation involving the use of NATO 
assets and capabili t ies. 
• Requirements for WEU-led operations to be taken into 
account in NATO's defence planning system. 
• NATO's command structure to be able to provide H.Q. 
elements and command positions to command and conduct 
WEU-led operations 
• Planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions to be 
conducted by NATO at request of, and in coordination with, 
WEU." 
The further impetus by Heads of State and Government at 
NATO's Madrid Summit on July, 1997, gave the Europeans more 
clout in Alliance decision making and provided the WEU the tools 
it needed to carry out its own missions. The ESDI formula 
endorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid includes: 
• NATO's full support for the development of ESDI within 
NATO by making available NATO assets and capabili t ies for 
WEU operations; 
• Providing for the support of WEU; 
• Led operations as an element of the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) concept; 
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• Provision wilhin ihe fuUuc new comimuul slnicluro for 
European command arrangements able to prepare, support, 
command and conduct WEU-led operation; 
• Creation of forces capable of operating under the political 
control and strategic direction of the WEU; 
• Arrangement for the identifications of NATO assets and 
capabilit ies that could support WEU- led operations and 
arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of 
such operations; 
• Commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in 
crisis management , including through joint consultations; 
• Strengthening of the institutional cooperation between the two 
organisations; 
• Involving WEU in NATO's defence planning processes/'^ 
The European Union's efforts to develop a credible, 
autonomous European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) were 
concretized with the launch at the France-British Summit at St 
Malo, France in December 1998 of ESDI. It has been the top 
defence policy priority for many European members of NATO for 
the past several years. New, EU-based security organisations-a 
Political and Security Committee, a European Military Staff-have 
been set-up in Brussels, and the Union is developing its 'head line 
goal' force of 60,000 troops, capable of being deployed with 60 
days notice and sustained on mission for at least a year.**^ In 
November 2000, when European governments individually pledged 
to put up enough troops, aircraft and warships to enable a 60,000 
strong force to begin operating over a wide range of missions from 
2003.The largest contributor to the force will be Germany, which 
has pledged 13,500 ground troops, while the UK has committed 
12,500 and France 12,000. Italy and Spain will each contribute 
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upto 6,000 and the Dutch 5000. Other contributions range from 
Greece's 3500 to Luxembourg's 100 of the 15 EU nations, 
only Denmark has declined to take part. The new 100-strong EU 
military Staff will be in place in Brussels by early 2001 under its 
first Director of Military Staff German Army Lt Gen Klaus 
Schuwirth.*** However, General Gustav Hugglund, the EU's 
military chief, said in January ,2002, the 60,000 strong rapid 
reaction force would launch its first exercises in May,2002 but he 
admitted it would be another 10 years before it could carry out "all 
operat ions ' /* Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO 
quoted Mr. Jovier Solana-Chief of the proposed common European 
defence and foreign policy assignment who wrote recently . "If 
NATO and the US want to tackle the crises, all the better. But if 
the US does not engage, as we saw in the Balkans from 1991, to 
1995, someone else may need to , it is better for our over all 
security, if we Europeans can do so effectively. "Hence he 
argued that "Europe would have to ask the United States to do 
something they feel reluctant about, and the United States and 
NATO would be dragged into operations simply for lack of 
alternative".'** 
The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was introduced by 
US Secretary of Defence William Cohen in 1998 and formally 
accepted at April 1999's Washington Summit. The DCI, which 
according to one NATO official, is "to direct national plans 
increasingly to NATO priorities" address five areas: mobility; 
sustainability; precision engagement, command, control and 
communications (C*); and survivability."^ NATO's Defence 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) has provided a sharp focus for nations 
to improve capabilities in critical areas. On a list of 59 action 
items, adopted at Washington on March 1999, only a few are in a 
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stage of being "nearly or fully implemented." These include 
resource implementations for joint logistical centres; requirements 
for multinational logistic formations; interoperability though 
standardisation; national exercise programmes; concept 
development and experimentation; NATO policy on training; 
evaluation and exercises; clearing house mechanism for 
multinational formations; exercises for multi-national forces lo 
promote command and control procedures and common (hjclrinc ; 
and the need for a wide-Area Net work. Another 23 DCl action 
items were said to be showing "Significant progress as given by the 
heads of state and government. However, other DCI areas, mostly 
supporting key improvements in "effective engagement " and 
"survivability of forces and infrastructure work either started late, 
move studies needing to be completed before further activities can 
be launched or, progress depends on procurement of resources not 
forthcoming. Examples include capabilit ies against weapons of 
mass destruction; suppression of enemy air defence and support 
jamming; combat identifications system; and nuclear, biological 
and chemical protection and detection means. NATO's Prague 2002 
Summit, decided to consider 27 of the 59 action items as 
candidates for either multinational, joint or common NATO 
funding. Of those, only 15 were found to be promising, including 
sealift and airlift, co-operative approaches to logistic stocks, 
precision-guided munitions, combat identification, sea-mine 
protection equipment and tactical communications, air-ground 
battlefield surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance systems 
and unmanned air vehicles,**" 
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CHAPTER - 3 
Role Of NATO In Bosnian Crisis 
1. The Background of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed pari of the 
Turkish (Ottoman) Empire for almost 400 years before annexation to 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, On 4 " December 1918 the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were proclaimed when the 
Serbs and Croats agreed with ethnic groups to establish a common 
state under the Serbian monarchy, and in January 1929 King 
Alexander imposed a dictatorship, changing the name of the country 
to Yougoslavia. 
Though officially banned in 1921, the Communist Part of 
Yugoslavia (CPY) operated clandestinely, and in 1937 Josep Broz 
(alias Tito) became the General Secretary of the CPY. During the 
second World War, Tito's Partisans, who were from a variety of 
ethnic groups and were united by ideology rather than ethnicity, 
dominated most of Bosnia and Herzegovina, simultaneously waging 
war against invading German and Italian troops, the 'Ustasa' regime 
in Croatia and the Serb-dominated 'Chetniks ' . On Tito's victory, 
after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was made a constituent 
republic of the Yugoslav federation (despite Serbian pressure to 
limit the region to provincial status).^ 
The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia was 
proclaimed on 29 November 1945. A Soviet-type Constitution, 
establishing a federation of six republics (Serbia, Montenegro, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two 
autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina was adopted in 
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January 1946.'^ The death of Tilo and ihe collapse of Commuiiisl 
rule destroyed the fabric which has held the country together. The 
federal system, which balanced power between the large republics, 
slowly broke down, and the newly elected nationalist leaders in 
Croatia and Serbia set the course which led to war. 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly 
the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a constituent 
republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was 
situated in South-eastern Europe. It was bounded by Croatia to the 
north and West, by Serbia to the east and by Montenegro to the 
South-east. The Muslims (the majority of whom belonged to the 
Sunni sect) were the largest religious grouping in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, comprising 43.7% of the population in 1991. 
Religions affiliation was roughly equaled with ethnicity, the Serbs 
(31.4% of the population) belonging to the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and the Croats (17.3%) being members of the Roman 
Catholic Church,^ 
In the republican election in November and December 1990, 
The ruling League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
ousted, and the three main parties to emerge were all nationalist: 
the Muslim (Bosniak) of the Party of Democratic Action (PDA), 
with 86 Seats; the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), with 72 
seats; and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (CDU-BH), an affiliate of the ruling CDU party of 
Croatia, with 44 seats. On 20 December 1990 they announced 
that Dr. Alija Izetbegovic of the PDA was to be President of the 
Presidency, Jure Pelivan of the CDU-BH was to be President of 
the Executive Council (Prime Minister) and Momcilo Krajisnik of 
the SDP was to be President of the Assembly." 
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In 1991 the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
increasingly dominated by the Serb-Croat conflict. Following the 
declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June, 
Serb-dominated territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina decJiircd 
their intent to remain within the Yugoslav federation (or in a 
'Greater Serbia') . On 9-10 November 1991 the referendum of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's Serbs overwhelming supported their 
remaining in a Yugoslav or Serb State. However, in another 
referendum held on 29' February and 1" March 1992, which was 
open to all ethnic groups but was boycotted by the Serbs, 99.4% 
of the 6 3 % of the electorate who part icipated, were in favour of 
full independence. President Izetbegovic immediately declared 
the republic 's independence and omitted the word 'socialist ' 
from the new state's official title. 
When Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared 
independence and appealed for international recognition. 
Macedonia had no choice but to follow suit. Otherwise it would 
have been swallowed up by Serbia. 
The European Community (EC, now European Union - EU) 
and USA recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence on 7' 
April 1992. On 27' March the Serbs announced the formation of a 
'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which comprised 
Serbian-held area of the republic (about 6 5 % of the total area), 
which was to be headed by Dr. Radovan K a r a d z i c ' 
On June 1992, Francois Mitterrand visited Sarajevo. The 
French President 's trip galvanized humanitarian relief efforts in 
Sarajevo. Until the visit. Western leadership had been in a stupor. 
NATO declined a large role; the EC, riven by dissent and 
discouraged by its inability to make a cease-fire stick, more or less 
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gave up; the United Stales talked tough but refused to a d 
unilaterally. ' 
On July 1992 there was a major development in the 
Bosnian conflict, when a breakaway Croat state, 'The Croatian 
Union of Herzeg-Bosna', was declared. The new state covered about 
30% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was headed by 
Mate Boban. Izetbegovic's Government promptly declared it illegal, 
and Karadzic proposed Serbs and Croats partition of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina among themselves. The United Nations slarletl 
dispatching United Nations Protection Force - 'UNPROFOR' lo 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-July 1992, and it had imposed the 
'no fly zone' on Bosnian airspace in October of the same year. 
2. THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
(1992-93) 
NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Norway on June 1992, 
approved for the first time the formation of a force that could be 
used outside the territory of the alliance states. Finally, impelled 
by scenes of civilian slaughter in Sarajevo, the U.S. and its 
European allies went to work on June, 1992 to impose economic 
sanctions on Serbia. NATO stated its readiness to provide support 
to peace operations under the auspices of the UN Security Council. 
So NATO adopted a series of critical decisions leading to NATO 
naval and air force operations. In June 1992 NATO ships belonging 
to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by 
NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the 
Adriatic. NATO undertook these operations independently in 
support of the UN arms embargo against all republics of the formers 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 'FRY' (resolution 713) and 
sanctions against FRY (resolution 757). They also established full 
control of the Yugoslav coast. According to NATO reports, since 
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November 1992, 63,000 vessel were inspected, and after April 1993 
no ship managed to break the barrier and violate the embargo, 
additionally tightened by resolution 820. ' 
In July 1992, Washington scnl conClicling signals. First il 
ordered a naval task force, including 2,200 marines, into the 
Adriatic Sea off the coast of Yugoslavia. Then, apparently satisfied 
that the Serbs took the point, Washington sent the ships to liberty 
ports in Italy and Greece for the Fourth of July weekend. The U.S. 
restricted itself to sending in supplies into Sarajevo abroad airforce 
C-130, transport planes transport and threatening air and naval 
action if the Serbs interfered. So the first two flights into Sarajevo 
completed safely, and there were contingency plans for retaliation 
of something went wrong later on. 
NATO began enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina on 12' April 1993. The Alliance's action, which 
was being pursued under the authority of UN Security Council 
Resolution 816, was decided by the North Atlantic Council on 8" 
April 1993. * NATO airborne warning and control planes were 
monitoring the 'no-fly' zone established by the Security Council 
over Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1992, and since April 
1993, fighter and reconnaissance planes of NATO member 
states, now numbering some 100, were providing the teeth to 
enhance the Council's interdiction on military flights. And, since 
July 1993, as a further precedent, member states operating in 
the NATO framework had been providing protective air cover (or 
UNPROFOR troops operating on the ground to deter attacks 
against the 'Safe areas ' established by the Security Council. ' ' 
Srebrenica was the first town to be adopted as a safe area in 
April 1993. The next June this formula was applied to another 
five areas, namely Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa.'" 
According lo Bosnian governmenl sources uplo July 1993, Uir 
war in Bosnia alone had cost 139,000 dead and missing; 68,000 
seriously wounded; 3 million refugees; 38 towns substantially 
destroyed; 800 mosques demolished; 200 Churches destroyed; 3 
million people without power; 2.5 million people without water. 
The Bosnian forces, which included Serbs and Croats as well 
as Muslims, now controlled only 10%of the land and were 
desperately seeking Western military intervention lo reverse the 
Serbian tide.^" In March, 1993, without firing a single shot, 
America had intervened in Bosnia. Bill Clinton's decision to 
parachute food and medicine to besieged eastern villages moved 
the United States a critical step deeper into the Balkan crisis if 
only by talking the lead in providing humanitarian aid. In fact, 
despite backing from allies, the United Slates ended-up acting 
alone: with the exception of Turkey and the Netherlands, NATO 
members declined to offer planes or supplies.^' 
Containing the conflict in the Bosnian area was one of the 
prime goals of President Clinton. The constrict and contain 
option was a hash of measures already in place. It preserved the 
no-fly zone and sanctions against Serbia and renewed the threat 
of a war-crimes tribunal. In addition, it aimed to :-
• Press Serbia to accept U.N. monitors or troops along with 
Serbia-Bosnia border to police Belgrade's blockade of 
Bosnian Serb territory, and to place monitors on the Bosnia-
Croatia border. 
• Threaten Croatia with sanctions unless it cuts off support to 
Bosnian Croats. 
This new option also raised fresh suspicious that the West was 
implicitly ratifying the process of "ethnic cleansing". The first 
cracks in the alliance were French made. Foreign Minister of 
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France, Alain Juppe criticized Washington's minimalism, citing its 
continued refusal to commit ground forces to a United Nations 
contingent and its unwillingness to use air power to protect the 
Muslims. Italy was next, apparently miffed that it wasn't consulted. 
Then Germany and Turkey weighted in with objections on moral 
grounds, arguing that they ratified Serbian aggression. ^ Lastly, in 
June 1993 the United Stated began deploying 300 troops to join a 
700-strong U.N. peacekeeping force already in Macedonia. The 
force was supposed to be a tripwire, though after Clinton's cave-in 
over Bosnia, it was not clear that the Serbs would be deterred from 
at tacking," In August 1993's attacks on U.N. troops in Sarajevo by 
the Bosnian Serbs - at the Olympic Stadium and T.V. Station-the 
allies seemed willing to help this time. Washington called a 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing political 
body, to determine when and how airstrikes would be launched from 
Aviano, the Italian air base. Among the possible targets: Serbian 
artillery batteries and ammunition dumps, transport depots and 
routes, command-and-control centers and bridges over the Drina 
river. 
A demilitarised zone had been established on Mt. Igman in 
August 1993, when Bosnian Government forces were in full retreat 
from the Bosnian Serbs. Following an ultimatum from NATO to the 
Serbs to withdraw their forces from Mt. Igman, an agreement was 
negotiated on 14 August 1993 by Gen. Briquenmont for all forces to 
be withdrawn from the region." On 6 October 1993, a Bosnian Army 
patrol crossed the demilitarised zone and killed 20 Serbian 
soldiers. The NATO's position regarding the use of air strikes 
against the Bosnian Army, which was in permanent violation of the 
NATO ultimatum covering the demilitarised zone on Mt. Igman. 
NATO was not prepared to carry out airstrikes against the Bosnian 
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Army merely because they were in the demililarised zone in 
violation of the NATO ultimatum. For the first time it was being 
officially told that NATO had taken sides in the war/" In the same 
month, President Bill Clinton once again warned of possible 
airstrikes on Serbian positions in the hills around Sarajevo. The 
Serbs, who on October 16, 1993 gave the city its worst one-day 
drubbing in at least three months. 
3 . THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 
1994 
At the moment, NATO air forces were operating in support of 
UNPROFOR whose ground operations were essentially humanitarian 
in nature, while the highly effective maritime embargo had been 
mounted in conjunction with the WEU to support the enforcement of 
UN Security Council Resolution 820. The reality was that NATO 
integrated forces made the largest single contribution to the 
international effort in former Yugoslavia. Excluding forces serving 
directly under UN Command, there were now over 100 aircraft, 
more than a dozen highly capable ships and some 10,000 men and 
women from Alliance nations conducting NATO integrated maritime 
and air operations in support of the United Nations effort, 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week. In addition, a further 15,000 personnel 
were contributed directly by Alliance nations to UNPROFOR 
operations. Thus out of a total of approximately 34,000 personnel 
now committed in support of UN operations associated with the 
former Yugoslavia, about 25,000 - that was about three quarters of 
them - came directly or via the Alliance from NATO nations. '" 
In January, 1994, once again NATO repeated its threats of 
airstrikes against the Serbs if they didn't let up. The Serbs 
continued a bombardment heavier that any in the war so far. 
"Sarajevans will not be counting the dead", Bosnian Serb leader 
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Radovan Karadzic cawed in a speech to his rump parliament in 
January. "They will be counting the living". "" The Serbs had been 
threatened so many times with so little alliance follow up-more than 
1,000 violations of the no-fly zone over Bosnia had gone 
unchallenged." 
When a Serb shell killed 68 people and wounded an 
additional 200 in February 1994, NATO established a 20.12 KM 
heavy weapons - exclusion zone around the city of Sarajevo and 
forced the Serbs to put their guns under U.IN. Control. Il was 
decided that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10 February 1994, heavy 
weapons of any of the parties founded within the Sarajevo exclusion 
zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, would, along with their 
direct and essential military support facilities, be subjected to 
NATO airstrikes which would be conducted in close coordination 
with the UN Security Council and would be consistent with the 
North Atlantic Council 's decisions of 2 and 9 Augustl993.' '^ 
In February, 1994, NATO was satisfied that virtually all 
heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo had either been withdrawn or 
placed under effective UNPROFOR control. NATO's objectives set 
on9 February were now being met. Diplomacy could succeed when il 
was backed by credible actions. The solidarity and resolve of this 
Alliance had borne fruit.''* In March, 1994, six Serbian Jastreh 
ground-attack fighters left Banja Luka on a bombing mission to the 
Muslim munitions depot at Novi Travnik. Two U.S. Air Force F-16s, 
patrolling the no-fly zone over Bosnia, ordered the jets to descend; 
when their warnings were ignored, they shot down four of the 
Jaslrebs in what amounted to NATO's first military action in its 45-
year history.•'^' 
It was in March, 1994 also in Washington Bosnian and 
Croatian leaders signed two documents to establish a Bosnian 
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ftuleralion and link lo Croatia. The federation agreements was holl) 
complex and incomplete. It provided for a merger of the Croat and 
Muslim areas of Bosnia under a strong central government and for a 
system of cantons with their own legislatures and courts. 
Within weeks after the Croat formed the federation with 
Bosnia planeloads of Iranian arms began arriving at Zagreb airport, 
waiting for shipment over the border to the weapons starved 
Muslims. John Kenneth Galbraith, the first U.S. ambassador to 
Croatia, his role in permitting Iranian arms to be sold to the 
Bosnian Muslims, not withstanding a U.N. arms embargo, Galbraith 
convinced Franjo Tudjman (Croatian President) that the road to 
favor in Washington was through friendship with Sarajevo.' A 
three-week assault by Serbs during April 1994, turned Gorazde into 
a slaughter house, leaving more than 700 people dead and more 
than 1,900 wounded. NATO threatened the Bosnian Serbs with 
immediate airstrikes if they continued to attack Gorazde, giving 
them 24 hours to withdraw 1.9 miles from the centre of the town, 
and five days to pull back heavy weapons beyond a 12.4 mile 
exclusion zone.*' By Friday, April 15, 1994, Serb forces had moved 
artillery and armored vehicles into surrounding hills and pounded 
away at city of 65,000 civilians with howitzers, and mortars and 
tank cannons. On Saturday, April 16, 1994, afternoon, as Bosnian 
radio reported fretfully that tanks were rolling through Gorazde and 
firing into residential areas, NATO dispatched six planes to search 
for a Serb tank lobbing shells into Gorazde from the city's outskirts. 
Bad weather forced the planes back, but not before a surface-to-air 
missile launched by the Serbs downed a British Sea Harrier Jet. '" 
The Bosnian Serbs wanted to just say no. They did not intend to 
accept the U.S. - European proposal for partitioning war-torn 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The map was the heart of last-ditch peace 
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effort offered by the so-called Contact Group of the U.S., Russia, 
Britain, France and Germany. When the proposal was presented to 
the Muslim-led Bosnian government and the Serb rebels on July 6, 
1994, it came with a ultimatum: if they turned it down, they would 
be punished. The Bosnian government signed on without conditions. 
But the Serbs, who never met a peace plan they liked, with called 
the bluff. The Bosnian Serbs, also viewed the 49% share they were 
allotted as too small, their troops had already captured 72% of the 
country.*' In August, 1994, NATO aircraft conducted airstrikes at 
request of UNPROFOR, NATO aircraft attacked a target within the 
Sarajevo Exclusion Zone on the afternoon of Friday, (5 August, 
1994). The Strikes were ordered following agreement between 
NATO and UNPROFOR, after weapons were seized by Bosnian 
Serbs from a weapons collection site near Sarajevo early ihul 
morning. The Serbs in the zone brushed aside U.N. troops in the 
suburb of Ilidza and took back a T-55 lank, two armored personnel 
carriers and a mobile gun and shot at a U.N. helicopter trailing 
their escape. At this provocation, the United Nations asked NATO 
to strike. Two U.S. 'A-10 Warthogs' soon found an M-18 mobile 
"tank buster" cannon 14 kilometers outside Sarajevo and chewed it 
to pieces in seconds with their 30 MM Machine guns. Russia, which 
had opposed such action in the past, promptly blamed the Serbs for 
provoking it. Earlier in the week the rebel 's longtime patron, 
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, slammed their borders shut 
and even cut off their phones, furious over their final refusal lo 
accept the peace plan devised weeks ago by the joint Western 
Russian Contact Group."'' On Thursday night (September 18, 1994) 
that NATO planes had struck again on the outskirts of Sarajevo. 
NATO fighter-bombers hit Bosnian Serb positions near the capital 
for the fourth time since February in retaliation for attacks on U.N. 
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forces. The planes struck a Bosnian Serb position 11.3 km west of 
Sarajevo, destroying a tank. The NATO action was authorized by 
Yasushi Akashi, the top U.N. official in the former Yugoslavia, 
after two French soldiers were wounded, one seriously, in four 
separate at tacks. The peacekeepers had placed themselves between 
opposing Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government troops, when heavy 
fighting broke out on September 18, in the Sarajevo suburb of 
Sedrenik.*"* Once again, NATO had bombed an obsolete Serb tank on 
September 22, 1994, in an attempt to enforce the breached heavy-
weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, the Serbs quickly stopped 
all aid convoys.** In the course of two weeks, for the first time in 31 
months of war, the Bosnian government forces had retaken some 
150 sq. km. of territory from the Serbs near Bihac in the north, 
made significant gains around strategic Mount Igman overlooking 
the capital of Sarajevo and recaptured the town of Kupres and 
perhaps an additional 100 sq. km. in central Bosnia. '' After the two 
Serbian jets bombed Bihac and the centre of the nearby two of 
Cazin. On Saturday (November 19, 1994), the U.N. Security 
Council voted to permit NATO airstrikes into Croatia, forcing 
NATO officials to confer nervously on how to put the resolution into 
effect. On Monday (November 2 1 , 1994), 39 allied planes repaid 
Croatian Serbs for using napalm and cluster bombs against civilians 
in Bihac a so-called "safe area" in northwest Bosnia-by cratering an 
airbase in Udbina. "Clearly the signal had been sent", said Adm. 
Leighton Smith, commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe. 
Problem was, the Serbs didn't get it: they responded by repairing 
the runway, pressing their attack on the besieged enclave and firing 
on a couple of patrolling British jets . On Wednesday (November 23, 
1994), more than 50 NATO aircraft hit three Serbian missile sites. 
In return, the Serbs took 250 U.N. soldiers hostage, and moved lo 
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within a half - mile of Bihac, where they rained shells on 45,000 
apartment dwellers, 20,000 refugees and the hundreds of mostly 
unarmed Bangladeshi U.N. troops. On Friday (November 25, 1994) 
NATO planes set off to pound the offending artillery pieces, but 
failed to find them. 
At a NATO meeting in Brussels, the U.S. proposed creating 
a weapons-exclusion zone around Bihac, like the one around 
Sarajevo, from which all artillery and tanks would have to be 
withdrawn. For the French and British, it was typical American 
naivete. Exclusion zones need ground troops to monitor the terrain, 
take weaponry into holding areas and report violations. The U.S. 
suggested policing the proposed zone with aircraft. The allies again 
d 49 no. 
4.THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 
1995 
The United Nations embargo on arms shipments to Bosnia was full 
of holes. Of 24,200 vessels challenged by NATO warship in the 
Adriatic Sea over the past two years, only three were found to 
contain military contraband intended for Bosnia. Arms and 
ammunition filtered into the beleaguered country on other routes: 
by air from Muslim supporter such as Turkey or Iran and over land 
from Croatia, Bosnia's new - ally. Tanks and heavy weapons were 
harder to smuggle, but even they were beginning to show up on the 
Bosnian side of the lines.*" 
On May7, 1995, a Bosnian Serb shell killed 11 people in a 
Sarajevo suburb. The next day Bill Clinton asked Anthony Lake, his 
national security advisor, to persuade the allies to strike back. Soon 
after the attack Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith, the U.N. commander in 
Bosnia, requested airstrikes, but was overruled by his civilian 
counterpart in the U.N. mission, Yasushi Akashi."^' The Serbs had 
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already been shelling the Bosnian capital from inside the zone, 
breaking the February 1994, agreement. The Serbs made the nose; 
thumbing official by brassily pulling three artillery pieces and a 
mortar out of U,N. impoundment depot, firing them at Sarajevo and 
ignoring a U.N. - NATO ultimatum to hand them back. This time, 
that was too much even for Yasushi Akashi; the top U.N. Official in 
Bosnia. He had vetoed several previous requests by local U.N. 
commanders for bombing strikes, but this time he approved one. It 
came on Thursday (June 1, 1995) and was more than the usual 
pinprick: a squadron of 15 NATO planes flying out of Italy-Mostly 
American-bombed ammunition dumps just outside Pale, the Bosnian 
Serb's so called capital. The Serbs retaliated by shelling five to the 
six U.N. - established "safe zone" in Bosnia, killing 76 people.^ 
On Friday (June 2, 1995), a U.S. Air Force F-16 had been shol 
down over the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka.' 
After using tanks to drive Dutch peacekeepers out of their 
observation posts and taking several of them hostage, the Serbs 
drew up less than a Kilometer from Srebrenica. On Monday (July 
10, 1995), Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic issued his ultimatum: 
the population of the enclave and the 400-man Dutch battalion must 
leave. Throughout the day, fighting had been going on all over the 
area between Serbs and some 4,000 lightly armed Bosnian 
government troops; one Dutch peacekeeper was killed at a Bosnian 
roadblock. Serbs had already entered Srebrenica when NATO 
planes, finally called in for support, dropped their first bombs-500 
pounders (225 kg) aimed at two tanks. That prompted the Serbs to 
threaten to kill the Dutch soldier they had captured and to shell the 
crowds of refugees already heading for the Dutch battalion's base at 
Potocar i ." Srebrenica enclave fell on July 11 , 1995. The relief 
workers and war-crimes investigators suggested that civilians in 
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Srebrenica around 6,000 to 9,000 men were killed by the Serbs . " 
The war in Bosnia flared like a midsummer forest fire, defying the 
West's wavering attempts to contain it. On Friday, July 2 1 , 1995, 
the NATO allies announced a bold new plan to deter Serb 
aggression. 
In the days that followed this call to arms. Gen. Kalko 
Mladic, the commander of the rebel Bosnia Serbs seized and 
"ethnically cleansed" one "safe area", Zepa, and intensified a 
brutal assault of another, Bihac. By Tuesday, July 25, 1995, 
Bosnian Serbs finally occupied the eastern enclave of Zepa, which 
they had been attacking since June, and promptly ejected 5,000 
women, children and old men because they were Muslim. ^ "There 
are only 69-Ukrainians there," said a senior NATO official. "And 
half of them are drunk". The U.N. troops fired warning shots-not at 
the Serbs, but to warn Muslim Civilians of the Serb advance. This 
time, when the attackers closed in on the enclave, they reportedly 
left their tanks and artillery outside the town limits. "They are 
leaving them outside because they don't want to suffer and more 
bad press" , said the NATO official.*' 
The Croats helped out the Bosnian Muslims and took two 
towns in Bosnia controlled by the Serbs. Following that action, the 
Croats seemed to gear up for a full scale offensive to retake Krajina 
from the Serbs. On Friday (August 11 , 1995), A Danish Soldier was 
killed and two poles were wounded when Croatian units began 
shelling several U.N. observation posts, two more peacekeepers, 
both Czech, had been killed, and more than 90 U.N. soldiers had 
been detained by the Croats. There was no immediate allied 
military response to the attacks, French General Bernard Janvier, 
head of U.N. troops in the former Yugoslavia, pledged air support to 
U.N. peacekeepers who were coming under fire. A pair of U.S. Navy 
EA-6B warplanes demonstrated the all ies ' resolve at dust on Friday, 
when they unleashed a pair of missiles at a Serb missile battery 
near Knin.** France and Britain condemned the assault, while the 
U.S. and Germany all but applauded i t . " The Serbs finally provoked 
the Western allies in August 29, 1995, by firing a shell into a 
Sarajevo market, killing 38 civilians and triggering NATO's air 
Strikes. 
At 2 a.m. on Wednesday (August 30, 1995), the first wave of 
aircraft took off in the dark from NATO bases in Italy and the USS 
Theodore Roosevelt. They bombed Serbian airdefence inslallalioiis 
from Mostar to Gorazde to Tuzla, A second wave of F-18 and F-16 
fighters and radar-jamming planes targeted ammunition depots 
and Serb command posts near Sarajevo. Succeeding waves on 
August 30, targeted Serb command posts and ammunition depots. 
NATO suspended bombing to look for French Pilots shot down near 
Pale. On August 3 1 , NATO warplanes continued to strike targets 
around Sarajevo, hitting at least two ammunition dumps. Bad 
weather and low clouds prevented wider at tacks. ' Over three 
successive days from Wednesday (August 30, 1995) to Friday 
(September 1, 1995), NATO conducted the largest combat operation 
in its history. American, French, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish 
and Turkish Warplanes flew 500 missions from bases in Italy and 
aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. ' When Richard Holbooke landed 
in Belgrade on Wednesday (August 30, 1995), the bombs had 
already been dropping from nine hours, and he had no idea whether 
Milosevic would even agree to see him. However, Milosevic handed 
the American envoy a document signed by Bosnian Serb leaders, 
including Gen. Ratko Mladic and Patriarch Pavie of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. "Look", said Milosevic "I now speak for Pale". 
The Serbian President did what he had boasted he could do he had 
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delivered the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating t ab l e . " The idea was 
to bring the warring parties in Bosnia closer together, and with 
some overt stage management, the U.S. accomplished it literally. 
When the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serb-led 
Yugoslavia arrived at the American mission in Geneva of Friday 
(September 11 , 1995). All of them accepted the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in its present borders, they also approved dividing il 
in some undefined way into "two ent i t ies" , one a Bosnian Serb 
republic and the other the Muslim-Croat federation, 49% of Bosnia 
lo go to the Serbs and 5 1 % to the existing federation of Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats. Even as the diplomats put the final touches on 
their agreement, NATO warplanes were blasting Serb military 
targets in Bosnia for the second straight week. By Friday, 
(September 11, 1995), when the diplomats met in Geneva, NATO 
airforces had flown more than 2,000 sorties.*** For Holbrooke 
persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. Milosevic 
assured him he could force such an outcome. So NATO would halt 
the air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs moved some of their heavy 
weapons out of a 12.4 mile exclusion zone and the Bosnian Muslims 
refrained from the capi ta l . " On September 14, 1995, Bosnian Serbs 
agreed to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and allow 
U.N. access, opened up the Sarajevo airport and one of two relief 
routes for the first time in months.'*'* NATO promptly put its 
airstrikes on hold and gave the Serbs three days-until Sunday 
(September 17, 1995) night - to begin fulfilling their promises. If 
they did so, the bombing pause would be extended for another three 
days to complete and verify the pullback.'"' 
The agreement, negotiated by U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Holbrooke in October, 1995, signed by Izetbegovic 
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and Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ralko Mladic, and 
witnessed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, called for: 
• A comprehensive cease-fire lo commence al one minute after 
midnight (Tuedsay, October 5, 1995) and continue for 60 days 
or until completion of peace talks. 
• Restoration of gas and electricity to the besieged Bosnian 
Capital, Sarajevo. 
• Exchange of all prisoner of war. 
• Free passage of non-military traffic between Sarajevo and 
Gorazde, the Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia. ' 
In Dayton, Ohio, on November 1995, where the President of 
Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia were beginning negotiations aimed at 
ending the brutality of the war in Bosnia. Bosnia will be remained 
as a single state, with an equitable distribution of territory, free 
elections and democratic government. If peace is achieved, NATO 
must help secure it - and only NATO proven, strong, effective - can 
give the Bosnian people the breathing space they need to begin to 
reconcile and rebuild. 
One proposal was for Bosnia's new territories to be bordered 
by "zones of separation" that would provide a 2-KM wide buffer 
zone to keep opposing armies apart. There would also be "heavy-
weapons-exclusion zones" to keep artillery, mortars and tanks an 
additional five miles from each side of the l ine. One task for the 
NATO troops would be maintaining those zones.^" 
In November 1995, NATO planners were also working flat-
out. They seemed to have made a breakthrough-an agreement on the 
terms under which Russian troops would join the 60,000 person 
"implementation force" that was designed to oversee a peacedeal.^' 
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The overall commander of IFOR, U.S. Adm. Leighton Smith, 
would set up his headquarters in Sarajevo. The country would be 
divided into three sectors: The American, headquartered at Tuzla; 
the British, at Gornji Vakuf, and ; the French, at Sarajevo. A 
Russian contingent of roughly 3,000 men probably would deploy in 
American zone. IFOR troops would employ standard NATO rules of 
engagement, meaning that they can shoot first if they think they 
have to.'^ President Milosevic had agreed to give up the safe haven 
of Gorazde, connected by a corridor to Sarajevo. In return, Bosnian 
Muslim would give up Srebrenica and Zepa, and permitted a 
widening of the Posavina Corridor, which linked Serb-controlled 
Bosnian territories in the northwest and the northeast with each 
other and with Serbia. The settlement on Sarajevo not only turned 
the city over to the Muslim-Croat federation's administration but 
also ceded four Serb Suburbs. It would be a very tricky business for 
the Muslims and Croats to take control of them.^^ 
5. The NATO's Role After the Dayton Agreement 
The Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) were 
created by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (commonly known as the "Dayton Accord") which 
ended the war. The Accord was signed on December 14, 1995 by 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." when the transfer of authority 
took place on 20 December 1995, from the commander of UN Peace 
Forces to the commander of IFOR, IFOR'S first priority was to 
establish a secure environment, in which that IFOR was indeed 
different from its predecessor, UNPROFOR-the United Nations 
Protection Force. This was accomplished within hours of transfer of 
authority by IFOR forces knocking down checkpoints and crossing 
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the former confrontation lines into Serb-held areas, areas in which 
UNPROFOR had not previously been allowed to venture."^ 
In Sarajevo, some 40 positions (20 Serb and 20 Bosniac) were 
evaluated and/or destroyed on D+7 that was seven days after 
transfer of authority; former warring faction forces removed all 
forces and weapons from the two-kilometer exclusion zone along the 
entire former line of confrontation and the checkpoints were 
removed." 60 days after the authority was transferred from the U,N. 
to NATO on December 1995. Some 2,500 transport flights, 50 ships 
and 380 trains moved over 200,000 tons of Cargo and nearly 40,000 
troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina/" In January, 1996, an Italian 
sentry in Vogosca, Serb Sarajevo Suburb, was shot, apparently by a 
serb. In the move difficult British and French sectors - as had four 
of the five woundings of NATO troops by mines so far. In this month 
also, it forced a resolution of the most serious incident D-Day. 
Serbs in the heartline Sarajevo of Ilidza, which was not under 
French jurisdiction, abducted 16 Muslims traveling through llic 
area. NATO sent its top aides to visit the Serbs in Ilidza and read 
them the riot act. The 16 were quickly released.^'^ 
In February 1996, a NATO unit of commando from a U.S. 
Special Forces Blackhawk helicopter landed onto a snow-covered 
former skichatet 20 miles west of Sarajevo, in territory controlled 
by the Bosnian government. They stormed in. By the mission's end, 
they had arrested end, they had arrested 11 men suspected of being 
terrorists, three of them Iranians, the rest of them Bosnian Muslims. 
The commandos found a stunning array of sniper rifles, rocket-
launchers and children's toys wired with plastic explosives - one a 
booby - trapped ice-cream cone. And NATO also discovered six 
similar outposts in Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla, the base of the 
American forces."" 
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IFOR's original mandate was to separate the warring parlies 
and take away their heavy weapons, arresting accused war criminals 
only "if they happened to bump into them," as a U.S. official put it. 
Already, NATO forces were paying more attention to war crimes. As 
many as 200 U.S. troops were assigned to protect investigators 
digging up mass graves near Srebrenica. Some 7,000 IFOR military 
engineers had repaired and maintained over 2,500 kilometers of 
roads, repaired and opened up airports, demined and repaired rail-
lines; surveyed damaged power supplies and assisted local 
engineers with repairs, assisted in repairing water supply system 
and constructing new systems, and constructed or repaired over 60 
bridges in the country. 
IFOR had a specialised group of about 350 personnel such as 
lawyers, educators, public transportations special is ts , engineers, 
agriculture experts, economists, public health officials, 
veterinarians, communications experts and many others. These were 
part of a Civil-Military team, referred to as CIMIC, who provided 
technical advice and assistance to various commissions and working 
groups, and to parties, civil organizations and non-governmenlal 
organizations, IFOR units and local authorities."^ In July, 1996, war 
crimes investigators, guarded by NATO troops, began exhuming the 
mass graves of the victims, more than 60 bodies had been founded 
at a site called Cerska. when the Dayton accords that ended the 
fighting in Bosnia were signed, the national and municipal elections 
scheduled for September 14, 1996."' NATO deployed every 
available soldier to guard 4,000 polling places and in effect 
instructed troops to shoot anyone who tried to disrupt the process."' 
The world's most complicated election. Fifty-five parties were 
fielding 3,492 candidates for federal and regional offices, electing 
three ethnic presidents to a joint presidency, and a separate Serb 
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president, and two pair of parliamentary bodies, one for the 
Muslim-Croat federation and one for the Serb Republic. 
4.1 IFOR support covered three a reas : 
• Planning: A team of IFOR officers worked with the OSCE for 
some three months to assists in preparing the elections, 
assisted in selecting polling station si tes , organizing local 
election commission. 
• Logistics: IFOR provided extensive air and ground 
transportation for OSCE officials, supervisors and observers. 
IFOR arranged for printing the massive voter registration list. 
Out-of-theatre, and then transported them to Bosnia. IFOR 
delivered election material to and from the 4,000 polling 
stations, including over 17,000 ballot boxes. 
• Security: On election day, IFOR conducted deterrent patrols 
for voters to cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, closely 
monitored the 19 recommended sites and established quick 
response teams. IFOR successfully completed its mission 
during its one-year mandate. At the end of 1996 a two-year 
civilian consolidation plan was drawn up in Paris and 
London. NATO foreign and Defence Ministers concluded that 
a reduced military presence had to maintained to provide the 
necessary stability for this plan to succeed. The result was 
the organization of a Stabilization Force, which was 
subsequently activated on 20 December 1996. The mission of 
the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) was to deter fresh 
hostilities and to stabilize peace. The North Atlantic Council 
intended to review the force levels of SFOR periodically with 
a view to shifting the focus from stabilization to deterrence 
and completing the mission by 1998."" 
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During the first 100 days of its 18-month mission, the NATO-
led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
• Ensured continued compliance with the 1995 Peace 
Agreement; 
• Promoted freedom of movement throughout the country; 
• Confiscated and destroyed 3,147 unauthorised weapons; 
• Conducted over 1,600 weapons site inspections; 
• Monitored 900 training and movement activit ies; 
• Oversaw approximately 150 de-mining activities; 
• Directed the parties to the Agreement to reduce their weapons 
sites, by 25 percent and increase de-mining" Under IFOR, 
the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) were separated, their heavy 
weapons were put into cantonment sites, and their training 
was brought under IFOR control. SFOR continued to ensure 
thai the EAF remained in compliance with the mililaiy 
aspects of the Peace Agreement, SFOR patrolled a 1,400 KM-
long Zone of Separation, all year in all weather conditions of 
cantonment sites - almost 450 inspections per month. SFOR 
was requiring the EAF to carry out their responsibilit ies for 
de-mining. Failure to carry out these de-mining activities 
could result in unit training bans. With SFOR encouragement 
the entities produced detailed plans for counler-mininj;; 
operations in 1997, and more than 20,000 mines and 1,100 
other unexploded objects had been removed.''" 
In an effort to assist Bosnia to build confidence and mutual trust in 
the military sphere, NATO conducted a two-week course on 
international security for military and civilian defence officials 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The course was held from 23 June to 
4 July 1997 at the NATO School in Oberammergua, Germany. A 
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lolal of 45 military officers and civilian officials participated Iroiii 
both the Federation and Republika Srpska and from all three ethnic 
groups in Bosnia.'" Until autumn 1997, the international community 
in Bosnia was obliged to tolerate the hale speech spewing from 
Srpska Radio-Televizija (SRI), the station controlled by Milosevic's 
poleges in Pale, Republika Srpska, just outside Sarajevo. On 
October 1, 1997, SFOR, troops intervened and seized four 
transmission towers.''^ Thanks to its action, SRT had now been put 
under international supervision and was being reoriented and 
restructured to conform to democratic standards of broadcasting. 
In August, 1997, British and Czech troops intervened in the 
northern city of Banja Luka, to clean out several nest of pro-
Karadzic police. They confiscated 12 tons of weapons. In the same 
month, SFOR's announced a new policy for control and 
restructuring of paramilitary Special Police. SFOR's Operation 
SECURE BEAT was designed to ensure that these forces were 
disbanded or properly incorporated into the armed forces or civil 
police. On 10 November 1997, SFOR took military action to shut 
down a non-compliant Special Police unit in Doboj."* NATO Foreign 
and Defence Ministers, meeting in Brussels on December 1997, 
noted that "securing the peace over the long-term will all require 
further steps to promote confidence and cooperation among the 
armed forces of Bosnia and to encourage the development of 
democratic practices and central defence mechanisms". 
Accordingly, they endorsed an initial set of Security Cooperation 
Activities between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to involve 
representation from both entities and all three ethnic groups. 
Building on the trail Security Cooperation Course conducted by 
NATO in June 1997, these activities would include additional such 
courses, seminars, visits and assessment of how NATO can assist 
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the Bosnian government's central defence institution, the Standing 
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). The aim of the Security 
Cooperation Activities is to contribute to regional stability by: 
• Promoting confidence and cooperation among the armed 
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 
• Encouraging the development of democratic practice and 
central defence structures such as the SCMM. 
6. NATO ON WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 
On 10 July 1997, during a daring operation, UK peacekeepers 
arrested one war crimes suspect, Milan Kovacevic, and killed 
another, Simo Drljaca. Kovacevic and, in particular their removal 
broke the cycle of impunity which had characterized the wars of 
Yugoslav dissolut ion." On 22 January, 1998, SFOR acted to detain 
Goran Jel is ic , who was indicted for war crimes by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He had been 
indicted by the ICTY for the murder of more than 16 persons, 
torture, theft, plunder and ordering the murder of many others. '" 
The Alliance determined its commitment to peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was reconfirmed by February 1998's, decision to 
continue SFOR's mission beyond its initial mandate which ended in 
June 1998. ' Simo Zaric surrendered himself voluntarily to SFOR on 
February 1998 and on 4 March 1998, Dragoljub Kunarac 
surrendered himself voluntarily to SFOR. They had been indicted 
for war crimes by the ICTY.'**" 
On 8 April, 1998, SFOR detained Miroslavkvocka and Mladeii 
Radio, who were indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.'"' On 28 May, 
1998, SFOR detained Milojica Kos, who was indicted by the (ICTY) 
for grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, violations of the laws 
and crimes against humanity and command responsibility and on 15 
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June, 1998, SFOR detained Milorad Kronjelac indicted for war 
crimes by the ICTY. He was a commander of the KP DOM Prison 
camp. He was accused of beatings, murder, willful killing, and 
inhuman acts towards prisoners in this camp during the period of 
April 1992 until 1994."" On 22 July, 1998 SFOR detained two 
individuals who were believed to be indicted for war crimes by the 
ICTY. '" On 27 September 1998, SFOR detained Stevan Todorovic, 
indicted by the ICTY for war crimes committed while serving as the 
Chief of Police for Bosanski Samac between 13 June 1992 and 29 
July 1992, and on 2 December 1998, SFOR detained General 
Radislav Krastic, who was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.'"^ 
On Wednesday, December 2, 1998, NATO forces arrested the 
most senior Bosnian Serb military figure yet seized and within 
hours were preparing to send him to The Hague for trail by the 
ICTY on genocide and war crimes charges. Gen. Radislav Krastic 
was arrested in the sector of north Bosnia controlled by American 
troops as part of the NATO - led Stablization Force (SFOR).'"^ 
On April 3, 2000, NATO-led peacekeepers in Bosnia arrested 
Momcilo Krajisnik, an ally of the notorious former Bosnian Serb 
leader Radovan Karadzic. On 21 April 2000, SFOR peacekeepers 
arrested war crimes suspect Dragan Nikolic, and transferred him to 
the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Haque. Nikolic was 
commander of the Susica detention camp and was accused of crimes 
against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.'"" 
On 25 June, 2000, Dusko Sikirica, was snatched in Bosnia by SFOR 
peacekeepers and transferred him to the International War Crimes 
Tribunal in The Haque. Sikirica, a former commander of the 
Keraterm prison camp, was accused of genocide, violation of the 
laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva 
conventions,'"" During the night of October 12-13, 2000 (NATO-led) 
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SFOR forces conducted an operations to arrest Janko Janjic, a 
Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect indicted for gang-rape and his war 
crimes committed between April 1992 and February 1993 in 
Bosnia. During the course of the arrest on October 12,2000, Janjic 
detonated a hand grenade, which killed himself. 
On 15 April 2001 , SFOR troops detained Dragan Obrenovic, 
one of three Bosnian Serbs Indicted for the Srebrenica massacre, 
and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in 
The Haque."" In April, 2001 , roughly 4,00 NATO - troops 
descended on the Bosnia's strongest private financial institution 
headquarter (Herce - govacka Banka in the city of Mostar), in 80 
armored vehicles, backed by 20 helicopters and two fixed-wing 
aircraft. The troops loaded six trucks with confiscated documents 
from the bank. The bank raid was supposed to help prevent a new 
ethnic collapse. International officials believed that militant Croat 
secessionist were using the bank to launder money for their cause. 
SFOR helped to expel the breakaway forces from military bases and 
weapons depots. Instead SFOR commander Lt. Gen. Michael 
Dodson, ordered all units to retrieve munitions from Bosnian Croat 
storage sites and consolidated them under SFOR control . ' " 
The NATO-led Stabilisation Force troops maintained control 
of the Croatian component of the Federation Army arms and 
ammunition throughout the crisis, forcing hardliners to drop their 
demands."^ On 29 and 30 October 2001 , two illegal arms caches 
were discovered by SFOR troops, in Han Pijesak, a Serb-controlled 
village in Bosnia and Herzegovina which served as a Bosnian Serb-
military headquarters during the Bosnian War . " ' In March 2002 
NATO-led SFOR had launched the operation to arrest Radovan 
Karadzic, former Bosnian Serb leader in the village of Celebici 
involved armored vehicles and helicopter-borne troops but found no 
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sign of Mr. Karadzic who had been indicted for war crimes. Bui the 
operation uncovered nothing more than a weapons store. 
By the end of 2004, NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) would 
be handed over to the European Union Force (EUFOR), The next 
stage in the path from the active peace enforcement of NATO's 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and reduction of military presence in 
SFOR to co-operative arrangements of EUFOR. NATO approved 
EUFOR at its Istanbul Summit on 28-29 June, 2004, and the 
transfer to the new force was planned by the end of 2004. EUFOR 
would be supported by 'Over The Horizon Forces' (OTHFs) that 
could respond to areas that flare up. These included both rapid 
reaction forces capable of deploying within 48 hours and a larger 
capability that could respond over a longer time. ' * Finally , the 
7,000 - strong European Union Forces took over from SFOR on 
December 1, 2 0 0 4 . ' " 
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CHAPTER - 4 
Role Of NATO In Kosovo Crisis 
1. The Background of Kosovo Crisis 
In the Middle Ages most of Kosovo's people were Serbs, or at 
least they were Orthodox Christians, by 1389 Serbia had been 
carved up by feuding nobles. Under the leadership of one of them, 
Lazar Hrebeljanovic, several of Serbia's barons came together in 
that year to take a stand at Kosovo Field against the Ottoman 
Turks. ' The Serbs were not able to stop the Turks. Their last effort 
to stop the invaders was made at the Kosovo Polje. So strong were 
the memories of the Battle of Kosovo Polje that they became the 
most important historical event in the perception of the Serbian 
nationhood. On the feast day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan), 15 June 1389 
(28 June in the Gregoria calendar), the Serbs, led by Lazar and 
joined by the Bosnians, led by Stefan Turtko, were defeated by the 
army of Sultan Mourad I. Both Mourad and Lazar lost their lives in 
the battle," laying the foundations for 500 years of Turkish rule. 
Most Serbs in Kosovo moved north, to be replaced over the 
centuries by Albanians, who largely converted to Islam.* Vov 
centuries after the battle, the Ottoman ruled Kosovo and the rest of 
Serbia, but no empire lasted forever, and the Ottoman spent most of 
the 1800s getting smaller. Serbia regained its independence in 
1878 and in 1912 briefly reasserted control over Kosovo. After 
World War I, Serbia (including Kosovo) was in corporated into llio 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Solvenes, later known as 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was formed in 1918, incorporating Serbia 
with territories formerly under Austrian or Hungarian rule. The 
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Federal Republic was a mosaic of different nalionalilies consisling 
of six republics-Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia.* During the Second World War, 'I'ilo 
and his partisans found very few willing recruits amongst the 
Kosovo Albanians, who did not want to be part of a future 
Yugoslavia. Some Albanian recruits did join after the 1944 Bujan 
Conference, which declared that the future Communist Kosovo 
would have the option of remaining united with Albania. The 
promise was not kept. By the late 1960s things began to change, as 
Tito allowed the Albanianisation of the province. By 1974 Kosovo 
had become a Yugoslav republic in all but name. It had it own 
assembly, police force and local government, and all the 
prerogatives of the other Yugoslav republics such as Croatia or 
Slovenia, In theory the Yugoslav constitution gave the republics llic 
right to secede: Kosovo did not have this right. The powers that the 
1974 constitution granted to the republics and Serbia's two 
provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina in the north, were in many ways 
more theoretical than real. The republics and provinces did have a 
large measure of autonomy but Tito was the final arbiter and the 
real law of the land.^ In tracing the rise of Serbian President, 
Slobodan Milosevic, one was led to Kosovo. Following the ouster of 
his mentor Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic used Kosovo to initiate an 
anti-Albanian campaign, beginning in 1987. Fanning the flames of 
discontent, he took a hard-line position against Kosovo's Albanians. 
Following a 'wildcat' strike at the Trepca mines which brought the 
province to a standstil l , Milosevic rallied over 500,000 Serbs in 
Belgrade's main square. He promised that those responsible would 
be punished and that Serbia would never give up Kosovo. He 
succeeded by late 1989 in increasing police precincts in Kosovo by 
63 percent, police units by 58 percent and more importantly, in 
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gaining the majority he needed in the Kosovo Assembly to retract 
Kosovo's status as an autonomous province. Moving swiftly, 
Milosevic used the Serb-led Assembly to legislate Serbia's control 
over Kosovo's police, civil defence, courts and selection ol 
officials.' In July 1990, the Serbs dissolved the Kosovo provincial 
assembly and indicted 111 of ils members for Ireason. Thousands of 
ethnic Albanian employees of the provincial government were fired 
because they were Albanians, Serb police occupied the province's 
television and radio stations, closed the main Albanian-language 
newspaper, detained hundreds of suspected dissidents , and ki l leld 
at least 50 participants in street demonstrations. After Croatia and 
Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, Serbia sent additional 
police and army units to Kosovo and increased patrols and 
roadblocks there, turning the province into " a virtual police 
state". Milosevic's reimposition of Serbian power in Kosovo 
sparked a cycle of competitive nationalisms, which by 1991, was to 
lead to the demise of Yugoslavia and to war. The Albanians had 
fought the Serbs at least four times in the twentieth century, so the 
Albanians decision not to fight in the early 1990s was born not of 
passivity but of Shrewd logic. With the demise of Communism and 
the one-party state, Kosovo Albanian politics came to be dominated 
by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova. 
But with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, he declared 
Kosovo's independence and became President of the Republic. 
Unlike Slovenia or Croatia, however, Kosovo had no means to make 
this independence real . ' Ibrahim Rugova believed that mounting an 
insurrection against the Serbs would be suicidal since they would 
use their vastly superior forces to respond with 'ethnic cleansing' 
and a campaign of massacres. Instead, he promoted a strategy of 
passive resistance and 'created parallel ' state structures. '" 
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2. The Causes of ihe War in Kosovo 
Until 1996, the resistance in Kosovo was generally passive. Thai 
year with Milosevic under intense pressure from the West, the KLA 
(Kosovo Liberation Army) made its appearance. The heavy flow of 
illegal weapons from neighboring Albania strenghetened the KLA. 
The KLA (also known under its Albanian acronym UCK for -
Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves) was the main military organization 
fighting for the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian rule. Its origins 
went back as far ar- 1996. Only in November 1997, however, did 
UCK members identified themselves for the first time to the 
public.'^ The KLA had adopted a classic insurgency strategy lo 
undermine Belgradt 's control. This included; 
• attacks on Serbian forces; 
• intermittent pressure on Serbian civilians to leave their 
homes; 
• assassinations of local Albanian 'collaborators ' . 
By early 1998, the KLA succeeded in driving the Serbian police 
from Drenica. On 4 March, the police struck back in Drenica and 
killing some 80 people, including many women and children, this 
indiscriminate Serbian violence infuriated the Kosovars and 
sparked a rebellion, for which the KLA was not prepared. The 
organization found itself attempting to manage and arm an uprising 
that grew far faster than it had anticipated.''* On April 30, 1998. 
The North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to independence for 
Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status quo. It 
rejected all use of violence, either by state security forces lo 
suppress political dissent or by separatist groups to seek political 
change. 
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In mid-1998 NATO conducted a number of military exercises 
in Albania, in conjunction with the Albanian armed forces, in an 
attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian Government to end 
military action in Kosovo," Vowing not to permit another slaughter 
like Bosnia' s the NATO allies threatened Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic in June, 1998 with air strikes unless he hailed 
his security force's attacks on the rebellious Albanians. Secretary 
of State Madeliene Albright wanted the White House to push harder 
for NATO military action, but Defence Secretary William Cohen 
balked, fearing air strikes would only embolden the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, then at the peak of its strength and demanding an 
independent state, which Washington opposed. 
Serbian forces dealt the Kosovo Liberation Army a severe 
blow on 14 August 1998, when they captured the Junik in Western 
Kosovo. Situated in the hills just below the mountainous frontier 
with Albania, the village had served as the main distribution point 
for arms, ammunition and men smuggled - across the border to the 
KLA. The operation inflicted heavy casualties and drove thousands 
of ethnic Albanians from their villages.'" 
Press accounts suggested a dramatic change in the attitude of 
NATO members after the discovery on September 29, 1998, that the 
Serbs had massacred Albanian civilians in the villages of Gornje 
Obrinje and Golubuvac. This time, the NATO countries did belter 
at orchestrating words and deeds and conveying threats by deed as 
well as by word. Over the course of two carefully scripted weeks 
September 30 to October 13 - attack aircraft were moved to bases 
in Italy and Great Britain, an aircraft carrier and other naval 
vessels were moved closer to Yugoslavia, and an activation order 
authorizing an strikes was issued.'** On September 23 , 1998, the UN 
Security Council had demanded an immediate cease-fire and the 
116 
slarl of a credible political dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. 
Shortly thereafter, the Serbs launched new offensives aimed ul 
eradicating the KLA in the Drenica region, in the Cicavica 
Mountains northwest of Pristina, and in the Southwest part of 
Kosovo.^" This Serb offensives occurred even as the United Stales 
was asking the North Atlantic Council canvass NATO members 
concerning their willingness to contribute personnel and equipment 
to a military operation in Kosovo.^ Most of the NATO debate on llu; 
use of force against Yugoslavia took place between the Security 
Council voted on Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998 and 
NATO's brandishing the threat of force on 12 October. That threat 
took the form of an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing the 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) to launch air 
strikes within four days if Milosevic did not comply with the 
provisions of the UN resi lut ion." NATO had insisted on full and 
unconditional compliance by President Milosevic with United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (to maintain the ceasefire 
and withdrawal the Special Police Force from Kosovo) and 
Resolution 1203 (The unrestricted access of NATO's aerial 
surveillance assets and the Kosovo Diplomatic Mission in Kosovo). 
NATO knew that President Milosevic would move when he was 
presented with the credible threat of force." The agreement reached 
on 12 October between the US and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia removed the immediate threat of NATO air strikes, and 
was an important step towards the internationalisation of the 
Kosovo conflict. The document stipulated that: 
• Serbian forces in the province should be reduced to their pre-
conflict levels (around 10,000 police and 11,000 army troops, 
compared to a total of more than 50,000 before the 
agreement); 
117 
• refugees should be able to return to their homes; and 
• upto 2,000 'compliance verifiers' from the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would be 
deployed to monitor the situation on the ground. 
Just before the Serbian redeployment began on 26 October, 1998, 
KLA sources were saying that the KLA had not signed ihe 
agreement and was thus not bound by its terms. After heavy US 
pressure to the KLA, however, they declared on 27 October thai 
they would: 
• abide by a cease fire; 
• not set up checkpoints; and 
• not begin any new offensives, as long as Serbian 
forces kept out of the areas in which KLA fighters 
were deployed. 
The agreement concluded between the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and NATO established the air verification mission, 
complementing the OSCE ground mission, to verify compliance with 
UNSCRs 1199 and 1203. Sustained pressure was instrumental in 
achieving these results and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. 
The threat of the use of NATO airpower to verify compliance 
through the conduct of the air verification mission over Kosovo, 
Operation "Eagle Eye". In order to provide the ability to withdraw 
verifiers in an emergency, NATO had deployed an Extraction Force, 
Operation "Joint Guarantor", in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Experts estimated that by the end of 1998, 2,500 Kosovars 
had been killed in the struggle for autonomy , and more than 
200,000 had fled their homes in the province for fear of Serb 
paramilitary assaults.^^ The Serbs not entirely living upto the 
October agreement in any case, responded accordingly. In January 
1999, the discovery of forty-five Albanian bodies in the village ol 
Racak, most apparently murdered by Serb security forces or 
paramilitaries. Thus all the parties were summoned to Rambouillel, 
France, to try to achieve a permanent negotiated solution. Brilaiti, 
France and the United Stales controlled the February negotiations, 
drafting the settlement document with little input from the Albanian 
and Serb delegation that were present. The proposed Rambouillel 
accords would have provided Kosovo with substantial autonomy, 
essentially self-government for its Albanian majority. The province 
would have been policed by NATO for three or more years. The Serb 
regular army would have been required to leave Kosovo except for 
2,500 border troops permitted to remain in the province to survey 
its external borders. Twenty five hundred Serb interior ministry 
police would have been allowed to remain for one year. NATO 
forces required complete and unimpeded military access (including 
basing rights) any where in Yugoslavia." Sources in the U.S. 
intelligence community reported toward the end of February 1999 
that "6,500 more Yugoslav troops, along with 250 tanks and 90 
artillery pieces, were massing just outside (Kosovo) in apparent 
preparation for a large-scale offensive". Other intelligence reports 
indicated that Yugoslav "army units and other security forces 
throughout Serbia were being mobilized for a possible a t tack ." That 
winter, NATO intelligence officers learned that the Serbs planned a 
massive encircling operation against the KLA, code-named 
"Potkova" (Horseshoe), after the Spring thaw. One report published 
in March 1999 concluded that Milosevic intended to ethnically 
cleanse all 1.8 million Albanians living in the province within a 
1 29 
week. 
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The 17-day-long peace conference on Kosovo held in 
Rambouillet, France, in February ended in deadlock. Milsoevic 
maintained that his government would not agree to the stationing of 
armed NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo and his government was 
against the Western proposal for holding referendum in three years 
time on the question of independence for Kosovo. NATO issued a 
warning that 400 aircraft were kept ready to strike if Yugoslavia did 
not sign an accord which would be readied in March 1999.' The 
Kosovo Albanians signed an international peace plan for the 
Serbian province on March 19, 1999, but their Yugoslav adversaries 
boycotted the event and Russia declined to countersign the historic 
document as a witness. In a televised ceremony, four ethnic 
Albanian leaders signed an 82 page "interim agreement for peace 
and self-government in Kosovo "negotiated in February 1999 in 
Rambouillet, near Paris." 
On March 24, 1999, four German Tornado fighter bombers 
took off from a NATO base and participated in the first wave of air 
strikes against Serb military targets in Kosovo. Fifteen German 
aircraft and hundreds of support troops were engaged in NATO's 
Operation Allied Force for the next 78 days. The same day (on 
March 24, 1999) U.S. led NATO forces launched cruise missiles 
and bombs at target throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), plunging America into a military conflict that President 
Clinton said was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and bring 
stability to Eastern Europe". By bombing the FRY, Clinton 
informed the nation, "we are upholding our values, protecting our 
interests, and advancing the cause of peace". "We cannot respond 
to such tragedies everywhere, but when ethnic conflict turns inlo 
ethnic cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and 
that is clearly the case in Kosovo". Had we faltered in what ihe 
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heading of his speech calls "A Jusl and Necessary War", ''\\\v 
result would have been a moral and strategic disaster. The Albanian 
Kosovars would have become a people without a homeland, living in 
difficult conditions in some of the poorest countries in Europe", a 
fate that the U.S. cannot tolerate for suffering people". 
From a NATO perspective, Milosevic's campaign of ethnic 
cleansing started well before the initiation of airstr ikes. In January 
1999, two months before Allied Force, the Serb special forces had 
already forced 300,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes and 
ethnic cleansing of the local civilian population was on upward 
trend and would have increased whether NATO had acted or not.^ 
NATO's objectives in starting the raids were two fold. One was to 
induce President Slobodan Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet 
Plan, the minimlalist agenda of which was to restore Kosovo's 
autonomy abrogated by Milosevic in 1989. The other objective was 
to save the civilians of Kosovo from immenenl 'ethnic cleansing ' . ' ' 
A total of 20 F-16 fighter aircraft of the Royal Netherlands Air 
Force (RNLAF), was made available to the NATO operations 
"Allied Force". The contribution of the Netherlands was part of a 
combined Belgian Dutch detachment operating under the name of 
DATF. DATF flew its missions from the military arirfield Amendola 
in the South of Italy. The Italians provided round-the-clock host 
nation support which included, inter alia, fire services, air traffic 
control, security etc. Transport aircraft were also flying almost 
round-the-clock from the Netherlands, carrying the right type of 
munitions on schedule to Amendola, while two KDC-10 tanker 
aircraft of the RNLAF provided air-to-air refuelling to NATO 
fighter aircraft. During the first hours of the strikes the RNLAF 
downed an MIG-29 Fulcrum by means of a Beyond Vision Range 
radar-guided miss i le . " In the first days of the war, most air attacks 
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were directed against the Serb air defence network. But although 
NATO destroyed 12 of Yugoslavia's 15 most modern MIG-29 
fighters and ten anti-aircraft missile sites, the bulk of Serb low-
level air defence systems remained intact. ' On April 14, 1999, 
NATO warplanes dumped bombs and missiles on a convoy of 
Albanian refugees on the Dakovica Prizren road; they included 
elderly people, women and children. In the attack, 82 people were 
killed and 50 were injured. In the same month, Serbian state 
television accused NATO of using its helicopters to transport 
guerilla forces to positions from where they could launch attacks 
inside Yugoslavia.*' And according to Belgrade, by the third week 
of April, NATO had conducted more than 1,000 airstrikes using 600 
aircraft and 800 cruise missiles. Three thousand tonnes of 
explosives were expended on 150 targets; more than 300 civilians 
were killed and 3,000 more were seriously injured.^" And the 
bombing of Radio-Television Serbia on April 23 , 1999, as pari of 
NATO's airstrikes against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict. 
Sixteen people died in the attack. The weight of evidence 
suggested that NATO forces began the war over Kosovo without a 
well worked-out plan for employing airpower to affect directly the 
ability of Serb forces to .opera te in Kosovo: President Clinton's 
initial claimed that the purpose of the war was to punish Serb 
forces that were attacking Kosovar Albanians, and to reduce their 
ability to do so, had not been translated into an operational plan. 
Once it became clear that the initial limited air attacks would not 
influence the Serbs, who parallel campaigns were launched: one 
against Serbia proper and one against the Serb Forces in the field. 
NATO never came up with an answer to Serb forces in the field, 
though it often claimed to have them on the ropes. From the outset 
of the war through mid-May, it was reasonable for Milosevic to be 
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believe thai his political strategy was working, if not perfectly. The 
Russians provided substantial diplomatic support. Germany, Italy, 
and Greece proved uneasy about the war. The expulsion of the 
Albanians had not, however, worked to undermine NATO's 
cohesion. Russia immediately proved deeply distressed with 
NATO's action, suspending most formal cooperative arrangements 
with NATO after the first night of the war.*^ Milosevic's efforts to 
exploit collateral damage failed to erode significantly U.S. or allied 
support for the short-term fighting of targeting restrictions on 
NATO bombers: in April, for instance, NATO modified its 
procedures to require that U.S. pilots receive authorization before 
striking military convoys, after a U.S. warplane mistakenly hit a 
refugee convoy.*"' During Operation Allied Force, the U.S. airpower 
doctrine was not fully applied. It was a phased air campaign without 
'massive and overwhelming force'. The NATO intervention was not 
an intensive war, but an air campaign with sequential phases. The 
first phase was the so-called limited air response, with phase 1 of 
Operations Plan (Oplan) 10601, which required air superiority. The 
second phase was aimed to Serb units in Kosovo. This was the so-
called tactical air campaign. Third phase was the so- called 
strategic air campaign throughout the FRY. It was aimed at 
isolating the Serbs in Kosovo.** At the start of April, NATO thus 
decided to shift to a new phase in its air campaign. This involved 
targeting economic and communications points in Serbia, including 
bridges, oil refineries and power stations. Attack on civilian 
infrastructure were intended to cripple the Yugoslav army's fuel 
supplies. They also signaled to the Serbian authorities and ihc 
population that, if they refused to surrender, NATO would do great 
damage in the long run Yugoslavia's economy and to any prospects 
of national growth and prosperity. The second aspect of NATO's 
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strategy: the move to hit Yugoslav forces in Kosovo with ground-
attack aircraft and helicopters. The aim was both to restrict the 
ability of these forces to attack the ethnic - Albanian population, 
and to underline to Belgrade that NATO was determined to carry on 
its air campaign over a long-period and even at the cost of 
casualt ies. NATO thus deployed new aircraft, including, most 
importantly, some 24 US air force A-10 Warthog ground-attack 
aircraft, and a similar number of US army AH-64 Apache 
helicopters. The Albanian government gave permission for the 
Apaches to be stationed near its border with Kosovo, together with 
18 multi-launched ground-attack rocket systems and 2,600 
American ground troops. The declared purpose of these forces was 
to provide security for the Apaches and their crews and support 
staff against Yugoslav forces infiltrating across the border, " a 
threat highlighted by the capture on 31 March 1999 of three US 
soldiers on the Macedonia border by Yugoslav forces. ' NATO war 
planners had the suppression of Serb air defences as their initial 
military objective. Once air defences had been suppressed, other 
attack aircraft could be avoided because the political leaders of 
NATO feared that there was not enough political support at home to 
continue the war in the event of sustained losses. The Serbs seemed 
to have understood NATO's tactical hopes, and operated lo thwart 
ihem. So long as Serb defences survived and continued lo engage 
NATO aircraft, NATO's overall effectiveness could be diminished. 
Thus the Serbs took great care in each potential engagement to 
weigh risk against opportunity. They had to show NATO that their 
air defences were still dangerous, everyday so they had to launch 
some weapons. At the same time, the Serbs had to take into account 
the limitations of their own systems vis-a-vis those of NATO. If 
radars were left on too long in the hopes of completing an 
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engagemenl, a NATO hunter-killer aircraft, the F-16 CJ equipped 
with high-speed anti-radiation missile and special targeting gear to 
locate Serb radars, would surely attack them. The Serbs played cat 
and mouse, ihey would turn off llieir eiigugciiKMil radars if ihcy 
thought they would come under attack. On average, they fired only 
about 10 SAMs per night for the duration of the war-but 
occasionally as many as three dozen. On the eve of NATO's 50' 
anniversary summit meeting in Washington, British and French 
leaders began pressing allies to consider sending ground forces into 
Kosovo.* Critics warned, however, that holding the alliance 
together even during the air war nearly impossible, and they 
believed that the ground troops contingency might very well bring 
down governments across Europe. For example, leftists in the 
Italian government threatened serious political action unless the 
government could convince allies to offer a bombing pause as a 
concession for peace negotiations. The Greek government was 
deeply opposed to any use of force in the region, and the German 
government faced potential opposition to a ground war from the 
political left and right. Thus, NATO leaders sought a delicate 
comprises on the eve of the 50' anniversary summit: Prime Minister 
Tony Blair would stop talking publicly about an invasion, and 
NATO officers would update old contingency plans for ground 
operations in the Balkans. Within weeks they had come up with a 
preliminary plan for an attack on Kosovo by 175,000 troops set to 
begin on September 1, 1999. The ground troops issue came to a 
head on May 27, 1999, in a secret meeting of NATO Defence 
Ministers held at the German Defence Ministry Office outside Bone, 
U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen, German Defence Minister 
Rudoff Scharping, British Defence Minister George Robertson, and 
the Defence Ministers of France and Italy met for seven intense 
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hours of debate about ground troops. While they did not reach a 
final decision, the ministers were united in their opinions that 
NATO could not afford to lose the war and that their five 
governments needed to reach a consensus on ground troops wilhin 
the next week. On a very practical level, allied leaders were aware 
that initial deployments to ready a ground offensive were urgently 
needed; the first snowfall in Kosovo would arrive by the end of 
October.*" Hungary was in a uniquely sensitive position among the 
allies vis-a-vis Serbia for several reasons. First, Hungary was the 
only NATO member that shared a border with Yugoslavia, so fears 
related to the spread of the war were foremost in the thinking of 
political leaders. Second, 300,000 ethnic Hungarians lived in the 
Vojvodina region of northern Serbia. Concern about Yugoslav 
reprisals against this segment of the Hungarian Diaspora drove 
Hungarian policy to oppose a NATO ground war and to refuse direct 
participation in a ground war should it occur. Only NATO, and 
certainly not the relief agencies, could resolve the worsening 
refugee crisis-one that would grow worse so long as Kosovo 
remained in the hands of Milosevic's thugs. It was NATO that took 
care of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Only a military 
organization had the money, the logistical capability and the 
political muscle to build camps for hundreds of thousands. If NATO 
were to withdraw from the camps in Macedonia, where the Kosovar 
refugees were hated by the ethnic Macedonian majority, new 
catastrophe would be all but a certainty, ^ In this context, NATO 
during its April 1999 fifteenth anniversary meeting declared that il 
had the authority to intervene in conflicts beyond its borders 
without the sanction of the United Nat ions." NATO had provided an 
unprecedented level of humanitarian support to alleviate the 
suffering to those refugees. NATO supported for the UNHCR-led 
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humanitarian operation in Albania and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. When Yugoslav aggression against ethnic 
Albanians began to generate large numbers of forced expulsions and 
refugees, UNHCR again turned to NATO for assistance in: 
• Managing the airlift of relief supplies; 
• Easing pressure on the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia by Iransfering some refugees to NATO countries 
on a temporary basis; 
• Off loading and providing immediate storage of aid cargoes; 
• Setting up refugee camp sites; and 
• Providing information regarding numbers and locations of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
NATO countries responded to appeals from UNHCR and the Skopje 
government by offering to provide temporary asylum for more than 
110,000 Kosovar refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. They had provided aircraft to move more than 60,000 
people to all 19 NATO member countries.*^ On Friday, May 7, the 
CNN was reporting that NATO had bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade", The B2 bombers really had dropped bombs on a building 
that NATO's pilots had thought was a Yugoslav weapons acquisition 
agency. Tragically, the targeters had confused the agency with a 
similarly shaped building nearby the Chinese embassy. The fateful 
error caused the death of three Chinese and injured twenty. The 
fact that the embassy had been hit several times prompted Beijing 
to accuse NATO of a deliberate a t t ack ." NATO's accidental 
bombing of the Chinese embassy on May 7, probably encouraged the 
Serbs to stay in the game. Bombing of downtown Belgrade was 
suspended for nearly two weeks after this mistake. Given the minor 
diplomatic firestorm that immediately ensued, it was reasonable for 
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Milosevic lo wail and see if he could profit from ihe error. And l!ie 
change in NATO targeting no doubt suggested to him that he was 
profiting from it. On the other front, little damage was done to the 
Serb forces in Kosovo between May 8 and May 29, so Milosevic 
would not have felt under any great pressure in the province. And 
another colosal NATO targeting error on May, 13, in which perhaps 
eighty-seven Kosovar Albanian civilians were killed in bombing of 
the village of Korisa, might also have convinced the Serbs that 
there was still hope that collateral damage would produce internal 
fissures in the alliance. 
The NATO campaign aimed to prevent the Serb-Albanian 
conflict in Kosovo from spilling into Macedonia. This 'doomsday 
scenario' foresaw a war pitting Macedonian Slavs against 
Macedonian Albanians, which would then suck in the neighbours, 
Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece, and later, possibly even 
Turkey. The entire 78-day operation, AWACS aircraft in nearly 
three continuous 24-hour orbits controlled the Kosovo and Serbian 
airspace. Operation Allied Force required the NATO Airborne Early 
Warning (NAEW) Force to operate at 200% of its peace-time flying 
rate. NATO E-3s flew 656 sorties and 6,110 hours in support of 
Operation Allied Force from 24 March-9 June, 1999,^" More than 
23,000 weapons were delivered with devastating effect against 
hundreds of fixed and mobile targets througout Serbia and 
Montenegro. By early June, moderate damage had been inflicted 
upon Serb ground forces and the air defence and command and 
control systems. Significant damage had been inflicted upon the 
supply routes into Kosovo, fuel and other key military industries. 
The electrical power system, the sinews of the modern industrial 
state, was taken down but in manner that permitted rapid 
restoration upon termination of the conflict. Despite the launch of 
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uliiiosl BOO uir doroiioc missiles uiid signiliiuml ex|)(Mi(liliiics ol 
other air defence munitions, only two NATO aircraft were lost. Both 
pitots were recovered from Serb territory by Allied search and 
rescue teams.*^ Operation Allied Force was also military 
significant. It was NATO's largest combat operation to dale, 
demonstrating significant prowess and featuring the most precise 
air campaign conducted in history, with a minimum of collateral 
damage. The technology was the key to their success, some of the 
innovations introduced in Kosovo were the result of a U.S. 
Department of Defence Initiative called the Advance Concept 
Technology Demonstration Programme, such as the Predator 
unmaned aerial vehicle. This aircraft carried video cameras and 
other sensing devices. In Kosovo, Predators often flew over areas 
too dangerous for manned aircraft. They kept almost constant 
surveillance on enemy forces operating in open country and were 
also used to observe refugees and assess battle damage. NATO's 
extensive surveillance during the Kosovo campaign increasingly 
drove Serbian forces into hiding, forcing them to rely extensively on 
camouflage and concealment. Though this made it more difficult for 
Alliance planes to find them, it also prevented their offensive 
employment.*" The damage count after these two and a half months 
read something like this: bridges demolished: 24; bridges damaged: 
12; petrochemicals industry, totally destroyed; automobile and 
aeronautical industry, bombed to extinction; airports damaged : 7; 
television stations hit:6; power plants destroyed in Belgrade, 
Kolubara, Kostulac and on the river Drina.*' In Washington, it was 
now frequently said that the war to undo Milosevic's campaign for 
murder and mass deportation of the Kosovo Albanians could help 
usher in a new global moral order. But NATO's unwillingness to 
attack on land meant that the moral claims it was now making for 
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itself needed to be treated with skepticism. Kosovo did indeed 
break new ground in terms of the lengths that great powers now 
seemed willing to go in ordering their soldiers to kill for high moral 
principles. But Kosovo revealed little about the far more imporlaril 
commitment that would have been involved had NATO been willing 
to have its soldiers die for such principles. It was all very well to 
talk about the defence of human rights. But such talk rang hallow 
when the commitment was not permitted to go much below 15,000 
feet ." 
West Europeans were entitled to think that America's way of 
waging war was ugly, for it involved putting thousands of civilians 
at risk while minimizing the dangers to its own armed forces. Yet 
the European method was even uglier; it was to pretend that war 
was such a horrible thing that it could always be avoided so long as 
men of good will were prepared to talk, and talk, and talk to each 
other. But sometimes men of good will were nowhere to be found. 
Then war might be necessary; but modern Europe was not ready for 
it. So for nearly a decade, Europeans had been unable to stop a 
succession of brutal conflicts in the Balkans. Even as sneered al 
the reluctant cowboys of the United States, the old World had to 
rely on the New World's muscle."^^ From a NATO perspective, the 
most helpful observations was that Milosevic's campaign of ethnic 
cleansing started well before the initiation of air strikes that in 
January 1999, two months before Allied Force, the Serb special 
forces had already forced 300,000 Kosovo Albanians from their 
homes. The ethnic cleansing of the local civilian 
population was on an upward trend and would have increased 
whether NATO had acted or not. In doing so, he gave the lie to 
commentators who alleged that NATO caused the humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo by taking action and that its cure was worse than 
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ihe disease. NATO task for starling the air campaign loo slowly and 
ruling out a ground option at the beginning, thereby depriving the 
Alliance's strategy of the element of surprise, which would have 
kept Milosevic guessing. They had a point, but conflict was the url 
of the politically possible as well as the militarily desirable. 
NATO's choice was not between the perfect campaign and the 
imperfect variant. Given the need to achieve consensus among the 
19 NATO governments, it was a choice between an imperfect 
campaign and none at all. Better perhaps to win ugly than to lose 
beautifully.** 
3 . HOW DID NATO END THE WAR IN KOSOVO? 
On May 30, 1999, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbot held talks in Bonn with Schroder, Fischer, President 
Ahtisari, and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, as the 
international diplomats prepared for the final shuttle mission to 
Belgrade the next day. Schroder was optimistic about the prospects 
for peace, and he told reporters that the world was "on the way to a 
political solution of the problem and substantial progress had been 
made. He was right. One June 2, 1999, Ahtisari and Chernomyrdin 
negotiated a final settlement with Slobodan Milosevic to end the 
Kosovo War. The G-8 hammered out a consolidated taxt by the 
morning of June 2, which was taken Belgrade the same day. The 
agreement included all of NATO's critical demands for ending the 
war: the end of violence, the withdrawal of all Serb security forces, 
the deployment of substantial and unconstrained NATO force in 
Kosovo, the return of refugees, and commitment from Yugoslavia 
to "substantial self government for Kosovo". From the Russian and 
Serb points of view, the document included a central political role 
for the UN in the "interim" administration of the province, an 
acknowledgement that "self-government" must also take into 
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account the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, "the demilitarization of the KLA, and no 
explicit reference to any process that could lead to dejure 
independence for Kosovo. Indirectly, the document also included a 
military role for Russia.*' Thus, while NATO insisted on a unified 
NATO command in Kosovo, its negotiators allowed ambiguity in the 
draft peace accords about the relationship of Russian troops lo 
NATO. Had all ambiguity been eliminated, it seemed possible that 
Russia would have abandoned the negotiations which might have 
caused Milosevic to hang on a little longer to see if Russian anti-
NATO diplomacy and concomitant European unease would reemerge 
to provide the possibility of a better deal. The diplomatic action 
then shifted lo the technical talks in Macedonia between the Serb 
military and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) about the modalities of 
the Serb withdrawal, where the fight over the role of the UN 
continued. NATO leaders expected that these talks, which began on 
June 5, 1999, would go quickly, but both the Serbs and NATO (and 
arguably the Russians) continued to argue over the terms of the 
settlement. The original NATO draft military agreement included no 
reference to the UN, and thus from the Serbs point of view 
represented a substantial deviation from the G-8 peace proposal 
they had just endorsed.*" In the last fortnight of the war, KLA 
operations near the Kosovo-Albanian border forced Yugoslav 
soldiers out into the open. This enabled NATO aircraft to attack 
them, causing what were probably the most substantial military 
casualties of the whole campaign. A NATO air attack on 7 June, in 
which US B-52s used cluster bombs against Yugoslav forces near 
Mount Pastrick, killing several hundred, appeared to have put 
effective pressure on the Serb negotiators in the stalled talks al 
Kumanovo, Macedonia.*' On June 10, 1999 UNSC Resolution 1244 
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set the basis for ending the air campaign. The air operation was 
suspended by Secretary General Javier Solana on June 10, 1999 
after Milosevic had accepted the prescribed conditions and was 
formally ended on June 20, 1999 after the withdrawal of all Serb 
military, special police and para-military forces from Kosovo. The 
elite force for 200 Russian paratroopers outmanoeuvred the force of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and arrived in 
Pristina on June 12, Russian paratroopers had taken control of the 
Pristina airport before NATO troops could move in. NATO officials 
said off the record that Russian peacekeepers were not given a 
separate sector to patrol because such a move would have led to the 
partition of Kosovo, with the slavs protecting the Serbs and the 
Kosovars refusing to return to a Russian-controlled zone. Under the 
terms of the deal negotiated in July, 1999, Russia could send 3,600 
peacekeepers to Kosovo, Around 750 of them would be located in 
the vicinity of Pristina airport a Russian would be designated 
commander of the airfield but the overall air operations would be 
under the NATO command. The rest of the Russian troops would be 
in the three sectors located in the north and north-west of Kosovo, 
under the control of the U.S., Germany and France ."The Chairman 
of the foreign affairs committee of the Duma (the lower House of the 
Russian Parliament), Vladimir Lukin, said the United States was 
trying to dupe Moscow. He said that the Security Council resolution 
provided for the deployment of an international security force -
under a joint command. However, after the resolution was signcul, 
there was an announcement that NATO would conduct the 
operation. ^ KFOR entered Kosovo from the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia on 12 June ("D-day"), with a force of 20,000 
troops split up into six brigades led by France, Germany, Italy, the 
US and two from the U.K. In 11 days, the operation achieved that 
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stated aim: the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo and their replacement by KFOR as the only legitimate 
military force under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1244. 
The outcome on 9 June was a Military Technical Agreement 
(MTA) that set out in detail that was to be in effect a "relief in 
place" between the withdrawing Yugoslav forces and the advancing 
KFOR troops. On 10 June, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1244 which formalized the mission for the 
International Security Presence, provided by the NATO led KFOR, 
and the International Civilian Presence known as UNMIK (UN 
Interim) Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
The NATO forces were entering Kosovo on the basis of a 
U.N. mandate rather than an agreement between Belgrade and the 
Atlantic Alliance. Kosovo was explicitly described as a part of 
Yugoslavia, albeit an autonomous one; the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Yugoslavia were affirmed. The provision for a 
referendum at the end of three years had been abandoned, and the 
initial insistence on complete NATO control had been watered down 
some extent by a series of U.N. mandates. Given the magnitude of 
the tasks required by Resolution 1244, they obviously had to be 
carried out in an integrated manner with a clear chain of command. 
But reality did not quite comply. There was dualism at the top of 
the international administration between the United Nations Interim 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR and also significanl 
divisions with UNMIK. Dualism at the top of the command of an 
international administration was not a novel problem. The Dayton 
Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina envisaged a similar 
arrangement (although in that case, the civilian component was run 
by a specially created international authority rather than the UN). 
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This dualism rei'lecled iho relucluiice ol' key NATO slules lo p k u r 
their military forces under UN command, with inevitably created an 
accountability gap in the chain of command, and the capacity of the 
civilian administrators to display credible authority to the local 
population. During the first phase of Kosovo's international 
administration, the problem of enforcing a clear chain of command 
were in fact bigger within KFOR, particularly between the 
commander of KFOR and national contingents, than between 
UNMIK and KFOR. The generally excellent personal cooperation 
between and first Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG), Bernard Kouchner, and the first four KFOR commanders 
reduced considerably the potential problems of this top-level 
dualism. Still, given that UNMIK could not promptly deploy a 
credible international police force, its ability to enforce political 
initiatives was limited by what KFOR was willing or able to do. One 
important consequence was the failure to exercise full authority in 
Serb-majority areas of northern Kosovo and divided Mitrovica." 
4 . NATO and the outcome of the War In Kosovo 
The European Union had estimated that rebuilding Kosovo would 
cost atleast S30 billion. The NATO bombardment had set 
Yugoslavia back into an almost pre-industrial state. A Belgrade 
research unit estimated that costs of rebuilding could run $50 
billion to S150 billion and could take decades.'*^ The President of 
the European Union (E.U.), Romano Prodi, recently admitted that 
the NATO ignited war in the Balkans had "created a horrible 
environmental problem that is for us to take care of"." The United 
States dropped more than 1,100 cluster bomb on Kosovo: that was 
1,100 "dispensers" containing a total of more than 200,000 
"bomblets" as the soda-can-sized explosive were called. The British 
dropped hundreds more. Others were jettisoned into the Adriatic by 
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Allied pilots who deemed it unsafe to land with unused ordnance 
still attached to their wings. According to the World Health 
Organization, about 150 Kosovars were killed or injured by "land 
mines and unexploded ordnance" - including bomblets - in the first 
four weeks after the war ended on June 13, 1999, 
In just two weeks on KFOR's operation, it had detained more 
than two hundered detainees, many of them held for such serious 
criminal offenses as arson, violent assaults and murder, but also for 
grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
laws ." On 20 September 1999, the KLA was officially approved the 
statement by KLA (also known as (UCK) Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. 
Agim Ceku that declared: "The UCK has complied with all 
provisions of the Undertaking (to disarm) and completed its process 
of demilitrization". The Undertaking of Demilitarization and 
Transformation, signed by the KLA on 21 June 1999, stipulated ihai 
the KLA would hand over its weapons to be stored under NATO 
supervision. More than 9,000 rifles, 800 machine guns, 300 anti-
lank weapons, 178 mortars, 27,000 handgrenades, 1,200 mortar 
bombs, over a ton of explosives and 5.5 million rounds of 
ammunition were handed in."" The Kosovo Force (KFOR) had been 
instrumental in much of the progress made in many areas of the 
province's daily life. Mandated by the United Nations with prime 
responsibility for preventing renewed hosti l i t ies, securing the 
province and ensuring public safety, KFOR was also tasked lo 
support the lead civilian agencies in the areas of humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction, as well as the work to rebuild Kosovo's 
civil society. One priority that was to clear mines. Explosive 
experts had cleared mines and other devices from 1,700 kilometers 
of roads, over 1,200 schools and 16,000 houses or public buildings. 
But the main challenge would be keeping a lid on ethnic tensions 
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and tacking crime. On any given day, two out of every three KFOR 
soldiers were out conducting between 500 to 750 patrols, guarding 
over 550 key sites and operating over 200 vehicle checkpoints. 
During the past year (1999), the number of serious crimes, such as 
looting, kidnapping and arson, had decreased dramatically and the 
murder rate was down from some 50 revenge killings a week to an 
average of five-fewer than many Western capitals . But many KFOR 
Commanders expressed their frustration in terms of being unable to 
place an armored vehicle outside every home. In fact, every Serbian 
or Roma pocket had a KFOR guard force, as did every Orthodox 
church and cemetery or Serbian monument. Despite the large 
number of troops engaged in guarding minorities, violence and 
murders continue and serve to further undermine KFOR authority."^ 
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4.1 The Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac 
(UCPMB in Albanian) 
On 21-22 November 2000, when ethnic Albanian militants 
launched attacks against Serbian police units stationed in the 
Presevo Valley bordering Kosovo. The area was within the 
demilitarised zone specified within the agreement between the 
Yugoslav government and NATO that ended the al l iance 's 1999 air 
campaign against Yugoslavia. The militants were fighting to unite 
the predominantly Albanian Presevo Valley with Kosovo. After four 
Serbian policeman were killed in the fighting and 12 others were 
injured. The NATO-led Kosovo Force closed all routes leading to 
the border with the Presevo Valley and seized mortars, rocket 
launchers ammunition in a raid prompted by mortar fire into the 
valley originated from Kosovo."^ The Liberation Army of Presevo, 
Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB in Albanian) named after three 
towns in this ethnic Albanian-dominated sliver of southern Serbia, 
the well-armed rebels were fighting for autonomy and the right to 
unify their region with neighbouring Kosovo. In December, 2000, 
NATO peacekeepers seized a truckload of ammunition, mortars, 
camouflage uniforms and shoulder patches bound for Presevo from 
Kosovo's Drenica region, the birthplace of the KLA."* 
4.2 The National Liberation Army (NLA) 
NATO - led units based throughout Kosovo had all 
contributed to the success of alliance efforts to slop ethnic 
Albanian rebel forces of the National Liberation Army (NLA) usiti}^ 
the U.N. administered province as base for their operation in 
Macedonia. The evidence was that it had been successful. More 
than 2,000 weapons, 1,500 handgrenades, over 132,000 rounds of 
ammunition had been seized. The border interdiction programme, 
dubbed 'Operation Eagle', aimed to seize arms, ammunition and 
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personnel smuggled across from Kosovo into Macedonia and 
involved between 11-15 companies of KFOR troops at any one time. 
"Operation Eagle was a highly successful operation", it was only 
one part of KFOR's campaign against extremist violence in 
Kosovo." Following the deployment of KFOR to the north, NATO 
had maintained about 2,500 troops in Macedonia. During Operation 
Essential Harvest, NATO forces helped enforce a cease-fire 
agreement between Albanian separatists and the Macedonian 
government. NATO forces collected 3,300 small arms and more than 
70,000 rounds of ammunition. Alliance troops also provided border 
security and arrested more than 300 suspected rebels who were 
endeavoring to cross illegally into Macedonia.* 
5. The UN General Assembly under the "Uni t ing for Peace" 
mechanism and the Veto power of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council 
The veto power of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council has been questioned in its present form. During the Korean 
War (1950-53), the then Western majority of the United Nations did 
not accept that the Security Council could be blocked out of action 
and influence by the use of the veto by the Soviet Union, at a time 
when peace was being threatened or broken. The so-called "Uniting 
for Peace" resolution, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
November 1950, allowed a qualified majority of the Assembly to 
assume responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, whenever the Security Council was unable or 
unwilling to do so. During the Kosovo crisis-when both Russia and 
China threatened to veto any enabling Council resolution - NATO 
could have appealed to the General Assembly under the "Uniting 
for Peace" mechanism for approval of its armed intervention."' 
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The latest report concerning NATO's compliance with 
international humanitarian law took the form of a decision rendered 
on the 13 June 2000 by a Special Committee established on 14 May 
1999 by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in pursuance of article 
18 of its statute. Assessing whether the operations led by NATO in 
Kosovo violated articles 35(3) and 55 of protocol I pertaining to the 
protection of environment, the Committee concluded that the extent 
of harm did not reach the threshold encapsulated in these 
provisions. It also came to the conclusion that the damage to the 
natural environment was collateral, i.e. unintentional and 
furthermore proportionate to the military purpose. Such reasoning 
was also applicable to the use of deplecled uranium projecliles. As 
to the use of cluster bombs, the report noted, unlike in the case 
presented in front of ICTY's Trial Chamber, that NATO's intention 
was not to attack the civilian population. The first incident 
reviewed by the Committee was the attack on a civilian passenger 
train at the Grdelice Gorge on 12 April 1999, upon which the basic 
facts had been agreed. In the instance of the first attack on ihe 
train, the Committee declared that the information provided "did 
not provide a sufficient basis to initiate on investigation", for the 
bridge should be considered as a legitimate military objective and 
it appeared that the train "was not deliberately targeted". As to the 
second incident related to the attack on the Djakovica convoy that 
was composed refugees the Committee declared that it had "divided 
views" as to its legality but nonetheless held that "the incident 
should not be investigated" as it did not reach the threshold set 
forth in paragraphs 5 of the Commitee's report dealing with the 
Review Criteria. The careful formulation of the Committee showed 
that whereas some members doubted as to the legality of the second 
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attack, they nevertheless did not believe that NATO should be held 
criminally liable for it.'" NATO officials explained to Amnesty 
International that, in practice, if a NATO member who had been 
given a bombing assignment by NATO staff, believed that "the 
target was illegitimate or that the attack would otherwise violate 
international law and possibly their national law", then, that stale 
might refuse to execute it. The attack would however not be 
reassigned to another member in that case. Rather frightening was 
the fact that NATO admitted that, in some instances, not all 
members were aware of the selected targets or the means and 
method used for a given attack. This meant that, despite its 
ignorance of an attack, a member state might be held legally 
responsible for the attack. In addition, some accounts suggested 
that the United States chose to bomb the Radio-Television Serbia 
(RTS) despite objections raised by other NATO members. For 
example, the British forces refused to take part in the bombing of 
the Serbian Television while the French refused to hit bridges. 
These positions "drove the level of American involvement upon 
90% range, simply because they read the Geneva Conventions [in a 
different way] and they were prepared to go and Europeans were 
not. In a rather consternating conclusion pertaining to the 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy, the Committee declared that the 
aircrew should not be held criminally responsible as they were 
given the wrong target and that seniors leaders should not either be 
assigned criminal responsibility as they were provided with wrong 
information. 
5.1 NATO and International Law in the Kosovo Crisis 
When NATO threatened in October 1998 to bomb Yugoslavia 
for the first time over Kosovo, everyone of its then 16 members 
resisted the idea, as did the U.N. Security Council. As a U.S. 
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administration official said back then, "The Chinese didn't like it 
because of Tibet. The, Russians hated it because of Chechnya, 
France and Spain have Corsica and the Basques". 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo with the unsparing logic, a 
tension between "two pillars of world order": the United Nations 
Charter prohibits the forcible violation of state sovereignty while 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the 
individual's right against slate supression.' ' 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan provided unexpected 
backing for NATO's military threats. Portrayed at being at adds on 
the use of force during the Kosovo crisis in October 1998, Annan 
told NATO ambassadors that the international community must have 
no "i l lusions", about the need to use force when all other means 
have failed"."' The better legal view is that the NATO bombing was 
not unlawful if it was a genuine and proportionate response as a 
matter of humanitarian necessity, to stop ( or even to punish) an 
ongoing crime against humanity."* One of the most assertive 
proponents of military action was the US Washington's arguments, 
however, was based more on political than legal arguments. Indeed, 
answering a journalist 's question on 8 October 1998, Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright said that she did not think she had to 
answer international legal questions in detail."* NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana relied on a cluster of reasons to justify the 
threat of military action in October 1998. These reasons included: 
• The failure of Yugoslavia to fulfil the requirements set out by 
Resolutions 1160 and 1199, based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter ' ; 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression. 
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• The imminent risk of a humanitarian catastrophe, as 
documented by the report of the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan on 4 September 1998; 
• The impossibility to obtain, in short order, a Security Council 
resolution mandating the use of force; and 
• The fact that Resolution 1199 states that the deterioration of 
the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region.^ 
Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998, in particular, had 
demanded that Yugoslavia inter alia ' cease all action by the 
security forces affecting the civilian population, and had referred to 
possible 'further action' if measures demand in the resolution were 
not taken. In addition. Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998, by 
demanding Serb compliance with a number of key provisions of 
accords concluded in Belgrade on 15-16 October (including with 
the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo), accepted that the 
Alliance had direct standing and interest in the Kosovo issue. An 
argument can be made that, even if the Security Council was not 
able to follow these resolutions on Kosovo with a specific aulhority 
to use force, they provided some legal basis for military action. On 
26 March 1999, two days after the bombing began, the Security 
Council did, in a curious way give at least a crumb of legal comfort 
to the NATO cause. A draft resolution sponsored by Russia (and 
supported by two non-Council members, India and Belarus) called 
for 'an immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia'. Only three states (Russia, China and 
Namibia) voted in favour, and 12 against. In the debate, the 
speeches in support of the resolution did not address in any detail 
the question of what to do about Kosovo. The representative of 
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Slovenia, which was among ihe stales opposing ihe resolulion, made, 
the key point that the Security Council did not have monopoly and 
decision-making regarding the use of force. It has the primary, hul 
not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace 
and security. 
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan showed awareness of this 
when, at the beginning of the bombing campaign, he issued a 
statement which recognised that there were occasion when force 
might be necessary, but also referred to the importance of Security 
Council authorisation."" The most important was that the situation 
in Kosovo was indeed a threat to international peace and security. 
Both President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair, in their 
major speeches on the war, put emphasis on the proposition that a 
large new wave of refugees from Kosovo could destabilize 
neighbouring countries and lead to an expansion of the war. " 
Further, it became increasingly clear that the recommendations, 
resolutions and roles of outside institutions - the European Union 
(EU), NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and UN-were being ignored or violated, especially 
by the Yugoslav authorities. The absence of U.N. Security Council 
authorization for the use of force against Yugoslavia was always 
going to be a difficult problem for NATO. Russia and China had 
consistently made it clear that they would veto any proposal for 
military action against Yugoslavia regarding its conduct in its own 
territory. Was NATO right to have launch Operation Allied Force 
without at least making an attempt to get authorization from the 
Security Council? The argument for and would have enabled people 
around the world to see exactly which states were refusing to 
authorise action to stop atrocities.'"" But NATO's unilateral use of 
force, critics argued, was, at best, a significant departure from 
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international legality. At worst, it jeopardised the international 
order based on the UN Charter which entrusts the Security Council 
with the responsibility to monitor and guarantee international peace 
and security. The Alliance's military action was necessary on moral 
and political grounds. 
5.2 International Lawyers and the Kosovo Cr i s i s . 
The legal question, however, is important. It goes, indeed, to 
the foundation of the international order established since 1945 on 
the basis of the UN Charter. By and large, despite their criticism on 
the UN as an organisation, the countries of NATO had stood 
staunchly against 'rouge' and other lawless stales that threaten lo 
upset that order. More significant perhaps, NATO regarded itself as 
an alliance of democratic nations, whose political system is based 
on the rule of law and it had certainly been, accepted as such by the 
new members eager to join the 'Club of democracies ' . Presumably, 
respect for the rule of law domestically should be joined by a 
similar respect for the rule law on the international scence."" The 
use of forces is governed in international law by the UN Charter. At 
the root of that Charter is the principle of the sovereignty and 
integrity of states. As a result, the Charter sets clear prohibitions 
on 'the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state' (article 2 S 4), allowing for the 
two exceptions only. The first is individual or collective self-
defence (art.51), when a member state is the victim of aggression. 
Called to rule on attempts by some states to justify encroachment 
on other states ' sovereignty by claims of self-defence.'"^ 
In late September 1998, Italian Defence Minister Benjamino 
Adreatta hinted that the danger of humanitarian catastrophe caused 
by Belgrade created the 'conditions for the application of article 
5 1 ' , meaning, presumably, the right to collective self defence. 
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According to the UN Charter, however, this right only applies lo 
states not entities such as Kosovo. International law governing the 
right of humanitarian intervention is incomplete. International 
practice has evolved swiftly during the 1990s. Yet the incipient 
political and moral consensus that intervention is somelinics 
necessary to prevent human-rights violation on a major scale has 
not been formalised into a set of rules of international law. It is now 
urgent that this consensus should be transformed into law. 
Incoming Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping came perhaps closest 
in spirit to German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel 's argument in 
stating that he considered it essential that international law be 
further developed so that massive human-rights violations could be 
considered as legitimate ground for military intervention. 
International human-rights law is an offshoot of the UN's 
Declaration of Human Rights, and consists of a body of rules 
adopted either at the universal level (for example, the 1966 
Covenants on International Civil and Political Rights, and on 
Economic and Social Rights; and the 1984 Convention against 
Torture), or the regional level (the 1949 European Convention on 
the Human Rights). These provides for a set of political or judicial 
procedures to monitor and respect for the rights involved. Some of 
these rights, such as the prohibition of torture, have been confirmed 
as having erga omnes quality. One of the weakness of human-rights 
law, however, is that apart from genocide-which is the object of a 
specific convention (1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) - definition of 'gross and 
massive violations of human rights ' is no where to be found. Even in 
the case of genocide, which each state is obliged to 'prevent ' and 
'punish ' , the Convention does not have an enforcement mechanism, 
and is virtually silent on means to prevent the crime.'"^ But what is 
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also common to international human-rights law and humanitarian 
law is that however sophisticated they are becoming in laying out 
sanctions, they are silent on preventive measures. Yet, it is 
precisely the prevention of massive human rights violations of 
humanitarian catastrophes that has become the basis ol 
'humanitarian intervention' practices in recent years. These 
practices have not yet been codified into law. The only certainly, 
about them is that, increasingly they give primacy to human rights 
over the sovereignty of states when the two principles conflict. At 
the root of humanitarian intervention is the recognition that 
population in danger of starvation, massacre or other forms of 
massive suffering have the right to receive assistance. That 
principles set-out by the Geneva Assembly's Resolution 43/131 (8 
December 1988), reaffirmed and specified in the General 
Assembly's Resolution 45/100 (14 December 1990)-has been 
confirmed by many subsequent Security Council Resolutions.""' 
One therefore has to agree with French lawyer Mario Bettati 
that there is a certain 'hypocrisy' in international right of victims to 
assistance, it is not possible to derive a right of states to bring this 
assistance by all means, including military force. At best one has lo 
consider that states face a moral obligation which consists for the 
slate where a humanitarian disaster is occurring, in refraining from 
obstructing relief operations, and, for other states, in bringing 
assistance to those in need. The unfinished state of international 
law, and its strong political coloration. As stressed above, there is 
increasing recognition that human rights do not belong exclusively 
to the domestic affairs of slates. In addition, since ihe early ]99()s 
it has become the practice of the Security Council, supported by 
international opinion, to allow military intervention to rescue the 
victims of domestic conflicts. '"' Most international lawyers would 
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agree that the current law of the UN Charter does not accommodate 
the bombing of Yugoslavia, since the action was neither based on a 
Security Council decision under Charter VII of the UN Charter, nor 
pursued in collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter-
the only two justifications for use of force that are currently 
available under international law. Nevertheless, many of these same 
lawyers, would also agree that there is a trend in today's 
international community towards a belter balance between iho 
security of states, on the one hand, and the security of the people, 
on the other. Recent statements by UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan also support this view. Addressing the Commission on 
Human Rights in Geneva on T"" April 1999 - in the early days of 
NATO's bombing campaign and referring to the "universal sense out 
outrage"-provoked by the repression of Kosovo Albanians by 
Milosevic's regime, he stated: "Emerging slowly, but I believe 
surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of 
minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of 
sovereignty", and that the UN Charter should "never [be] the source 
of comfort or "justification" for "those guilty of gross and shocking 
violations of human rights". ' 108 
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CHAPTER - 5 
Conclusion 
A stable peace on the planet in many respects also depended on peace of 
Europe. The whole of Europe has been trampled by jackboots and sodden with 
the blood of its peoples. No part of the continent has been spared the horrors of 
war from ancient times to ourday. It had witnessed the Greco-Persian and the 
Punic wars, the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the conquest of Gaul by 
Julius Caesar, the movement of the Goths against Italy, the wars of the Huns 
against the Goths, the struggle against the invasion of Genghis" Khan, the 
conquest of the Scandinavians, the Crusades, dynastic wars of the feudal lords, 
the Napoleonic wars for the division and the repartitioning of the World, wars 
that lasted seven, thirty and even one hundred years. Both World wars began in 
Europe. 
NATO was always intended to be both more and less than a military alliance. 
The original idea was the brainchild of Britain's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. 
In Jan 1948, Bevin suggested to Washington that it would be possible to stem the 
further encroachment of the Soviet tide only "by organizing and consolidating the 
ethical and spiritual forces of Western civilization". 
The alliance had been created in 1949, in order to keep the Americans in, the 
Russians out, and to solve the German problem. 
Besides preventively deterring the elusive Soviet threat, did NATO fend 
off other threats to Europe's peace? "Keeping the Americans in, the Russians 
out, and the Germans down" has been cited as a triple raison d'etre ever since 
the alliance's first secretary-general. Lord Ismay, uttered the quip. Yet the nation 
of German menace was a fallacy. The first West German Chancellor, Konrad 
Adenauer, had a hard time convincing his compatriots that the new German state 
needed an army at all. The alliance justified German rearmament on the 
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specious grounds that Germans has to be contained in a Western defence 
stnicture to proclivities; this excuse was originally intended to reassure the 
fearful postwar generation in France. Once the West had been reassured, the 
curious idea took hold that even the Russians liked NATO because it kept the 
German Bundeswher under American rein. 
When Soviet power collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, an intense 
debate developed over the roles Europe's security institutions should play in the 
new era. Some, led by Moscow, favored abolishing both the Warsaw pact and 
NATO and giving primacy to a pan - European collective security organization, 
perhaps in the form of a strengthened Conference on Security and Cooperation on 
Europe. Others, led by Paris, believed that NATO was still needed, but that 
primacy should be given to European institutions such as the Western European 
Union and the European Community, which became the European Union (EU) 
when the Maastricht Treaty and European Union went into effect in November 
1993. Still others, led by Washington and London, believe that direct American 
engagement in European security affairs is still indispensable and that NATO, 
which provided the organizational framework for American engagement in 
Europe, was indispensable as well. According to this line of thinking, NATO is 
needed to be preserved, reformulated, and made the centerpiece of Europe's new 
security architecture. 
European war has been avoided; who deserved the credit for that, as with 
anything that did not happen, will remain forever uncertain. Did NATO deter 
intended Soviet aggression? Did it curb the bellicosity of Germans and keep the 
lid on a crisis? Did it shorten the Cold War, bring it to a happy end? Did it keep 
the nuclear genie safely under control while the conflict lasted? Did it husband 
its other military forces well? With the Cold War over, evidence is now available 
to broaden the judgment on NATO and help provide answers to questions like 
these. 
NATO is not only a political and military reality but also an institution 
with a powerful legacy of historical success. Almost half a century of democracy, 
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stability, and prosperity in Western Europe, with most of those years passed 
under stressful Cold War conditions, has been possible because of NATO's 
defensive umbrella. This protection has also symbolized moral values in 
international affairs. 
NATO has been eminently successful in achieving the goal of deterrence. 
As a NATO publication has expressed it: "Not one square inch of free territory in 
Europe has fallen under Soviet domination since the signature of the Treaty". 
Now that the object has been achieved, voices are being raised suggesting 
that the marriage should be dissolved and its partners left free to look elsewhere 
for their security. But another characteristic of arranged marriages was thai they 
did not dissolve even after the children had grown up. For one thing, a household 
had been created that remained the family home. For another, spouse had grown 
used to one another, and even if there was still little affection, they had learned 
to make allowances for each other's infirmities. For a third, they could think of 
no other arrangement that was equally convenient to both. Most important of all, 
a separation was likely to have serious repercussions for their extended families 
and the society that surrounded them. So it is with NATO. It has built up a 
politico-military infrastructure that integrates the armed forces of much of 
Europe and provides the United States with a unique capacity to influence the 
policy of its allies and vice versa. It remains, astonishingly and perhaps absurdly 
and the Americans can meet to discuss their politico-military problems and 
make provisions for them. . 
Advocates of NATO expansion had given their views as follows;-
First, It was said that NATO enlargement was needed to deter Russian 
aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Second, advocates of NATO expansion maintained that, even if there is no 
Russian military threat, membership should be offered to Central Europe 
because this would "project stability" into the region. Michael Mandelbaun 
argued that NATO expansion would extend the Alliance's "Zone of Stability" 
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eastwards, while Volker Ruhe insisted that "if we do not export stahiiity, we will 
import instability. 
Third, advocates of NATO expansion maintained that, because it would 
take many years for former Warsaw Pact Slates to meet the economic and 
political standards of the European Union, the West must do something to 
reassure these states about their prospects of being fully integrated into the 
West. So NATO must provide a political and security anchor to these countries to 
the West. 
Fourth, advocates of NATO expansion, claimed that taking steps to bring 
Yisegrad states of Hungary, Czeck Republic, Slovakia into the Alliance would 
help to dampen aggressive nationalism and promote democracy in the region. 
There is nothing wrong with inertia so long as its keeps the object moving 
in the right direction, and few would deny that continuously solidarity and 
cooperation between the United States and the Nations of Europe remains an 
unexceptional goal. It might be argued that a military alliance is no longer a 
military threat, but it should be remembered that NATO was not just a military 
alliance in the first place. Today the threat that made its members emphasize 
their obligations under Article 5 at the expense of those under Article 2 no 
longer exists. So far as Article 2 is concerned, there is no reason why the 
membership of the Alliance should not be indefinitely extended, and the more 
widely the better. Who could possibly object to "the further development of 
peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well-
being"? If that were all that was involved the partners could extend their family 
indefinitely and rub along forever. Even the obligations undertaken under Article 
5, the regard an armed attack against one or more of the members as an attack 
against them all, are not especially rigorous: all that the parties undertake to 
assist the parties so attacked is to take "such action as [they] deem necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain international peace and 
161 
security", What action is deemed necessary is left to the discretion of each party, 
and armed forces is seen only as a possible option. 
As the allies developed this comprehensive framework to reconcile 
contending interests and ensure NATO's relevance for the 21" century, they 
began realizing that their plans for the future v^ rere mocked by the reality of war 
in Bosnia. They had treated Bosnia and Herzegovina as backwater, lying beyond 
the formal NATO treaty area, lacking in interest for all but a few of them, and 
clearly contained within its remote comer of the Balkans. That analysis proved 
unsound. As the moral and political implications of war and atrocity intruded on 
public attention, the allies came to see that NATO could achieve little else 
unless it also stopped the Bosnia war. They were finally impelled to use military 
force in the successful air campaign of August - September 1995 when they 
understood that allied credibility and political support for the broader security 
agenda demanded intervention in Europe's only open conflict. Responding 
decisively to ethnic conflict thus became an added NATO mission. 
A prime one was that active diplomacy needed military backing to be 
effective. NATO had provided that instrument. Without NATO's support, the UN 
could simply not have enforced the Adriatic embargo or the No-Fly Zone over 
Bosnia. UNPROFOR personnel would not have the protection afforded by NATO 
air power as they carried out humanitarian and related peacekeeping tasks in 
threatening circumstances. The UN could not handle by itself the ever-
increasing demand in the fields of crisis prevention and conflict resolution. 
There is no doubt that close cooperation between the UN and organizations such 
as NATO will be increasingly important in the future. The Western powers 
backed by NATO's military capabihty, finally succeeded in stopping the killing 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. 
In a vary real sense, a Bosnia that had almost destroyed the alliances 
proved its salvation. The alliance's actions in Bosnia brought every element of its 
future into play. Its military commands were reconfigured in particular to deploy 
combat forces through the Implementation Force, then the Stabilization Force, 
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now the European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia learned new political-military 
duties of peace making. Built relations with the U.N. and Non governmental 
organizations and integrated operations in space and air, at sea and land. 
With military success in Bosnia and its new security architecture in 
place, by 1997 NATO was finally ready to decide which central European 
countries should be asked to joined. Three countries of Hungary, Poland and 
Czech Republic were chosen at the Madrid summit on a compound of several 
criteria. 
NATO needs to take steps to ensure that old, new, and prospective 
members live to its political standards, thereby securing the organization's 
coherence and relevance. If NATO is truly dedicated to protecting democracy 
human rights, and the rule of law, its own membership cannot be exempt from 
upholding those principles. The golden ring of NATO membership has certainly 
served as a powerful incentive for internal reform and modernization throughout 
central and eastern Europe. 
For many months in 1998, the allies temporized in the face of conflict and 
atrocity in Kosovo, as they has earlier done with Bosnia. Kosovo did present 
special problems it was part of sovereign stale, not independent; the U.N. 
Security Council has not asked NATO to act; and allies differed about the 
desirable outcome of the crises. Most insisted that the ambition of Kosovar 
Albanians be limited to some form of autonomy with few prepared to accept 
independence for Kosovo. Nevertheless, in October, 1998, NATO decided to use 
airpower to Serbian assaults, based on each ally's judgment of the legal basis for 
doing so, but most allies were relieved that a cease-fire agreement obviated the 
need to act. In February, 1999, however, renewed fighting and Serb atrocities 
required NATO to confront its responsibilities again. This time, before the 
alliance's resolve could be tested, the parties to conflict agreed to bargain at an 
Anglo-French peace conference at Rambouillet, France. The alliance did 
undertake to provide an implementation force if peace were achieved, structured 
along the lines of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. After the collapse of 
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negotiations and a major Serb military assault on Kosovo, NATO finally agreed to 
redeem its pledges to act. 
Serbia's decision to end the war over Kosovo is treated by many as a 
capitulation. The peace deal was however, very different from the Rambouillel 
draft accords, Yugoslavia's rejection of which in March 1999, had provided the 
occasion for NATO's attack. NATO officials do not like to acknowledge these 
differences. They have a logic to paint the outcome of the war as a complete 
victory - more than ample reward for the preceding eleven weeks of military 
effort and political stress. And there is little doubt that NATO achieved more of 
its objectives in this war than did the Serbs. But the Serbs did not come away 
with nothing. The peace deal leaves open the possibility of a continued Serb 
political struggle for Kosovo. It attenuates the very real possibility opened by the 
terms of the Rambouillet accords that NATO would use its new presence in 
Kosovo to push for further demands on Serbia. Milosevic can claim credit for 
these changes with his nationalist supporters; he can also claim that he did not 
give in without a hard fight. In contrast to the terms of the Rambouillet accords, 
the Serbs achieved five gains. 
First, the UN rather than NATO is the overarching political authority in 
Kosovo. Thus Serbia now has two friendly great powers - Russia and China -
with influence over Kosovo's political future. 
Second, the legitimate political consolidation of Kosovo's independence 
may prove impossible. 
Third, the UN resolution is slightly more respectful of the "sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yougoslavia" with reference to 
Kosovo than was the Rambouillet document, though this is a subtle and perhaps 
debatable point. Fourth, the presence of Russian troops in Kosovo must be 
counted a Serb gain. Although Russian peace keepers may well have been 
deployed had Serbia accepted the Rambouillet plan, this was not to assume once 
that the UN became the overarching political authority in Kosovo, it would have 
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been very difficult for NATO to legitimately block the presence of Russian 
troops, even though NATO was the designated military presence. 
Fifth, the built in ability of the Rambouillet accords to lead to further 
NATO military interventions against Serbia has been eliminated. The strange 
clause of the Rambouillet accords (Appendix b, paragraph 8), tacked on late in 
the negotiations, that would have given NATO troops the freedom to operate 
anywhere in Yugoslavia was gone. 
Since the NATO victory and the withdrawal of all Serb police and 
Yugoslav troops in June 1999, Kosovo has been occupied by the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR)-42,000 troops dominated by NATO - and theoretically governed by the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), UN Resolution 1244, which 
formally ended the war, recognizes Yugoslav sovereignty while instructing 
UNMIK to establish the institutions of 'substantial autonomy and self 
government' within Yugoslavia, 'pending a final settlement'. NATO and Russia 
say that independence is, therefore, out of the question. However, the Albanians 
of Kosovo will never accept any kind of Yugoslav rule. 
Contention centered on the very concepts of self-government and 
'substantial autonomy'. While these concepts were perceived by the international 
administration as it key policy objectives, they meant very little to Albanians or 
Serbs. Both sides continued to pursue their completing objectives; secession and 
independence for the Kosovo Albanians; and preservation of Yugoslav 
sovereignty and return to rule from Belgrade for the Serbs. Thus, any policy 
decision undertaken by the international administration towards self-government 
and substantial autonomy was constructed by the local rivals as a move towards 
independence, and any decision appearing to preserve Yugoslav sovereignty, as 
a move away from independence and towards the reintegration of Kosovo into 
Yugoslavia. 
The main cause from optimism, however, is that the international 
administration now enjoys the confidence of both sides, a marked contrast to 
summer 1999, when UNMIK and KFOR were received as liberators by the 
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Kosovo Albanians and as an occupying force by the Serbs. The Serbs, both in 
Kosovo and Belgrade, are now prepared to cooperate - not merely by out of 
pragmatism but also because they believe that the international administration 
can be an impartial and constructive player. The positive relationship 
establishment by the new regime in Belgrade with the major international actors 
in Kosovo has been a significant help. The Kosovo Albanians continue lo 
maintain a high degree of confidence in the international administration and are 
largely convinced that the international community will not allow Kosovo lo fall 
under Serb rule again 
The conflict between Milosevic and the rest of the international 
community was at its very essence a conflict between two visions of Europe one 
vision-Milosevic's vision - is of a Europe of nationalism, authoritarianism and 
xenophobia; of a past that nobody should want to visit. The other vision - the 
vision of NATO Allies, E U members states and many Partner countries - is that 
of integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism. In short, the Euro-Atlantic 
community of the future. 
Kosovo is now one of the most difficult and complex issues, not only for 
the Balkans but, with its wider implications, especially, for the UN and European 
Union and, to some extent, for the USA and NATO. The FRY was transformed 
into the Association of the two States of Serbia and Montenegro. The 
Constitutional Charter of this new association treats Kosovo as a part of Serbia. 
The Situation in Kosovo and around remains as complex as ever, due lo 
the opposing positions of both sides Serbia and Kosovo Albanians. In the 
international community, divergent voices are heard on the future of Kosovo. The 
prevailing thinking, especially in UN and EU, seems to be that it is still too early 
to try and determine the final status of Kosovo. They feel that before discussing 
the final status of Kosovo, first certain conditions should be created. These 
include among others, the return of refugees and freedom of movement for all and 
a situation of security for Serbs and other non-Albanian ethnical groups. One of 
the arguments against the independence of Kosovo is that, it could lead to the 
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changing of borders, which is against basic provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 
1975. However, the borders in the Balkans are practically fixed since the 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia. 
Kosovo's international status is strange in that although it is formally a 
province of the Republic of Serbia, actual administration is presently conducted 
by the United Nations with no involvement on the part of the Serbian 
governments (under Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999; The 
government of the province is the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). Under the terms of the Kumanovo agreement and subsequent 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo War, security is 
provided by the Kosovo Force, (KFOR), which is led by NATO and is answerable 
to UNMIK. 
The Albanians reject Serbian sovereignty, most Kosovo Albanians also do 
not believe that the Serbian side will respect Albanian rights. On the other side 
Serbia is adamantly opposed to the independence of Kosovo and for historical 
and religions reasons continues to see the province as the heartland of Serbian 
culture. The international community is reluctant to see Kosovo become 
independent, as its independence without Serbia's consent would violate 
international law (The principles of territorial integrity and noninterference in 
internal affairs). It could also potentially provide a precedent for the secession of 
the Republika Srpska from Bosnia, which could re-ignite the war in thai 
country. The most likely outcome is the indefinite continuation of the current 
situation (with EU institutions taking over the roles of UN and NATO, a process 
which can be observed in present-day Bosnia). 
The Suggestions to the Kosovo problem can be considered as follows: 
1. Independence of Kosovo - For the'time being this option does not look 
realistic or promising, not only because of the Serbian resistance, but also 
it seems that the international community (UN, EU, USA) is not, as yet, 
inclined to accept such a solution. 
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2. Return to Serbia under its Sovereignty - Such solution seems at llie 
moment also unlikely and the international community might not be 
willing to impose it. 
3. Continuation of the present status - in the absence of a final solution, this 
option might be necessary. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the UN would 
be ready to play its role through UNMIK much longer. They may prefer to 
ultimately hand Kosovo over to the EU. 
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